Mr BoShambles

jambiguous
On Pakistan today:

It's fucked because it must be fucked is about as far as I've got. ;)

Robert Kaplan in his 1994 article The Coming Anarchy argued much the same thing:

In Geography and the Human Spirit, Anne Buttimer, a professor at University College, Dublin, recalls the work of an early-nineteenth-century German geographer, Carl Ritter, whose work implied "a divine plan for humanity" based on regionalism and a constant, living flow of forms. The map of the future, to the extent that a map is even possible, will represent a perverse twisting of Ritter's vision. Imagine cartography in three dimensions, as if in a hologram. In this hologram would be the overlapping sediments of group and other identities atop the merely two-dimensional color markings of city-states and the remaining nations, themselves confused in places by shadowy tentacles, hovering overhead, indicating the power of drug cartels, mafias, and private security agencies. Instead of borders, there would be moving "centers" of power, as in the Middle Ages. Many of these layers would be in motion. Replacing fixed and abrupt lines on a flat space would be a shifting pattern of buffer entities, like the Kurdish and Azeri buffer entities between Turkey and Iran, the Turkic Uighur buffer entity between Central Asia and Inner China (itself distinct from coastal China), and the Latino buffer entity replacing a precise U.S.-Mexican border. To this protean cartographic hologram one must add other factors, such as migrations of populations, explosions of birth rates, vectors of disease. Henceforward the map of the world will never be static. This future map--in a sense, the "Last Map"--will be an ever-mutating representation of chaos.

The Indian subcontinent offers examples of what is happening. For different reasons, both India and Pakistan are increasingly dysfunctional. The argument over democracy in these places is less and less relevant to the larger issue of governability. In India's case the question arises, Is one unwieldy bureaucracy in New Delhi the best available mechanism for promoting the lives of 866 million people of diverse languages, religions, and ethnic groups? In 1950, when the Indian population was much less than half as large and nation-building idealism was still strong, the argument for democracy was more impressive than it is now. Given that in 2025 India's population could be close to 1.5 billion, that much of its economy rests on a shrinking natural-resource base, including dramatically declining water levels, and that communal violence and urbanization are spiraling upward, it is difficult to imagine that the Indian state will survive the next century. India's oft-trumpeted Green Revolution has been achieved by overworking its croplands and depleting its watershed. Norman Myers, a British development consultant, worries that Indians have "been feeding themselves today by borrowing against their children's food sources."

Pakistan's problem is more basic still: like much of Africa, the country makes no geographic or demographic sense. It was founded as a homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent, yet there are more subcontinental Muslims outside Pakistan than within it. Like Yugoslavia, Pakistan is a patchwork of ethnic groups, increasingly in violent conflict with one another. While the Western media gushes over the fact that the country has a woman Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, Karachi is becoming a subcontinental version of Lagos. In eight visits to Pakistan, I have never gotten a sense of a cohesive national identity. With as much as 65 percent of its land dependent on intensive irrigation, with wide-scale deforestation, and with a yearly population growth of 2.7 percent (which ensures that the amount of cultivated land per rural inhabitant will plummet), Pakistan is becoming a more and more desperate place. As irrigation in the Indus River basin intensifies to serve two growing populations, Muslim-Hindu strife over falling water tables may be unavoidable.

"India and Pakistan will probably fall apart," Homer-Dixon predicts. "Their secular governments have less and less legitimacy as well as less management ability over people and resources." Rather than one bold line dividing the subcontinent into two parts, the future will likely see a lot of thinner lines and smaller parts, with the ethnic entities of Pakhtunistan and Punjab gradually replacing Pakistan in the space between the Central Asian plateau and the heart of the subcontinent.


Depressing stuff and yet strangely compelling me thinks...
 
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Gavin

booty bass intellectual
People of dissensus, I am genuinely surprised by the lack of interest in this thread. The institutional approach to political economy discussed here is a fairly new and exciting framework for analysing social interaction, and the incentives and constraints which shape social/political/economic continuity and change. This is fascinating stuff IMO and I am curious to know what people think of it. Gavin, Gek, Zhao, Crackerjack and anyone else --> what do you say??

Sorry, I've been very busy since the new academic quarter started, and barely got through Vimothy's homework for me on the other thread... Because I'm such an econ novice, I like to give myself plenty of time to read carefully and think; right now, I've got to devote most of my reading time to what I'm lecturing on.
 

Mr BoShambles

jambiguous
Sorry, I've been very busy since the new academic quarter started, and barely got through Vimothy's homework for me on the other thread... Because I'm such an econ novice, I like to give myself plenty of time to read carefully and think; right now, I've got to devote most of my reading time to what I'm lecturing on.

No worries, let us know your thoughts when you get the chance :)
 
N

nomadologist

Guest
Brilliant post Vim - summed it up perfectly. Any political system is inherently flawed since as you say:

Democracy is clearly the best system we have yet discovered to organise societies with big populations. By big I mean anything beyond very small-scale groups which can plausibly organise along autonomous non-hierarchical lines (if indeed this has ever truly existed -- zhao: you are the expert on primitive hunter-gatherer societies).

Well, to be honest, the first part of this post turned me off to this thread and I figured I'd leave it to the people who are super-interested in this sort of writing on economics. I agree that all political systems have inherent flaws, or at very least loopholes that people will find and exploit. I don't think it's at all "clear", however, that democracy (at least as it's been practiced in reality versus in theory) has been the best system of political organization in all of history. In theory, I agree that it is a wonderful system, but in reality just as much bloodshed and corruption has taken place in the name of democracy as did in name of the majority of systems that have existed throughout history. Of course, there have been worse systems (Stalinism), but there have been better ones as well (Greek ir "Athenian"/direct democracy, for example, was better American democracy is. Hunter-gatherer/matriarchal tribal society was hands-down far preferable to either).

What's more, I think that when people talk about democracy being the best system of political organization, they really mean to say that they favor democracy PLUS a free market economy. I don't believe that one necessitates the other, and I think democracy would operate "better" (in a way that benefited more people rather than thriving on class stratification) in the absence of free market capitalism.

I really do think hunter-gatherer societies are the "ideal" system of sustainable human living and that it would be best for our species in the long-run to be forced to return to this way of living.
 
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nomadologist

Guest
And the implications of Bueno de Mesquita's work are that it necessarily does this and in fact all aid ends up oppressing people in recipient countries by providing autocrats with the revenue to buy their constituents the goods they need to stay in power.

I would tend to agree with this, but I'd have to read more of Mesquita's work to know for sure whether I agree with him in the particulars.
 
N

nomadologist

Guest
What usually bugs me about most of these political and economic discussions is how (I feel) the territory itself is so deeply embedded in an ontological (or perhaps just anthropological) framework that is hopelessly compromised. Even engaging with ideas that originate from these regions is to give undue credence to paradigms and trajectories that I have little affection for.

Agree with this, as well.

Terms like "selectorate" and "winning coalition", though they seem useful and sound in describing a process that already exists, are being used here in such a way that they're supposed to be examples that prove that the phenomena they describe are inherently "good" and "superior" to other potential processes or systems. The way that a selectorate or winning coalition works sure has a lot of potential to be part of a wonderful, just, and glorious system of government, but the problem I have with the way they work in the U.S. is that a situation has been created due to wider circumstances in which the selectorate and winning coalition simply can't operate as fairly as they could operate under different circumstances. Specifically circumstances in which the candidates the selectorate had to choose from were actually interested in running in order to effect change on the level of policy, and weren't simply part of an American aristocracy.

This isn't to say selectorates and winning coaltions are *bad*, just that they way they are forced to work in American democracy does not at all support the assumption that democracy is "clearly" a superior form of government. If special-interest groups didn't exist, you might have a stronger point...
 

Mr BoShambles

jambiguous
Fair enough Nomad, but when I said
The way I see is that its all about pragmatism. Not idealism.

it was this kind of argument I had in mind:

I really do think hunter-gatherer societies are the "ideal" system of sustainable human living and that it would be best for our species in the long-run to be forced to return to this way of living.

What good is this kind of idealistic reasoning to the billions of people in the world who are (1)living in poverty; (2) governed by corrupt regimes; and (3) pretty much devoid of hope for positive change since the existing institutional framework in these societies is setup to reward rent-seeking, patronage and thus poor economic policies?

Furthermore, as aluded to up thread and in numerous others, hunter-gatherer type social organisation is patently not possible today - save for the few exisiting tribes who remain in isolation from everyone else - given (1) the huge population (6 Billion +); and (2) with the high birth rates found in many of the poorest parts of the world which mean that this population is expected to continue growing at phenomenal rates.
 
N

nomadologist

Guest
Fair enough Nomad, but when I said


it was this kind of argument I had in mind:



What good is this kind of idealistic reasoning to the billions of people in the world who are (1)living in poverty; (2) governed by corrupt regimes; and (3) pretty much devoid of hope for positive change since the existing institutional framework in these societies is setup to reward rent-seeking, patronage and thus poor economic policies?

Furthermore, as aluded to up thread and in numerous others, hunter-gatherer type social organisation is patently not possible today - save for the few exisiting tribes who remain in isolation from everyone else - given (1) the huge population (6 Billion +); and (2) with the high birth rates found in many of the poorest parts of the world which mean that this population is expected to continue growing at phenomenal rates.

Right, well, I do think that even if my ideal system of social organization isn't 100% feasible at the moment, there are still alternatives to our current system that might slowly start to eradicate poverty, at least in the first world. I think we should start in our own backyard and work our way outward on that front. I also think that the positive points about our current system don't justify the abuses and the negative points, and that we should always be actively engaged in trying to progress toward a better system and the solution to problematic points (policies, laws, corruption, etc.)
 

gek-opel

entered apprentice
sending aid money, as demonstrated above, is pretty ineffectual in its current format; in fact in many cases its counterproductive since it reinforces the current status quo.

Absolutely- and not only that but immorally extracted. Charity is repulsive.

Also- that Pakistan will fall apart is a fact widely agreed upon amongst Pakistani friends of mine...

"Democracy" I take this to mean a form of occasional public votes for "the winning coalition"-- which has shades of the "dominant faction" from Hegel's analysis of the French revolution (within the situation of political terror and the innate lack of legitimacy under their own concept which any government must face, within the Phenomenology Of Spirit)...
 
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nomadologist

Guest
the Phenomenology Of Spirit)...

I'm starting to feel like I should re-read this. I remember disliking it quite a bit, and it keeps coming up here and elsewhere to the point where I don't think it could possibly be as bad as I thought it was at the time.
 

gek-opel

entered apprentice
Its by turns brilliant, opaque, and downright infuriating, and has massive holes in some of the "transitions" between sections, but its an unavoidable beast. Read the bit on "life" for eerily proto-Deleuzian vitalism.
 

vimothy

yurp
Good to see some debate on this!

I have been reading a paper from the summer 2003 Journal of Economic Perspectives by William Easterly, “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?” It seems that it cannot, or at least, that it has not. (Two things: this is just at first scan; and I would be interested to find out how influential and / or cited (not necessarily the same thing) this paper is). Let me try to summarise:

Easterly addresses a previous paper by Burnside and Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth”, that he identifies as being behind a powerful consensus on foreign aid around the turn of the millennium, which did indeed find a positive correlation between “aid”, “good policy” and “economic growth”. The problem, demonstrated by Easterly, is that we can pick different definitions for those variables, and find some very different outcomes from the regression models.

First, Easterly cites one of his previous papers, which actually uses the same specifications as Burnside and Dollar, yet expands the data set with information that has become available since. They found, contra Burnside and Dollar, that, “the coefficient on the crucial interaction term between aid and policy was insignificant in the expanded sample including new data, indicating no support for the conclusion that “aid works in a good policy environment.””

Next, Easterly shows how, even using the same data set as Dollar and Burnside, the model is flawed and gives little indication that there is a positive role for aid in a good policy environment. Burnside and Dollar define “aid” only in terms of its grant component, but Easterly argues convincingly that aid should also include, as per the standard OECD definition, forgiveness of past loans as current aid, since the net effect is liquidity assistance to governments in need of it. “But using this alternative definition, the interactive terms with aid and policy is no longer statistically significant, not even at a 10 percent level in the Burnside-Dollar policy specification and country sample.”

Next, the paper examines the definition of “good policy”. Burnside and Dollar’s model uses three variables, “budget surplus, the inflation rate and a measure of the openness of an economy developed by Sachs and Warner”, excluding all other variables, to predict growth. However, the Sachs and Warner variable is a “dummy-variable” with a value of either one or zero. An economy is closed if it has high tariff barriers or high non-tariff barriers or state monopolies of key exports or a high black market premium or if it is socialist. As well as being simplistic, it is also subjective. Instead, Easterly proposes a measure of economic openness that uses the black market premium, financial depth (M2 against GDP, i.e. liquidity versus productivity), and trade-to-GDP ratio.

When tested under regression models, all three variants correlated significantly with economic growth. However, “the interactive term of aid and good policy was no longer statistically significant in any of the alternative definitions of the policy index.”

Finally, Easterly considers the definition of “growth”. Burnside and Dollar define growth as real per capita GDP growth over four years. However, such an arbitrarily small period might not necessarily capture the full measure of growth over the business cycle. Easterly states that most of the literature looks at growth over much longer periods. Holding the Burnside and Dollar data set constant and but looking at it in continuous periods of “eight, 12 and 24 years, respectively, for averages of “aid,” “policies” and “growth”,” Easterly finds that,

In the 12-year and 24-year specifications, the policy variable remains positively and significantly correlated with economic growth. However, the coefficient on the interaction term between aid and policy no longer enters significantly for periods of 12 years and for the pure cross-section of 24 years. The coefficient remains significant when using an eight-year period if the sample includes all developing countries, but not when the sample is restricted to low-income countries (where aid should presumably be more important).​
Therefore, it would seem that the empirical evidence that aid can work with good policy to promote economic growth is weak, and depends heavily on creative data selection and unreliable definitions of terms. Perhaps this isn’t surprising in light of Bueno de Mesquita, who predicts that aid to bad governments will reduce public goods provision in favour of more private goods provision. (And not forgetting Milton Friedman, who said that, “it is impossible to do good with other people’s money”). Can we see this? Does aid cause bad policy, to any significant degree? Also, I’m still interested in conditional aid. I wonder what happens when you include conditionalities in the regressions. Is conditionality statistically significant? Does it predict whether aid and good policy can produce growth? Are there any other key variables that we should consider? What role do institutions play? Is “good policy” an institutional variable? Does “good policy” correlate with good institutions, or should we use a different measure? If “good policy” does not correlate with good institutions, what are the effects of aid on institutional development and how should we measure this? Furthermore, if “good policy” does not correlate with good institutions, does institutional quality predict whether aid and good policy can produce growth?
 

Mr BoShambles

jambiguous
A good summary of the 'effectiveness of aid' debate:

The influence of Easterly’s work has been equaled only by a series of papers and reports that use cross-country evidence to study how globalization affects poverty in countries with and without good policies. The paper by Craig Burnside and David Dollar published in the American Economic Review in 2000, “Aid, policies, and growth,” has currently 743 cites according to Google Scholar. Contrary to Easterly’s arguments, this paper, which argues that aid is effective in countries with good policies, has become the orthodoxy for those who are in favor of aid, and is cited in many prominent Bank documents. Dollar’s widely cited (893 cites on GS) paper with Aart Kraay on “Growth is good for the poor,” needs neither abstract nor summary. Another paper by Dollar and Kraay, in the Economic Journal in 2004, argues that countries that used large tariff cuts to open their trade to the beneficial effects of globalization have seen more poverty reduction than those that have not. Many of these arguments are brought together in a 2001 Policy Research Report on Globalization, growth, and poverty written by Dollar and Paul Collier. All of this work has had an enormous influence on the intellectual debates about globalization and poverty reduction and, to many around the world, it is seen as defining the World Bank’s position on these issues, as well as establishing the Bank’s intellectual leadership in the globalization debate.

The panel agrees that this provocative research program has set out some stimulating research questions, and applauds the Banks initial efforts. At the same time, however, we see a serious failure in the checks and balances within the system that has led to Bank to repeatedly trumpet these early empirical results without recognizing their fragile and tentative nature. As we shall argue, much of this line of research appears to have such deep flaws that, at present, the results cannot be regarded as remotely reliable, much as one might want to believe the results. There is a deeper problem here than simply a wrong assessment of provocative new research results. The problem is that in major Bank policy speeches and publications, it proselytized the new work without appropriate caveats on its reliability.

Unfortunately, as one reads the research more carefully, and as new results come in, it is becoming clear that the Bank seriously over-reached in prematurely putting its globalization, aid and poverty publications on a pedestal. Nor has it corrected itself to this day. We wish to emphasize that we, too, believe that countries with good policies and institutions are far more likely to benefit from aid than, say, countries with deep corruption and poor governance where aid can delay reform rather than enhancing it. There is a strong theoretical presumption in favor of this commonsense dictum. However, it is very unclear empirically where the line can be drawn, or which policies matter, and in our view, the jury is very much still out on any quantitative assessment of the issue. Nor does the panel challenge the Bank’s need to mount strong arguments in favor of its policies. Our problems are with the way that Bank research was used in the process, given the great credibility attached to what the Bank says.


[My emphasis added]

Read the rest of this article here.
 
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Mr BoShambles

jambiguous
From the introduction to this report - Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show? by Rajan and Subramanian:

One of the most enduring and important questions in economics is whether foreign aid helps countries grow. There is a moral imperative to this question: it is a travesty for so many countries to remain poor if a relatively small transfer of resources from rich countries could set them on the path to growth. In fact, in the Millennium Declaration adopted in 2000, world leaders state, “We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently subjected” and they resolve “to grant more generous development assistance, especially to countries that are genuinely making an effort to apply their resources to poverty reduction.” As a result, the effort is on to mobilize billions of dollars of aid to help poor countries, especially those with good policies and institutions.

Yet, the question of whether aid helps poor countries grow in a sustained way is still mired in controversy. In this paper, we will re-examine (yet again!) whether aid leads to growth. Motivated by the finding in this paper that there is little evidence of a robust impact of aid on growth, Rajan and Subramanian (2005) examine why it might be so difficult to find a significant positive impact. In other words, it searches for factors that might thwart aid from having a positive impact on long-run growth.

What does this paper add to the voluminous literature on aid effectiveness? Essentially two things. First, as is well recognized, aid flows are influenced by a country’s situation. Aid may go to those countries in the midst of a natural disaster – which would explain a negative correlation between aid and growth. It may also go those who have used it well in the past – implying, if growth is persistent, there will be a positive correlation between aid and growth. Since neither of these relationships is causal, it is important to isolate the exogenous component of aid. While a number of prior studies have attempted to “instrument” aid, we believe, for reasons explained below, that our methodology adds some value, despite limitations, which we discuss below.

Second, the cross-country aid-growth literature typically focuses on one aspect of the relationship. Burnside and Dollar (2000), for example looked at the impact of aid conditional on policy. Hansen and Tarp (2001) examine the relationship in a panel framework, and most recently with a focus on aid’s impact conditional on geography. Recently, Clemens et. al. (2004) disaggregate aid into so-called short- and long-impact aid. A second contribution of this paper is to test the general validity of the aid-growth relationship. That is, we test, under one framework, the robustness of the relationship across time horizons (medium and long run) and periods (1960s through 1990s), sources of aid (multilateral and bilateral), types of aid (economic, social, food, etc.), timing of impact of aid (short-term versus long-term), specifications (cross-section and panel), and samples.

Thus, despite lying squarely in the tradition of cross-country growth regressions with all its well-known shortcomings (see Rodrik, 2005), our objective is to lay out in a transparent and structured manner the different ways of looking at the aid-growth relationship so that particular claims about it can be evaluated. In some ways, therefore, this paper is an attempt at encompassing, or rather generalizing, past work on aid and growth. It seeks to answer the question, “even though the cross-country regression framework may be flawed, what does it really tell us about the impact of aid on growth?”


*******

The whole thing looks like its worth reading but is very long!
 

Mr BoShambles

jambiguous
Therefore, it would seem that the empirical evidence that aid can work with good policy to promote economic growth is weak, and depends heavily on creative data selection and unreliable definitions of terms. Perhaps this isn’t surprising in light of Bueno de Mesquita, who predicts that aid to bad governments will reduce public goods provision in favour of more private goods provision. (And not forgetting Milton Friedman, who said that, “it is impossible to do good with other people’s money”). Can we see this? Does aid cause bad policy, to any significant degree? Also, I’m still interested in conditional aid. I wonder what happens when you include conditionalities in the regressions. Is conditionality statistically significant? Does it predict whether aid and good policy can produce growth? Are there any other key variables that we should consider? What role do institutions play? Is “good policy” an institutional variable? Does “good policy” correlate with good institutions, or should we use a different measure? If “good policy” does not correlate with good institutions, what are the effects of aid on institutional development and how should we measure this? Furthermore, if “good policy” does not correlate with good institutions, does institutional quality predict whether aid and good policy can produce growth?

I think the conclusion of the Rajan and Subramanian peice goes someway to answering (some of) your questions Vim:

Our central conclusion is there is no robust positive relationship between aid and growth in the cross-section, and this despite the fact that our instrumenting strategy corrects for the biasin conventional (ordinary least squares) estimation procedures of finding a negative impact of aid on growth. This conclusion holds across:
• time horizons;
• time periods;
• types of aid distinguished by:

o what they are used for (economic, social, food, etc.);
o who gives it (multilateral donors, bilateral donors etc.);
o who it is given to (those with good policies and institutions and others);
o who it is given to (those in the tropics and outside); and
o how long it takes to impact (short and long impact).

[...]

One implication may simply be that the entire enterprise of running cross-country growth regressions may be plagued by noise in the data, which makes it hard to establish any relationship even if they actually exist. This possibility is strengthened by a simple theoretical exercise, which suggests that the effects of aid on growth are likely to be positive but much smaller than suggested by previous studies. If noise in the data plague all findings, then strong claims about aid effectiveness (or equally, on aid ineffectiveness) based on crosscountry evidence are unwarranted, and aid policies that rely on such claims should be reexamined.

If noise is not the entire explanation (there are robust findings in the cross-country growth literature, such as the importance of institutions and policies for growth), one has to ask that aspects of aid offset what must be the indisputable growth enhancing effects of resource transfers. We then have to move away from the traditional cross-sectional analysis, and focus on more direct evidence of the channels through which aid might help or hinder growth. Such further research is essential to improve aid effectiveness. We attempt some answers in Rajan and Subramanian (2005).

In sum, there are two important implications of our findings. First, it should be stressed that our findings, which relate to the past, do not imply that aid cannot be beneficial in the future. But they do suggest that for aid to be effective in the future, the aid apparatus (in terms of how aid should be delivered, to whom, in what form, and under what conditions) will have to be rethought. Second, our findings force us to ask what aspects of aid offset what ought to be the indisputable growth enhancing effects of resource transfers. Understanding the hindrances is essential to any effort to making aid more effective. Thus, our findings support efforts under way at national and international levels to improve aid effectiveness.


[my emphasis added]
 

vimothy

yurp
It's also pretty clear that I need to read some Game Theory. Does anyone with a knowledge base have any recommendations for an entry level text?
 

vimothy

yurp
Props to Mr BoShambles for the leg work!

I guess then we need to audit recipient country's books, and censure governments who abuse aid. (Collier's Chad example is nearly beyond belief, BTW). And maybe be more honest about calling a bribe, a bribe.
 

vimothy

yurp
Terms like "selectorate" and "winning coalition", though they seem useful and sound in describing a process that already exists, are being used here in such a way that they're supposed to be examples that prove that the phenomena they describe are inherently "good" and "superior" to other potential processes or systems. The way that a selectorate or winning coalition works sure has a lot of potential to be part of a wonderful, just, and glorious system of government, but the problem I have with the way they work in the U.S. is that a situation has been created due to wider circumstances in which the selectorate and winning coalition simply can't operate as fairly as they could operate under different circumstances. Specifically circumstances in which the candidates the selectorate had to choose from were actually interested in running in order to effect change on the level of policy, and weren't simply part of an American aristocracy.

Surely this is the exact opposite of what Bueno de Mesquita means. The fact is, is that, according to his model of political economy, the only difference between dictatorship and democracy is the sizes of the two governing institutions, i.e. the only difference is in the sizes of the selectorate and winning coalition. "The way that a selectorate or winning coalition works," if Bueno de Mesquita is correct, has almost zero "potential to be part of a wonderful, just, and glorious system of government," merely a relatively superior system of government to regimes with smaller selectorates and smaller winning coalitions.

This isn't to say selectorates and winning coaltions are *bad*, just that they way they are forced to work in American democracy does not at all support the assumption that democracy is "clearly" a superior form of government. If special-interest groups didn't exist, you might have a stronger point...

:rolleyes: -- have you even read the initial post?
 
N

nomadologist

Guest
Surely this is the exact opposite of what Bueno de Mesquita means. The fact is, is that, according to his model of political economy, the only difference between dictatorship and democracy is the sizes of the two governing institutions, i.e. the only difference is in the sizes of the selectorate and winning coalition. "The way that a selectorate or winning coalition works," if Bueno de Mesquita is correct, has almost zero "potential to be part of a wonderful, just, and glorious system of government," merely a relatively superior system of government to regimes with smaller selectorates and smaller winning coalitions.

If this is true, whence all the talk about democracy being the "best" system in the world?

:rolleyes: -- have you even read the initial post?

Yes, and I disagree with it.
 

vimothy

yurp
Towards a working hypothesis on Pakistan --

It's obvious that the army elite form part of Musharraf's winning coalition, and recieve private goods in a similar manner to the CP in the USSR. However, I suspect that for a country of Pakistan's size, the selectorate is also quite large (relative to states like North Korea or Iraq under Saddam -- and this would be one of the reasons why Pakistan is not such a hell-hole as both of those). The selectorate might also include important clerics, business leaders, judges and so forth. Perhaps it is the case that America's bribes for WoT friendly policies are not large enough, and so alienate the clerical selectorate, and possibly other aspects of the selectorate. Perhaps it is also the case that the increase in private goods provision has alienated the non-fundamentalist, relatively more secular, elements of the selectorate (not in the winning coalition, or in the coalition (?))....

Any thoughts?
 
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