Race, Gender , and Class

poetix

we murder to dissect
D'you mean a graph in the mathematical sense, i.e. a network of vertices connected by lines?

Yes, although possibly a "fuzzy" or "weighted" graph where instead of a binary relation over a set of vertices you have a real-valued function from ordered pairs of vertices to a set of "weights" 0 <= w <= 1. So if f((k1, k2))=0, then k1 isn't connected to k2 at all, and if f((k1, k2))=1 then k1 is totally connected to k2, but there are also intermediate degrees of connectedness.
 

Mr. Tea

Let's Talk About Ceps
Yes, although possibly a "fuzzy" or "weighted" graph where instead of a binary relation over a set of vertices you have a real-valued function from ordered pairs of vertices to a set of "weights" 0 <= w <= 1. So if f((k1, k2))=0, then k1 isn't connected to k2 at all, and if f((k1, k2))=1 then k1 is totally connected to k2, but there are also intermediate degrees of connectedness.

Sounds like the basic setup of a neural net, right?
 

nomadthethird

more issues than Time mag
D&G's emphasis on "rhizomatic" structures is really like Vimothy said about decentralization and horizonticality, among other things. A rhizome is a shared root structure common to many plants, which allows the plants to spread across a surface area horizontically instead of only growing vertically. (rather than "arborescent" structures which grow upward and then outward and are grounded by one woody root system that mirrors the upward outward growth underground...)
 

nomadthethird

more issues than Time mag
The Oedipal stage/complex and "the nuclear family" aren't directly related, and most or many critics would say that, if anything, Freud's emphasis on the Oedipal stage is limited/limiting insofar as it is specific to the Victorian culture he lived in and as such is no longer relevant.

The Oedipus complex is based on the tragedy that befalls Oedipus after he is cursed to fall in love with his own mother and murder his father (the rival for his mother's affection).

There's a lot of misunderstanding and misapplication of the Oedipus complex in popular culture. It's not about literally wanting to have intercourse with your own parents, its about the infant/child's psychosexual development as this related to the initial cathected object (the mother) and a process of realization that includes (in males) the trauma experienced when boys find out their mothers don't have a penis (the lost object around which the fetish swirls and above which it floats looking for a home)...

Anyway, it's not directly related to every psychosexual pathology, but it's often there somewhere.
 

zhao

there are no accidents
Do they? Who says so? And what about daughters, what do they want?

well freud was the first one to focus on it... for girls there is the electra complex. anyhow there exists a lot of material out there for and against the importance given to the O and E complexes... i never said i personally think they are always at the centre of the development of personality, and in fact have much problems with a view of humanity where they are. (and i think, seems obvious, that this dynamic is only possible within, and since the rise of the nuclear family unit, not before.)
 

waffle

Banned
Is "rhizomatic" an intrinsically good way to be? So far as I can make out, the "arborescent" structure is a tree, and the "rhizomatic" structure is a graph. What's so special about this distinction, and why might one care whether capital organises itself arborescently or rhizomatically?

As a virus, capital can invade almost any organizational structure or assemblage, which is why traditional despotic cultures, primarily theocratic, were terrified of it (banning usury, for instance, still 'officially' the case in many Islamic countries).

The distinction is of some importance, nevertheless, because global capitalism has moved from a Fordist/Taylorist patriarchal capitalism to an increasingly neoliberal decentralized finance capitalism, from arborescent to rhizomatic. This is even reflected in corporate organizational structures, where a company like Ford used to have as many as 25-30 managerial layers from front-line manager up to chief executive, whereas today we see many organizations, like computer companies, with 'flat' structures, where the hierarchy may only have 3-5 levels and with staff more widely dispersed. This, of course, doesn't mean that such companies and their workforces are necessarily more 'liberated' or autonomous, just that the nature of control has significantly changed (the 'risk' society of hysterical flexibility and continuous communication, where 'work' never ends) - to immersive, immanent circuits, where 'no one' is in control. Patriarchal capitalism is authoritarian; finance capitalism is totalitarian.



Oh, right. Like the IDF.

The IDF remains a largely hierarchical military organization, whereas 'Al Qaida' ...
 

Pestario

tell your friends
did anyone see last week's Channel 4 documentary called Rich Kid Poor Kid?

"Cutting Edge presents this film by director Zac Beattie that explores the gap between rich and poor by following the lives of two teenage girls who live on the same street."

http://www.channel4.com/video/brandless-catchup.jsp?vodBrand=rich-kid-poor-kid

Yeah it was alright. No real surprises though. The rich kid is a snob, the poor kid comes from a crap home. They are stand-offish at first but learn that they are really more alike than they thought.

What I couldn't believe was how fearful the rich kid was of the 'dangerous' streets around clapham. She's lived there her whole life but hasn't ever turned left out of her house because there's a council estate down that road...
 

3 Body No Problem

Well-known member
nomadthesecond said:
But this is just too much. The same people who fought so hard for the last two ideas I mention above are now ready (it seems--correct me if I'm wrong) to reduce all social mediation to Game Theory.

I'm not sure you quite get the meaning of game theory, and my use thereof in my definition of power. I didn't mathematise my definition fully, I was only trying to be rigorous in an informal way, so it wasn't really game theoretic. Anyway, game theory is nothing more and nothing less than an abstract, mathematical theory of social interaction. Game theory is a convenient language to speak about interaction (not necessarily interaction of humans, but interaction in general). Any account whatsoever of the social can -- at least in principle -- be rephrased in game-theoretic terms.

As an aside, it has often been remarked that the term "game theory" is misleading. It should have been called theory of interaction.

If you look closely at my definition, it was phrased in terms of expectations, preferences and actions, all of which are surely at the heart of the social. My account is deliberately neutral on how these things are implemented, since you are fond of psychoanalysis (which I am not), you could understand preferences and their genesis in terms of e.g. oedipal attachement. That's perfectly compatible. This generality is one of the key advantages of such an abstract account of power.

I would be very interested in concrete criticism, if you had a specific instance of power, that you think cannot be phrased in terms of my definition.

Poetix said:
What's interesting about this is that although game theory begins with a kind of ahistorical, universal, atomic subject (homo economicus, rationally evaluating his options),

I'll have to disagree with you here. You are thinking of a specific form of game theory, as sometimes used in economics. Game theory as such just requires identifiable actors that can somehow interact (be social). These actors don't need to be human, let alone 'rational', they can be machines or animals for example (the game-theoretic analysis of animal evolution is a huge field and has lead to interesting insights).

If you look at my definition of power, you will notice that I go out of my way to avoid talking about humans, because I want my definition to cover forms of power like that nations or organisations have.
 
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poetix

we murder to dissect
I would be very interested in concrete criticism, if you had a specific instance of power, that you think cannot be phrased in terms of my definition.

How about the power to modify the primary weighting one of the agents gives to a particular option - e.g persuading them through a highly brilliant and affecting advertising campaign that life without plums is not worth living?

The deterrance model you sketched describes a scenario where an agent is dissuaded from doing something by the plausible threat of a consequence that makes the overall outcome less favourable than accepting some prima facie less attractive option with less dire consequences. But rather than threatening people with dire consequences if they, say, vote for a socialist government, it may be more effective just to persuade them that socialism is austere and boring and smells of cabbage.

Or let's suppose Deep Blue is playing chess against another chess computer, and hacks into its opponent and changes its algorithm so that it no longer regards winning positions as optimal. You might say that's an "out of band" move, one which alters the nature of the game (albeit possibly according to the rules of some larger game - let's play counterintrusion!). But "power" often is the power to make exceptional moves of this kind, to affect your opponent so that you no longer need the force of a deterrant to influence their behaviour to your advantage.
 

poetix

we murder to dissect
From what I remember of The Extended Phenotype, there's a fair amount of duping and spoofing goes on in the non-human animal kingdom too.
 

nomadthethird

more issues than Time mag
That's one term for it. But isn't what poetix has described more or less what parents do to bring up their children, and what teachers do to educate their pupils?

Ha. Some parents.

3BNP, I have little interest in defining things in (mathematical?) terms so broad that they can apply to all kinds of bodies. Unless you're talking about physics.

I'm usually more interested in differences rather than similarities between things.
 

3 Body No Problem

Well-known member
poetix said:
How about the power to modify the primary weighting one of the agents gives to a partiacular option - e.g persuading them through a highly brilliant and affecting advertising campaign that life without plums is not worth living? The deterrance
model you sketched describes a scenario where an agent is dissuaded from doing something by the plausible threat of a consequence that makes the overall outcome less favourable than accepting some prima facie less attractive option with less dire consequences. But rather than threatening people with dire consequences if they, say, vote for a socialist government, it may be more effective just to persuade them that socialism is austere and boring and smells of cabbage.

Thank you very much! That's an interesting point which let's me expand on the issue of aggregation of power, which means to use power to get/maintain power.

First, I would not call it the "deterrance model" since the available alternatives may all be quite positive. Neither eating Ryvita nor eating plums is exactly painful. One misunderstands power where one reduces it to applications of force. I would argue that typically the application of force signals a (partial) breakdown of power because if the powerful resorts to force, the subject of power has little to loose and little interest in cooperation. Power in institutions (in modern democracies) happens mostly via careers for example. In institutions the alternatives for a worker are between different speeds on the career path. None of which is a dire consequence. Anyway, second, Society is a temporal entity made up from temporal events (essentially communications). Society always changes. Islands of stability exist, but are improbable, and require institutional support.

Enough with generalities, and back to the issue at hand. My definition of power is implicitly also temporalised (I should have stated that more clearly, but didn't want to complicate too much). It is based on preferences and expectations. But there's no reason to assume that preferences and expectations are temporally stable, and in fact, it's easy to give examples of changing preferences and expectations. With these changes, power changes. A typical example is the subjugation of women: as long as they were financially dependent on men, the latter had a lot of power over women. With the rise of female employment and financial independence, this has changed.

A government can use its power to get mass media, educational institutions and similar to act as government propagandists. In this example power phenomena might be found on various levels. The institutions may fear withdrawing of funding if they don't tow the government line. The heads of these institutions might worry about their careers, and use their institutional power to pressure underlings ... In non-democratic societies, this power might not be applied via funding/career levers, instead Beria and his thugs might come, visit and execute half of the staff.

In other words, the example fits perfectly!

The change or maintenance of conviction in the general population that you mention is thus an indirect effect of governmental power.

Or let's suppose Deep Blue is playing chess against another chess computer, and hacks into its opponent and changes its algorithm so that it no longer regards winning positions as optimal. You might say that's an "out of band" move, one which alters the nature of the game

This is too counterfactual for my liking. Does it make sense to talk of "power" here in any intuitive sense you like? Do I have power over the toilet if I flush? After all, it wouldn't have flushed otherwise? I don't see a toilet as an actor, it's a causal mechanism (because understand it well), but admittedly, the boundary is fuzzy.

But "power" often is the power to make exceptional moves of this kind

Well, yes, but as in my example above, the "power to make exceptional moves" is typically an instance of my definition.
 

3 Body No Problem

Well-known member
3BNP, I have little interest in defining things in (mathematical?) terms so broad that they can apply to all kinds of bodies. Unless you're talking about physics. I'm usually more interested in differences rather than similarities between things.

Fair enough, but we commonly assume that states or institutions have power. My definition doesn't apply to all kinds of bodies, but only those to which we attribute expectation formation, the possibility of choice and action, and preferences.

Having read quote a bit on power, I felt that unification of the different approaches was interesting and promising.
 
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waffle

Banned
Coming back briefly to game theory, I think Curtis is guilty of some fairly lazy guilt-by-association-mongering in The Trap. Game theory describes games, or at least a certain class of games, pretty well. It doesn't describe people particularly well, except insofar as people are players of those sorts of games (cf the Transactional Analysis classic Games People Play). It does have the particular virtue of providing one with a language with which to talk about strategies without reference to the particular motivations of individual strategists - in other words, it is able to specify what Dennett calls "free-floating rationales" for behaviour (that is, for patterns of game-play) that are the rationales of no-one in particular, rationales that anyone at all (n'importe qui) might find it advantageous to adopt in certain sorts of strategic situation.

What's interesting about this is that although game theory begins with a kind of ahistorical, universal, atomic subject (homo economicus, rationally evaluating his options), it very quickly opens out into a theory of systemic strategic rationality in which the kinds of choices "you" might make are strongly contoured by rationales which were "there" (in the strategic situation) before you were. In other words, something suspiciously resembling class consciousness inexorably reappears on the scene in spite of having been explicitly excluded from the theory's fundamental premises. You could almost describe game theory as the ruling class's theory of class warfare...

Game theory developed out of the instrumentalist utilitarianism of rational choice theory (which considers only rational actions performed because they are assumed to be 'rational'), and this is why all of its early applications were in mainstream bourgeoise economics, as attested to by the title of the first text on the subject, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's 1944 Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.

By defining the political field as simply a game it serves ideology: game theory becomes an effective strategy for disavowing the political altogether, substituting a post-political realm of managerialism, strategy and 'expert' administration, so seemingly shutting down all social antagonisms and real choices (but in fact relying on a politics of fear: it is hardly coincidental that game theory became popular during the Cold War). What's interesting from the game example above between AA and BB is that it conceives of rational decision-making as a pre-determined structure devoid of all agency: in game-theoretic scenarios, free choice and predestination are strictly equivalent (AA has no real choice in the above game, for by failing to select the 'right' choice he is, according to the rules, irrational and therefore 'breaking the rules', which is disallowed. It's oppressively pre-rigged from the start, substituting faux choices for real ones.

In line with ruling class ideology, game theory assumes that at the limits of our ability to calculatively predict the conduct of other subjects, the only 'rational' thing to do is precisely to presume the pre-existence of fixed, dehistoricized, and impersonal social norms regulating our own conduct and that of others ie to assume that the Big Other exists.

Yes, it can be viewed as a theory of class warfare. By strategizing the world we are engaging in a double self-deception: firstly, by doing so we assume that one's very being, one's very subjectivity, one's agency, is not at stake in the so-called strategising; and secondly, by thinking it is all just a matter of strategy we can deceive ourselves that the core of this fantasy is not xenophobia and classism.

Moreover, if our quotidian social reality was 'just a game' as the game-theoretic ideologues like to speculate, it would in fact transpire to be a nightmare. Our everyday social world and life can only be imagined as a game by actively imposing a game structure on it and the moment we do that it ceases to be everyday life and becomes something else entirely (this, of course, is what happened to all of those Reality TV shows: they became brutalizing game shows, the game element [the voting, the humiliating tasks, etc] legitimizing such sadism). Game theory as the basis for cultural analysis is therefore exposed for the dystopian fantasy that it is.
 
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poetix

we murder to dissect
I remember a book my dad had called something like The Complete Chess Addict which was something like a dictionary of chess lore. Under the heading "friendly games" was the following sentence:

There are no friendly games of chess.

Game theory seems ideal for theorizing the war of all against all, be it a chess tournament or natural selection. But theorizing the social and political arena as a war of all against all (albeit one in which strategies of co-operation and mutual aid emerge from the polemological grid) is clearly an ideologically weighted move, with a venerable history stretching back long before von Neumann.
 

josef k.

Dangerous Mystagogue
Waffle, Poetix:

These are very superficial understanding of game theory, derived from watching a TV program! There is no necessary principle of all-pervasive mutual atomistic antagonism involved in the proposition that it is possible and productive to model the interaction of actors in terms of games, and no reason why there should be. The Prisoner's Dilemma - which seems to be your model for how game theory operates - is a very specialized kind of two-person game, and not to be confused for the field as a whole.

The real essence and thrust of game theory lies in its materialism - the point is not that all games are unfriendly, but rather that the principle of "friendliness" is not metaphysical, but rather susceptible to analysis in game-theoretical terms. What are the benefits of maintaining a friendship? They may be economic, political, libidinal, intellectual... but the wager of game theory is that they can be understood calculatively. Is this not preferable to (bourgeois, liberal) sentimentalism?
 
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