Rolling Great Lakes region thread

scottdisco

rip this joint please
if anyone has any news, views about the interconnectedness of the DRC/Burundi/Rwanda etc., the ongoing monstrous tragedy in the area, things to say about something happening in one particular country in the region, or trans-national, it could be posted here.

(is this good 'form'? starting a thread about one region of the world when so many regions of the world suffer? older hands please let me know. i am sure we could all learn much from, to pick one example, say, a Chad/Sudan/CAR thread, for instance.)

to start off, here's Justice Africa Director Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem a few weeks ago on the subject of 'RWANDA vs FRANCE: Who is Trying Whom?'.
(doing a bit of a time-warp here, granted, but there was a little debate on this issue on another thread, so it seems reasonable to kick off with this.)

a couple of points from there to flag up, that should strike most as uncontroversial stuff re, specifically, the Rwandan genocide, and that get to the heart of some matters: (although if Ed Herman is reading, maybe not..)

Some of them are now overcompensating by pouring aid into Rwanda and also being too cautious or ashamed to lecture Kagame’s regime on democracy and human rights.

and

Instead of confessing its sins and demonstrating genuine remorse before asking for forgiveness, France is demanding absolution through judicial vendetta.
 

vimothy

yurp
Good idea and surely good form, scott!

Rwanda v. interesting from an IR perspective -- I wonder if I could tempt Mr BoShambles back...
 

crackerjack

Well-known member
is this good 'form'? starting a thread about one region of the world when so many regions of the world suffer?

Yes, definitely - rarely have so many deaths generated so little commnet.
 

Mr BoShambles

jambiguous
Rwanda v. interesting from an IR perspective -- I wonder if I could tempt Mr BoShambles back...

Tempted! I will post something substantial soon but to start:

Interesting peice by Paul Collier on the dangers of implementing (quasi)democratic elections in conflict or post-conflict environments.

And for those with a bit of time - this shortish journal article by Timothy Raeymaekers provides a fantastic (IMO) overview of the history and contemporary dynamics of the conflict in the DRC.

This article argues that a failure to acknowledge the evolution of Congo’s political system, together with an ambiguous utilization of political power-sharing as a strategy for conflict resolution, will likely lead to more conflict and state “collapse” in this Central African country. Rather than fostering a profound political “transition” as it is understood in international policy circles, the attempts at rebuilding the Congolese state will likely reconfirm the logic of the patrimonial state, while at the same time fostering different levels of institutional mediation. In the meantime, real governance continues to revolve around the structure of social relationships that directs and gives meaning to the day to-day lives of state and non-state actors and organizations alike.

In particular he does much to dispel the economic reductionism of the 'resource war' type accounts. He argues:

What was often forgotten in this economic perspective, however, was the profoundly political nature of Congo’s civil conflict. As Mats Berdal observes in a recent review essay, it is indeed hard to believe that civil conflicts after the Cold War simply involved the displacement of political and ideological agendas in favour of purely economic ones (Berdal, 2005). Considering the DR Congo’s unsettled (post-)colonial history, the longstanding conflict also undoubtedly involved the crucial issue of determining who or what could be accepted to exercise power in its changing political context; this discussion related both to actual socio-economic grievances and to competing ideas about the type of political and economic system that the country should have.
 

Mr BoShambles

jambiguous
And on Rwanda, I totally recommend the seminal peice by Regine Anderson entitled 'How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered The Conflict In Rwanda'. I can't find it free to download anywhere but for anyone who has access to JSTOR type electronic libraries, the article was published in Third World Quarterly, Vol 21, No 3.

In brief, she argues that in the years prior to the outbreak of the genocidal conflict in 1994, multiltateral development agencies promoted three seperate strategies in the country: (1) economic structural adjustment programmes; (2) a multi-party democratisation process; (3) a peace-negotiation process. These processes had "contradictory and mutually negating effects on each other, and... they in combination contributed to the weakening of the regime." So, what were largely well-intentioned strategies in the end triggered the conflict by aggravating insecurity amongst the political elite(s). Of course, ultimate responsibility for the massacres must lie with those who willingly picked up machetes and did the killing. But understanding the dynamics of the environment in which this took place is of huge value if such tradgedies are to be avoided now and in the future.
 

Mr BoShambles

jambiguous
The transnational nature of conflict in the Great Lakes region

According to this peice from the International Crisis Group (ICG), the DRC was the theatre for a truly regional war during the latter half of the 1990's which involved "a dozen African countries, either directly as combatants in the fighting, or indirectly as mediators in various peace initiatives." Troops - whether formal-government or informal-militia (and the distinction is often very blurred) - from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia were directly involved in war-fighting on Congolese territory. Since the 'official' end of that war - with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999 - a kind of not peace - not war situation has prevailed. Politico-ethnic fragmentation, low intensity conflict, population displacement, zones of warlord control etc have been the key characteristics. No one party exercises a monopoly on violence (legitimate or otherwise) and thus the territorial integrity of the DRC and its neighbours is highly questionable.

Processes of informal regionalisation are taking place which link influential individuals and groups within the region to outside interests. Transnational networks are proliferating, involving state departments / officials (within Africa and the ROTW), warlord mafias, private security firms, local businessmen, MNC's, and various other actors. In the political space created by a lack of centralised authority and legitimacy; these networks represent essentially illiberal regimes of regulation, accumulation and social control. In this kind of environment, war can be a very profitable activity. Indeed, there is no reason to assume that the aim of the various parties is ultimate victory over the others. War acts as a mechanism around which ongoing social (re)ordering can take place -i.e. how opportunities and resources are allocated, how identities are defined, whose rules/beliefs etc are to be followed.

Pretty grim i know :(
 

craner

Beast of Burden
When The Times met Bagosora, then a colonel, on Day 10 of the genocide, he claimed to be deploying the Rwandan Army to stop the killings, despite being surrounded by a smiling group of drunk militia leaders, many of whom wore bloodstained clothes.

One of those images that defines the thing, that.
 

Mr BoShambles

jambiguous
Hi Scott. Both those links illustrate the point i was making perfectly! The LRA are an informal militia group who began fighting in Uganda; were heavily involved in conflict in Southern Sudan; and are now operational in North-Eastern DRC precisely because this area is not under the control of any centralised authority. Even if there was a functioning central government in the DRC, look at a map of the Congo and you'll appreciate just how far removed the capital city Kinshasa is from the affected regions. Projecting power from Kinshasa across the whole territory that constitutes the DRC would involve a mammoth effort. Is it even possible?

The Rwandan genocide can be seen as the trigger event for the current situation in the DRC. In the aftermath of the genocide and the rise to power of the RPF, nearly two million Rwandan Hutu refugees accompanied by significant remnants of the Hutu militias (interhamwe) crossed the border into the eastern provinces of what was then Zaire, carrying the seeds of future conflict with them. The massive social trauma caused by this influx reinvigorated longstanding tensions in Kivu [Eastern Zaire/DRC], leading to the re-emergence of local militia groups that tried to defend a complex set of local interests, mostly regarding land. This had a profoundly destabilizing effect on the already weak governmental regime of President Mobuto and, as such, played a significant role in triggering the ensuing wars of 1996 and 1998 fought across Congolese territory - which (as i already mentioned) involved upto twelve African states and a wide variety of non-state forces – leading eventually to the distinegration of the nominal state of Zaire (now the DRC). Since then, the Tutsi dominated government (under Paul Kagame) in Rwanda has systemically involved itself in the politics across the border in Eastern DRC. While claiming 'national interest' in seeking to weed out the remnants of the Hutu militias, it motives are complex and definitely involve economic incentives - i.e the extraction of mineral wealth.
 

craner

Beast of Burden
This should be hitting UK bookshops soon; looks very good. Published by Hurst, who have a decent record on the Middle East and Africa. Very few good books on this topic. Too vast & murky, I suppose.
 

Mr BoShambles

jambiguous
And this. Prunier is either incredibly prolific - less than 1 month between publication dates - or these are one and the same book (except published under different titles and by different publishers which don't make much sense :confused:). Either way he's a well respected authority on the Great Lakes: should be an excellent read!
 

Mr BoShambles

jambiguous
Bit of both i reckon. Nkunda clearly has a lot to answer for and his incarceration should be welcomed. But then again the socio-political ramifications will be complex and may lead to more conflict - at least in the short-medium term.

The arrest of rebel leader Laurent Nkunda, coupled with a Rwandan-backed operation to disarm Hutu militia in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, might eventually help to restore peace to the region but also poses great risks for civilians, according to analysts.


Read the rest here. [Edit: article includes Pruniers assessment which ain't to good!]
 

Mr BoShambles

jambiguous
International Crisis Group (ICG) update on the situation in eastern DRC:

The Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda have struck a deal for military cooperation that risks a new escalation of combat in the eastern Congo and an even greater humanitarian crisis without assurances that it will solve the region’s political and security problems. Kigali and Kinshasa should immediately suspend their joint military operations until they define clearer military and political objectives for their new cooperation, work with the UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC) and humanitarian agencies to minimise the risk to civilians of any combat and develop a comprehensive strategy to foster disarmament of the Rwandan Hutu insurgents (FDLR).

Normalisation of relations between Rwanda and Congo is essential if the eastern Congo and the Great Lakes region as a whole are to be stabilised. The agreement under which Rwanda accepted to withdraw its support from the CNDP insurgency of renegade general Laurent Nkunda, and simultaneously press it to accept integration into the national army, while Kinshasa agreed to a major military strike on its territory by the Rwandan army against the successors of the 1994 genocidaires is an attempt to address a problem that has poisoned bilateral relations for fifteen years. It has already produced one immediate and welcome result: Nkunda’s replacement and subsequent arrest on 22 January. But the deal in its current form carries as many dangers as opportunities.

The deployment of up to 7,000 Rwandan troops in eastern Congo will not achieve its goals within two weeks, as claimed by the Congolese information minister. The FDLR has some 6,500 tough fighters spread over a territory four to five times the size of Rwanda itself. Rwandan and Congolese troops will have to track their enemy deep into North Kivu, far from their own bases, and rely on civilians for their daily supplies. The Rwandans will be viewed as an occupying force by communities that suffered atrocities in two regional wars in 1996-97 and 1998-2001. Clear benchmarks have to be established for withdrawal of the Rwandan troops, as well as precise objectives to determine when the operation has succeeded or failed and needs to be stopped.

Like the joint military strike against the Lord’s Resistance Army that Uganda, Congo and the South Sudan army launched in December, the operation is likely to achieve few concrete results other than to cause damage to civilians, in this case notably to Congolese Hutus, and to provoke the intended target into a new spasm of attacks on innocent communities. At the same time other armed groups and communities who resent Tutsi military domination may oppose the Rwandans and even collaborate with the FDLR. If there are ambushes by local armed groups and subsequent reprisals, already extremely tense inter-communal relations will worsen.....
 
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zhao

there are no accidents
thanks to everyone for the links and articles in this thread. i have worked my way through almost all of them, currently finishing the last, great comprehensive one. and any longer than cursory look at the congo inevitably brings up Rwanda 94... the following are probably familiar for people in this thread, but thought i'd put it here as background information.


interview where she describes the process of trying to get Washington, the UN, and various European nations to do something in April 1994:

What they wanted to avoid at all costs was taking the risk for Rwanda, which in the end might not be worth the effort, from their point of view. So it was perhaps not just hard-heartedness, indifference, racism -- all of those things which one could easily accuse them of. But it was perhaps also, I would hope -- maybe it's too idealistic -- but I hope maybe also a concern for preserving some freedom of action vis-a-vis the U.N. in the future that led them to take this very hard line against involvement in Rwanda...

On the weekend of April 16-17, the (genocidal Hutu) government decided to expand and intensify the genocide and to make it nationwide, to carry it into those regions which had thus far remained generally peaceful. Why then? Why did they decide? Perhaps because that was the point at which most of the foreigners had gone. Where the U.N., the Belgian troops were being pulled back, and where the U.N. force was-- It was being discussed that this force was going to be shrunk or removed altogether.

the complete study of the events in Rwanda, entitled Leave None to Tell the Story (not sure if it is a shortened version of the book of the same name?). from the introduction:

this genocide was not an uncontrollable outburst of rage by a people consumed by “ancient tribal hatreds.” Nor was it the preordained result of the impersonal forces of poverty and over-population.

This genocide resulted from the deliberate choice of a modern elite to foster hatred and fear to keep itself in power. This small, privileged group first set the majority against the minority to counter a growing political opposition within Rwanda. Then, faced with RPF success on the battlefield and at the negotiatingtable, these few powerholders transformed the strategy of ethnic division into genocide. They believed that the extermination campaign would restore the solidarity of the Hutu under their leadership and help them win the war, or at least improve their chances of negotiating a favorable peace.They seized control of the state and used its machinery and itsauthority to carry out the slaughter.

Policymakers in France, Belgium, and the United States and at the United Nations all knew of the preparations for massive slaughter and failed to take the steps needed to prevent it. Aware from the start that Tutsi were being targeted for elimination, the leading foreign actors refused to acknowledge the genocide. To have stopped the leaders and the zealots would have required military force; in the early stages, a relatively small force. Not only did international leaders reject this course, but they also declined for weeks to use their political and moral authority to challenge the legitimacy of the genocidal government. They refused to declare that a government guilty of exterminating its citizens would never receive international assistance. They did nothing to silence the radio that broadcast calls for slaughter. Such simple measures would have sapped the strength of the authorities bent on mass murder and encouraged Rwandan opposition to the extermination campaign.

When international leaders did finally voice disapproval, the genocidal authorities listened well enough to change their tactics although not their ultimate goal. Far from cause for satisfaction, this small success only underscores the tragedy: if timid protests produced this result in late April, what might have been the result in mid-April had all the world cried “Never again.”
 
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