Race, Gender , and Class

One of the things I think is great about capitalism is that it allows the smart people (for creating smart people is the purpose of evolution) to succeed while the sub-humans (or "muties" as I call them) can be enslaved or just perish. That's why communism is basically evil, because it is against evolution, and trying to take a stand against capitalism and science is bound to fail, I mean, look at the muslims.

The relevance of the quote Waffles posted in response to the question of power and the subject was perfectly evident to me. I give a big "oh well" if 3 Body No Problem didn't get it. (Snore.)

If it helps people hate Waffle, go ahead and willfully miss the point of every last post he makes. That always works.

Swears, I like that about capitalism, but what I like even more is how once the worthy ones (Bill Gates, for instance), rise to the top, suddenly all of the exploitative power relations that are built in to the societal/social structures that support capitalism just melt away as Bill breaststrokes, Scrooge McDuck style, through his piles of money while his employees at his numerous foundations decide how best to shelter his billions from taxes via charitable donations.

Oh shit, totally forgot about the absolute best part of capitalism, where all of those social structures I was talking about that support capitalism (you might call them the apparatus, maybe) are dually perpetuated and reinforced by the Oedipal idyll (nuclear family anyone?) that is, THANK GOD, still the gooey center of all psychic AND power relations. Political ones, even. (If those exist)

please enlighten us about "hat we usually mean when we say 'power over others'"

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Here's a straightforward ideal-typical mathematical metaphor with a game-theoretic flavour. I simplify a bit, to make it easier to get into the spirit.

Assume two actors AA and BB and 4 future events w, x, y, z (which may be, among others, doing nothing). A has the following assumptions/preferences.

• AA thinks of him/herself as being able causally to bring about w or x
  
• AA prefers w over x.
  
• AA also prefers xy (standing for x and y) over wz.
  
• AA assumes that BB has y and z as behavioural options.
  
• AA expects that BB would react with y if AA does x, and BB would react with z if AA does w.
  

AA thus chooses action x rather then w, and attributes this choice to B's influence.

This structure of behavioural options, preference orderings and causal expectations is tersely referred to as "BB has power over AA". It's easy to generalise this definition to an arbitrary number of actors and actions.

It's neat, isn't it!

It's really quite simple, yet very general. It points to preferences, behavioural and causal expectations are operating at a fundamental level in power, without committing to any specific mechanism that implements those. It is neutral on details of preferences. It is more abstract, yet more precise, than other concepts of power that I'm aware of. Foucault would have been much clearer, and could have said more in fewer words, if he had been aware my definition.

Anyway, with this framework one can tackle many of the thorny issues in the theory of power, and ask more focussed questions about power. How are these preferences and behavioural expectations generated and reproduced. How can they be aggregated?

3 Body No Problem said:

[*] AA expects that BB would react with y if AA does x, and BB would react with z if AA does w.

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I don't understand this bit. Why would AA expect BB to react with y if AA does x?

3 Body No Problem said:

Here's a straightforward ideal-typical mathematical metaphor with a game-theoretic flavour. I simplify a bit, to make it easier to get into the spirit.

Assume two actors AA and BB and 4 future events w, x, y, z (which may be, among others, doing nothing). A has the following assumptions/preferences.

• AA thinks of him/herself as being able causally to bring about w or x
  
• AA prefers w over x.
  
• AA also prefers xy (standing for x and y) over wz.
  
• AA assumes that BB has y and z as behavioural options.
  
• AA expects that BB would react with y if AA does x, and BB would react with z if AA does w.
  

AA thus chooses action x rather then w, and attributes this choice to B's influence.

This structure of behavioural options, preference orderings and causal expectations is tersely referred to as "BB has power over AA". It's easy to generalise this definition to an arbitrary number of actors and actions.

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William is hungry and goes to the refrigerator. Next to the refrigerator is a packet of ryvita. William doesn't mind ryvita (option x), but he'd rather have some juicy plums (option w). He opens the refrigerator, and is delighted to behold a bowl of succulent plums sitting on the middle shelf. Attached to the bowl is a post-it note, bearing the legend:

William: If you eat my plums again, then so help me I will beat you like a red-headed step child (option z). Have some ryvita instead. They're good for you, and if you use them up I might let you have a plum (option y).

William shakes his head sadly. He would prefer the plums to the ryvita, but he'd rather have the ryvita and one plum to having all the plums and being beaten like a red-headed step child. He closes the fridge door, and starts munching through the ryvita. They are dry and slightly stale. He does not especially feel like writing a poem about them.

Option z (being beaten) in this scenario is what is more generally known as a deterrant. To "have power over" William is to possess a plausible deterrant (this is where "causal expectation" comes in) that will cause him to choose a sub-optimal (for him) option, and regard that choice as preferable to the alternative where he exercises his preferred option and has to endure the deterrant as a result.

The only way to win this game is, of course, not to play.

swears said:

One of the things I think is great about capitalism is that it allows the smart people (for creating smart people is the purpose of evolution) to succeed while the sub-humans (or "muties" as I call them) can be enslaved or just perish. That's why communism is basically evil, because it is against evolution, and trying to take a stand against capitalism and science is bound to fail, I mean, look at the muslims.

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http://www.somethingawful.com/d/news/aig-bailout-package.php

When it comes to what "we" usually mean when "we" talk about power, I think there are several distinct constituencies. There clearly is a commonplace understanding of power as the ability to influence others' behaviour through the threat of force (or sulking, or whatever effectively makes an otherwise attractive option appear suboptimal). Part of the point of, say, Foucault's various discussions of power-knowledge, subjectivation and bio-power is to decentre our understanding of "power" away from instances of direct coercion bearing on individual subjects and recentre it on the techniques and practices of organisation that bring forth such subjects to begin with.

With respect to race, gender and class, the question can be put like this: are race, gender and class a set of circumstances under which the game-theoretic subject finds his options skewed in various ways, or are they something that has happened to the subject (or, indeed, happened as the subject) before s/he even comes to consider his/her options?

I'm confused.

First poetix and 3BNP were in the thread about atheism trying to revise the meaning of "purpose" so it fits in well with a computational theory of The Nature of Things and How They Work. This was beside the point, since the thread was about Dawkins and atheism and a teleological brand of scientific fundamentalism. I love tangents and digressions, usually, so I didn't mind entertaining this one, however semantic and pedantic it may have seemed.

Then in another thread we were dragged into an argument about what "PC" means based on the idea that only the hopelessly PC believe that on the meta- or social level of human interaction, people (at least in part) construct "reality" (whatever *that* means) through the mediation of social factors and influences. Here it was suggested that race, though not a biological fact, is entirely real because some people believe it is. I'm interested in hyperstition, so I thought about this for a while. Ok. Beliefs often help construct "reality", too. And people, by virtue of their beliefs, often act in ways that influence social circumstances substantiality. I suppose I can buy "race" as "real" in this obviously nominal (and again, semantically tinkered with) sense.

But this is just too much. The same people who fought so hard for the last two ideas I mention above are now ready (it seems--correct me if I'm wrong) to reduce all social mediation to Game Theory.

poetix said:

When it comes to what "we" usually mean when "we" talk about power, I think there are several distinct constituencies. There clearly is a commonplace understanding of power as the ability to influence others' behaviour through the threat of force (or sulking, or whatever effectively makes an otherwise attractive option appear suboptimal). Part of the point of, say, Foucault's various discussions of power-knowledge, subjectivation and bio-power is to decentre our understanding of "power" away from instances of direct coercion bearing on individual subjects and recentre it on the techniques and practices of organisation that bring forth such subjects to begin with.

With respect to race, gender and class, the question can be put like this: are race, gender and class a set of circumstances under which the game-theoretic subject finds his options skewed in various ways, or are they something that has happened to the subject (or, indeed, happened as the subject) before s/he even comes to consider his/her options?

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How the first paragraph and the second paragraph relate conceptually is unclear to me, but I would agree with Foucault and only add that you're missing some key elements of what he meant by "power." Foucault maybe understood it more from a psychoanalytical perspective than a game theory one, anyway.

The answer to your question seems to me obviously: both.

Also, unfortunately, the game of power-relations in the world is one that no amount of choosing not-to-play will change.

I might disagree with Foucault if he thinks "opting-out" works to bring down the power structures that already exist in the subject (through the Oedipal stage first). You can opt-out but you'd have to radically realign the subject (D&G) if you wanted to be in a position to change the game.

Mr. Tea said:

http://www.somethingawful.com/d/news/aig-bailout-package.php

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This might be funnier than Richdork Media.

nomadthesecond said:

Foucault maybe understood it more from a psychoanalytical perspective

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Not I think according to his own conception of psychoanalysis.

I do remember reading somewhere that Foucault was briefly quite interested in Hayek; although of course he was perfectly capable of being interested in thinkers and discussing their ideas without actually approving of them.

poetix said:

Not I think according to his own conception of psychoanalysis.

I do remember reading somewhere that Foucault was briefly quite interested in Hayek; although of course he was perfectly capable of being interested in thinkers and discussing their ideas without actually approving of them.

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True, true.

Foucault is interesting to me lately because he sort of ignores and glosses over so much, including a lot of psychoanalytical principles that are relevant to the study of Institutional Power. He reminds me of Virilio in this way. Or vice versa.

I was expecting a completely different book when I read Madness and Civilization, anyhow.

poetix said:

"The only winning move is not to play"

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Ha, great movie.

Aha, well I'll admit this was not the first thing that came to mind when I thought of choosing not to eat someone's plums