Rationality is not masculine

johneffay

Well-known member
echo-friendly said:
what is gained by this concept of the political, apart from a novel
and perplexing way of saying "everything"?

Sorry, I'm not going to bite as I'm really not interested in watching you engage in yet another round of dismissive attempted point scoring, whilst refusing to engage in anything which even resembles mutual discussion.
 

&catherine

Well-known member
echo-friendly said:
so what your first example boils down to is in fact a
tautology.

What's that Nietzsche quote that I always think of?

"If (man) will not be satisfied with truth in the form of tautology, that is to say, if he will not be content with empty husks, then he will always exchange truths for illusions."
 
I would be intrigued if there's anyone out there willing to defend the thesis that a more 'feminine' mode of argumentation/reasoning trumps a more 'masculine' one....anyone?
 

dominic

Beast of Burden
this is in response to john effay's question up above . . . . everything is political, if you take the heideggerian view that all relations to "what is" imply a particular understanding of "being," a particular table of values, a particular sense of direction, etc . . . . the political, in this grand sense, is about hierarchy, directionalities, etc . . . . likewise, plato or at least his socrates seems to hold that all persons subscribe to a particular view of the good, i.e., have a particular political predisposition or bent. but as this predisposition is unfolded, the semi-articulate view of the good made articulate, it may of course prove riven by contradiction . . . . however, your definition of the political is not about the fundamental predispositions that guide our actions and judgments (the heideggerrian/hegelian/platonic definition), but rather a physical, atomistic conception wherein every human work or action impinges on others. however, because contemplation lacks physical dimension, so long as it remains unwritten, contemplation is not political. at least, that's how i understand your position. but you again raise the conflict between the interests of philosophy and the interests of the political community. the philosopher who runs off like a hermit to the woods, or in the fashion of Nietzsche up to the mountain tops, is of course politically irresponsible. just as the nightlife denizen is politically irresponsible, and the abstract artist, etc, etc, etcetera. and yet these people find it to be in their interests to pursue their mode of living away and apart from the collective, the city, the community, even if at the end of the day they're dependent upon the collective for the necessities of life, the luxuries, and personal security. and so they devise tactics, or make use of prevailing practice, to get what they want and need (a privileged existence) without incurring the wrath of others. this they do by convincing others that their work has value to others, the value of the profound writing, the value of the beautiful painting. or they strike a kind a bargain wherein it is agreed that if you let the nightlife denizen have his vice, he'll let you have your religious quackery . . . . as for my position, it's nothing that i've ever tried to work out systematically or defend in any rigorous fashion, apart from half-hearted measures. but i take what i would call a "spatial" approach to defining the political, and the social, and the private. certain types of spaces or venues are appropriate for certain kinds of activities. and certain kinds of activities constitute certain kinds of space. for example, activities such as contemplation and sex occur in private because the glare of the public is destructive of their integrity or essence. and on the other hand, activities like sex or unbridled thought, if performed in public, would prove harmful to the essence of what is held in common, in public space . . . . and political activities define political or public space. the protest is constitutive of the public park, and the park is the appropriate venue for the protest. and published writings are political, though in a way that is more mediated. and the media is the abstract space that such writings constitute . . . . admittedly, this "spatial" approach to defining what is private, what social, what political tends to breakdown when confronted with such abstract, highly mediated space as print media, the internet, television, etcetera . . . . i'm afraid i don't have time to elaborate . . . . however, hannah arendt has elaborated on this theme at great length (which is not to say that i by any means agree with everything that arendt has to say)
 
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johneffay

Well-known member
I wouldn't want to say that my definition of the political was a 'physical, atomistic conception', rather that is a social one predicated upon power relations. Basically it would be an extension of the concept of man as political animal with a much more inclusive version of the Polis than Aristotle's. The aim would be to draw a distinction between social relations as practised by non-humans, and those of humans. The reason I would want to do this is to highlight the fact that so-called human social relations are in fact artificial and imposed via a hierarchical power structure. This is very important for areas such as disability theory.

The conflict would not be between philosophy and the political (I go along with DeleuzeGuattari when they say 'politics precedes Being'), but rather forms of mysticism which attempt to escape the from the social.

I agree with what you say about artists, 'nightlife denizens', etc. and I am convinced their life has meaning for others ;)
 
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