Unconditionally supporting an unpopular military dictator tends to lead to all sorts of instability, which is then used to justify the continued support of the unpopular military dictator!How so? What should they have done that they didn't and what shouldn't they have done that they did?
I thought the consensus was it would be rigged sufficiently to keep Musharraf in power, with Bhutto providing enough of a democratic figleaf to make the whole debacle less embarrassing.This is pretty huge, wasn't Bhutto favored to win the election?
Musharraf was in power with or without US support. The alternative wasn't democracy, but ceding power to the even more pro-Islamist/pro-Taliban elements in the army*.Unconditionally supporting an unpopular military dictator tends to lead to all sorts of instability, which is then used to justify the continued support of the unpopular military dictator!
Are you sure?Musharraf was in power with or without US support.
Average yearly U.S. assistance to Pakistan during 2002-2006 is estimated to be $665 million
compared to $3.4 million in 2000-2001.
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31362.pdfPakistan received limited U.S. assistance during the 1990s — counter-narcotics support, food aid, and Pakistan
NGO Initiative programs — due to congressional restrictions in response to
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. In 1985, the Pressler Amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Section 620e) barred U.S. foreign assistance to
Pakistan unless the President determined that Pakistan did not possess nuclear
weapons and that U.S. assistance would reduce the risk of Pakistan’s obtaining them.
In 1990, President George H. W. Bush declined to make such determinations and
imposed Pressler Amendment sanctions against Pakistan. This restriction was eased
in 1995 to prohibit only military assistance. In 1998, following nuclear weapons
tests carried out by India and Pakistan, President Clinton imposed restrictions on
non-humanitarian aid to both countries pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act of 1968 (Section 102). Furthermore, Pakistan continued to be ineligible for most forms
of U.S. foreign assistance due to its delinquency in servicing its debt to the United
States and to the 1999 military coup. Although the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2000 (P.L. 106-79) gave the President authority to permanently
waive all nuclear test-related sanctions, President Clinton waived few restrictions on
Pakistan (e.g., USDA credits and U.S.commercial bank loans) as compared to India.
Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Pakistan
was designated as a front-line state in the war on terrorism and received dramatically
increased U.S. aid levels. In late September 2001, President GeorgeW.Bush waived
nuclear weapons sanctions that prohibited military and economic aid to India and
Pakistan. The Bush Administration also rescheduled $379 million of Pakistan’s $2.7
billion debt to the United States so that Pakistan would not be considered in arrears,
a requirement for further foreign assistance. On October 27, 2001, President Bush
signed S. 1465 into law (P.L. 107-57), allowing the United States government to
waive sanctions related to the military coup and authorizing presidential waiver
authority through 2003, provided the President determined that making foreign
assistance available would facilitate democratization and help the United States in
its battle against international terrorism. P.L. 107-57 also exempted Pakistan from
foreign assistance restrictions related to its default on international loans.
The United States is the major bilateral aid donor to Pakistan, followed by Japan
and the United Kingdom.