"Non-Problems" and Illusions of Language

[version]

I'm just reading something about Wittgenstein that's intrigued me,

... Wittgenstein believed that language has rules of usage that can deceive people into asking questions that have the form of real inquiries, but are in fact illusions. Clear and proper evaluation of our language and it's usage will uncover when our own language pulls us towards these illusions, and we can therefore distinguish between real and honest questions about our experiences in life and false uses of language that encourage delusions of language.

Discussing the view that "All words signify something", W. makes the following comparison: “Suppose someone said, ‘All tools serve to modify something. So, a hammer modifies the position of a nail, a saw the shape of a board, and so on.’ – And what is modified by a rule, a glue-pot and nails?” He gives us a few tentative answers: " Our knowledge of a thing’s length, the temperature of the glue, and the solidity of a box”. But of course, they do not modify anything. W. thus asks: "Would anything be gained by this assimilation of expressions?”. To him, the view that "All words signify something" does just the same. As P.M.S. Hacker puts it,
“‘All tools serve to modify something’ is analogous to ‘All words signify something’. Both are altogether uninformative, and involve the imposition of a form of description of uses that serves only to represent differences in use in the guise of uniformities [...] We use a rules to find out the length of a thing – but the function of a rules is misdescribed as being to modify our knowledge (its function is to measure). Analogously, assimilating the descriptions of the uses of words (§10) by imposing the form of description ‘The word ‘W’ signifies such-and-such’ serves only to obscure the diversity of uses of words’”. BAKER, G.P. HACKER, P.M.S. Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning. Volume 1 of An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. Part II: Exegesis §§ 1-184. p. 66-67.

Thoughts?

 

[sus]

Intrigued but tired, I'll take a look in the morning

 

[sus]

It's 5 there yeh? You're a crazy one

 

[version]

 

[constant escape]

Yeah a few thoughts.

Upon a question being asked, consider how much new information is brought to the table by an answer that is attempting only to relay pre-existing information. New information that needs to be processed, by further clarifications, each bringing more and more information to the table, etc. A low-resolution explanation, but hopefully the point gets across.

Also I think part of the problem can be understood in terms of a perpetual mistaking of the map for the territory, several times within a sentence. Treating a word as if it represents an aspect of our reality, when the word is really part of a mapping system, a system that operates by drawing lines where there are none. In the interest of abstraction, of learning from things that are not apparent but require some leap of intellect to apprehend.

Also a point that seems to be related to Laruelle and the project of non-standard philosophy, a point that he refers to as the principle of sufficient philosophy. Don't claim to understand his work enough to articulate it, but my point seems similar, namely the tendency for us to progress upon some antecedent logic as if that logic were absolutely and objectively secure, rather than only being secure in certain capacities, within certain contingent circumstances.

That is, if we cannot disprove some line of reasoning, we posit it as if we have illuminated some aspect of reality, rather than positing it tentatively, as a portion of our map that has not yet been disproven.

Also don't claim to understand Godel enough to accurately represent him here, but incompleteness also seems pertinent. I gather the central point is that there is no consistent logical system that can account for every possible application/scenario, because the field of possible applications/scenarios - reality - doesn't seem to play by the same laws of consistency that we apply to our logical systems.

 

[constant escape]

Then there is the seemingly much more relatable idea that much of our ideological difference boils down to a semantic difference. Seeing as most people think semantics is trivial, these differences go unremedied. Not only are we each subjected to a unique life-sequence of physical signals, this unique life-sequence then informs a unique semiotic system within us, the system which i supposed to function as a means of communication.

So its a sort of compounded relativity. If we came hardwired with a turnkey semiotic system, then the only degree of relativity would consist of the physical signals being received by this or that psychic system. But because each psychic system has to develop a semiotic system uniquely, this relativity is compounded to another degree. But here, as everywhere, is a good point to step back and classify all of the above as part of our map, rather than that which is being mapped.

That which is being mapped might as well be n-dimensional noise, the differentiation of which depends on screening some of that signal out, no?