The Political Economy of Democracy
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Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
Had any thoughts on this Vim?
Lustick is suggesting that a combination of (1) Western interventions along either geo-political or humanitarian lines; and (2) international "antibelligerency" norms, have prevented the process of strong state formation in the Mid-East. Regional wars have not been allowed to follow there own 'natural' logic which has, in Lustick's view, denied the region the opportunity to follow the war-making = state-making process - the European developmental trajectory - described by Tilly.
Lustick is suggesting that a combination of (1) Western interventions along either geo-political or humanitarian lines; and (2) international "antibelligerency" norms, have prevented the process of strong state formation in the Mid-East. Regional wars have not been allowed to follow there own 'natural' logic which has, in Lustick's view, denied the region the opportunity to follow the war-making = state-making process - the European developmental trajectory - described by Tilly.
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vimothy
yurp
Wow -- check this out: Government, Bound or Unbound? by Anthony de Jasay in the new issue of Cato Unbound. Great insights:
At least since Locke, that discourse sets out a normative ideal of government: the protector of “rights” its citizens are in some fashion endowed with, and the guarantor of liberty that ranks above rival values. Such government uses coercion only to enforce the rules of just conduct. This ideal is attractive enough to the liberal mind. The reason why it nevertheless irritates is that it makes it seem that the writing of a constitution of liberty is a plausible means for transforming the normative ideal into positive reality. The message is that “we” can have limited government in the above sense if only “we” understand why we ought to wish it. The “we” is crucial, for it suppresses the essence of collective choice. Collective choice starts where unanimity ends, and involves some deciding for all, where the “some” control the apparatus of government....
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
So what's your considered view of Lustick's hard line approach Vim?
vimothy
yurp
I think he overstates the case. If we hold that the Mid East is uniquely affected, can we see different trajectories in other regions? If we left Mid Eastern states alone to fight wars without international condemnation or aid, would the result really be well-formed Western post-Westphalian market democracies? What would Lustick have us do, reatreat to a safe distance and close the shipping lanes? "See you in 2107, yeah"...
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
I think that we can see different trajectories in other regions because the developmental process is affected by two sets of factors:
1. The internal - i.e. the preexisiting institutional order and the specific social hierarchies and modes of production and administration.
2. The external - i.e. the type of foreign intervention ranging along a continuum from direct colonial rule (the Spanish/French model and perhaps closer to British rule in India) through decentralized/fragmented 'indirect' rule (e.g. British rule in Africa) to coup d'etats involving few long-term structural relationships.
The dynamic interplay between these two sets of factors shapes the trajectory of development of a given region/state/society.
I don't think there is any implication that without foreign intervention the Mid-East would now be a bastion of strong-state market-orientated democracies. The process of development is contingent and open-ended. But there is every possibility that the situation would be different without the historical and contemporary interventions by foreign powers.
To quote Joel Migdal:
By no means did all forms of outside rule and influence have the same results. Variations in directness or intensity of rule and influence of outside states, as well as differences in the mix of outside forces with indigenous social structures, led to differing abilities of particular indigenous social organizations ultimately to gain social control.
[NB, there are no normative assertions here.]
I think there is much value in the notion of 'critical junctures in history' which argue that catastrophic changes (stemming from a combination of war, climatic changes, epidemics, crises in belief systems, population trends, economic decline etc ---> leading to the weakening of local and regional social organization) prime a society for a major institutional transformation. This is evidenced in the European crises of the 14th and 17th C and in much of Africa, Latin America and Asia in the 19thC.
In times of catastrophic change, institutional arrangements unravel, systems of social control decline, and thus preservation of order in society becomes problematic.
But out of this decaying/collapsing order something new will arise. As Einstadt says (in that Doornbos article i sent you):
collapse, far from being an anomaly, both in the real world and in social evolutionary theory, presents in dramatic form not the end of social institutions, but almost always the beginning of new ones.
When a new order - i.e. new institutionalised patterns of social control and strategies of survival (for both elites and masses) - become engrained, then change will become very difficult. Since critical junctures are rare historical occurences, the trajectory a region/state/society adopts post such an event will inform its future (path dependency).
Thus the questions to ask are:
(1) did the early part of the 20th C represent a critical juncture in the history of the Mid East? (I am thinking of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the rise of pan-arab nationalism, the broken promises of independence/autonomous rule, the creation of Isreal etc)
(2) If so, to what degree did the foreign interventions play a decisive role in determining its future (i.e. current) developmental trajectory?
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Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
These weren't meant as rhetorical questions -- i was hoping you might have a bash at answering them
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
I'm not sure exactly -- hence my questions regarding the Middle-Eastern historical experience.
Having said that, clearly there must be significant differences given (1) their divergent institutional orders and social hierarchies in the pre-colonial era; (2) their divergent colonial experiences; and (3) crucially how these factors synthesised to shape their future developmental trajectories.
Have a crack at answering those questions and we can try and build some kind of comparison from there.
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vimothy
yurp
Yeah, sorry, I'm reading from the wrong hymn sheet here. I'm gonna steel out for a fag and have a quick flick through Lustick's paper.
One thing that did occur to be last night while I was re-reading Tilly's paper, is that monarchical monopolisation of the use of force was the event that brought Europe up, and that the new form of state equilibrium has basically raised operating costs for all "non-Westphalian" actors. Happily though, our advances have given us plenty of aid and guns to hand out!
One thing that did occur to be last night while I was re-reading Tilly's paper, is that monarchical monopolisation of the use of force was the event that brought Europe up, and that the new form of state equilibrium has basically raised operating costs for all "non-Westphalian" actors. Happily though, our advances have given us plenty of aid and guns to hand out!
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
....and in the process radically altered exisiting power structures in the developing world. I think aid and security or development and violence have been highly interwoven historically and are becoming increasingly so in the contemporary era. What is legitimate use of violence? In a modern nation-state this is monopolised by the state although it is often contested. In weaker states where multiple parties have access to substantial means violence, what legitimates its use? Bakonyi and Stuvoy discuss 'social orders of violence' which exist either alongside, or in the absence of, a functioning state. Warlordism or quasi/shadow states are both examples of this kind of order. They differ in their degrees of institutionalisation and thus their legitimacy in the eyes of 'the people'. BUT, crucially, they do not represent anarchy or social breakdown but rather another form of order and control.
Seeing social order and its requisite mechanisms of social control as the foundational building blocks for any theory of development seems sensible to me.
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Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
This kinda plays into something Gavin said in the Islamaphobia thread:
Contrary to this, I reckon that there are 3 broad factors that motivate violence:
1. power and status (political)
2. control of resources and opportunities for accumulation (economic)
3. identity/ideational (religous, ethnic, tribal, national, organisational)
Given that violence has been prevelent throughout our history and remains so in the present day, a question of key importance must be: what limits the use of violence in society?
I think the answer lies in social control through an institutionalised order which regulates behaviour, built on a mix of:
1. control of violence exercised through political authority / coercive laws backed up with legitimate threats of violence
2. internalised systems of consent / symbolic discourses (like shared norms, values, codes of coduct, belief systems etc, which often have informal enforcement mechanisms like ostracism from a group, loss of reputation, use of illegitimate force like a private army or bunch of thugs).
3. guarantee of material economic means (for elites and masses)
*********
Definition of legitimate from here:
'lawful: authorized, sanctioned by, or in accordance with law'.
But who sets the laws? Is the authority or legitimacy of those people widely accepted, or highly contested, within society?
The art of state-building involves creating a highly institutionalized order where violence is consolidated/monopolised, the legitimacy of the state to set coercive laws is widely accepted, and economic reproduction is secured. Integral to this process is the ability of elites to create a symbolic discourse to reinforce the state as a legitimate order. (EDIT: Gramsci's notion of hegemony as a mix of consent and coercion is totally relevant here)
In the absence of a consolidated modern state, alternative social orders may arise which become institutionalised to varying degrees over time. In the eyes of the people, or in the eyes of some people, these orders may hold legitimacy equal to a functioning state apparatus (e.g. the quasi-state maintained by UNITA within parts of Angolan territory from the late 60's until the early 2000's).
Is a functioning state that uses coercive repression of certain groups as its primary tool in maintaining order more legitimate than a rebel organisation which adminsters a shadow-state (and may well use similar tactics)? The key question is 'in whose eyes'? The international community will recognise the former as sovereign and legitimate, while the latter is deemed illegitimate - an insurgency or seperatist movement. But in the eyes of people living in the region -- whose political authority do they recognise?
I'd say the difference between warlordism, quasi-states and Westphalian states is only one of degrees of separation along a continuum of institutionalised social order and control.
Bakonyi and Stuvoy:
The legitimacy of a social order of violence encompasses ideas, economic and power interests, as well as the use of force. In addition to examining the loyalties of the combatants to the elites, the discursive process of justifying and legitimising the use of force within a specific order must be studied. The specific legitimacy of a certain order is particularly important because it informs about the level of institutionalisation of the order of violence. This is the key to understanding the level of stability of a specific order.
The comprehension of the legitimacy of specific forms of authority in violent conflicts enhances the understanding of conflict dynamism because it provides insight excluded in the exclusively rational economic focus in concepts such as predation and patron-client relations. An interest in the form of social embeddedness of violent actors and their strategies also raises new challenges for conflict resolution. Focusing on the legitimacy of social orders of violence might represent an avenue for the future stabilisation of such orders as social orders of peace, thus making alternative forms of political community conceivable.
The comprehension of the legitimacy of specific forms of authority in violent conflicts enhances the understanding of conflict dynamism because it provides insight excluded in the exclusively rational economic focus in concepts such as predation and patron-client relations. An interest in the form of social embeddedness of violent actors and their strategies also raises new challenges for conflict resolution. Focusing on the legitimacy of social orders of violence might represent an avenue for the future stabilisation of such orders as social orders of peace, thus making alternative forms of political community conceivable.
And on that note of optimism I'll end this monologue.
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vimothy
yurp
I had a few thoughts last night on Charles Tilly's paper.
The Westphalian state represents a relatively new equilibrium in state formation: the nation-state. States exist and are needed where transaction costs are greater than zero. Vigorous internal and external competition amongst European states drove the evolution of the Westphalian nation-state. As a generic type, this category of state became very powerful and was able to partake of what we might describe as economies of scale of power projection. The existence of this new equilibrium raised transaction costs for other actors (for example, protecting one's subjects from invasion became more expensive).
Therefore, non-Westphalian states have become clients of Westphalian states. Client status has affected a kind of price fixing in the international arena. The prohibitive costs created by the existence of Westphalian nation-states sets a high barrier to entry into this market. In response, Westphalian states have effectively propped up their favourite companies, reducing the influence of Schumpeterian pressure and preventing market-style competition from honing the efficiency and structure of their clients. The same hyper-competitive regional "market-mechanism" that brought forth the nation-state is unable to function.
The Westphalian state represents a relatively new equilibrium in state formation: the nation-state. States exist and are needed where transaction costs are greater than zero. Vigorous internal and external competition amongst European states drove the evolution of the Westphalian nation-state. As a generic type, this category of state became very powerful and was able to partake of what we might describe as economies of scale of power projection. The existence of this new equilibrium raised transaction costs for other actors (for example, protecting one's subjects from invasion became more expensive).
Therefore, non-Westphalian states have become clients of Westphalian states. Client status has affected a kind of price fixing in the international arena. The prohibitive costs created by the existence of Westphalian nation-states sets a high barrier to entry into this market. In response, Westphalian states have effectively propped up their favourite companies, reducing the influence of Schumpeterian pressure and preventing market-style competition from honing the efficiency and structure of their clients. The same hyper-competitive regional "market-mechanism" that brought forth the nation-state is unable to function.
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vimothy
yurp
Read Lustick's paper last night. As a positive description of historical process, I think there is much to recommend it. However, I'm not so convinced by the apologies for Pan-Arabism and Baathism. ("Saddam's system of government, though brutally authoritarian at the top, was also based on offers of cultural autonomy to the Kurds and an extensive welfare state"! He talks about popular criticisms of Arab dictators as though they are founded on nothing more substantial than prejudice. Saddam was perhaps as similar to Henry II as he was to Hitler, but Hitler, under the same analysis, can also be compared to Henry II). Great power interference obviously played a part in the failure of various different attempts at Empire building in the Middle East, but the great powers also encouraged it, directly and indirectly (e.g. the USSR and Nasser, German philosophy and the Baath Party). The formation of an Arab USSR would have radically changed the political landscape in the Middle East -- so of course history would have been different, but would it have been any better?
I do think that there is some important stuff to draw out of the two papers. Schumpeterian competition in the arena of war drove state evolution to the present point. It is (even if inefficiently) prevented from doing so to the same extent today. Can we allow some sort of churn back into the third world, where states are conquering and being conquered? Or can we devise some sort of institutional structure where states clear at a level other than war?
I do think that there is some important stuff to draw out of the two papers. Schumpeterian competition in the arena of war drove state evolution to the present point. It is (even if inefficiently) prevented from doing so to the same extent today. Can we allow some sort of churn back into the third world, where states are conquering and being conquered? Or can we devise some sort of institutional structure where states clear at a level other than war?
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
Interesting Vim. Your questions get to the heart of the matter. By 'we' I assume you mean 'Western' policy makers and multilateral orgnaizations (which if we are honest represent, at least to large part, the interests of the dominant powers).
So can the 'West' allow the state-system that it was instrumental in creating (through colonialism) fall apart in certain regions of the world? Is it even falling apart? Often wars are fought over control of the state apparatus in much the same way as conflict raged within Europe over the same issue. Equally though if certain states are failing, or failed, why is this? Is it that they are no longer (or never really were) seen as legitimate by certain groups who instead seek to establish another form of order? What legitimacy is there in propping up states (as orders) which are not legitimate in the eyes of large numbers of their populations. If propped up, what measures will the state need to resort to in order to maintain order within its territorial boundaries?
Perhaps an institutional order can be created in which states do not routinely resort to violence to achieve objectives. But this assumes that states are themselves actors - monolithic structures - which are taken as a 'given' building block in socio-economic relations. In the contemporary world, the biggest problem is not inter-state conflict but intra-state conflict. And in fact this is even problematic because defining a conflict as intra-state assumes that a state exists. Is Somalia an intra-state conflict or is it in fact a conflict being waged by various tribal/ethnic/political groups within a geographic region not under the control of any state -- i.e. does Somalia exist? Also many conflicts rage across borders but are not classical state vs state wars, which further underlines the porous nature of some states and the proliferation of armed forces which are not aligned to any exisiting state structure.
There is a big debate in IR at the moment about whether we are experiencing a shift towards a post-Westphalian order and, if so, how this is/will manifest(ing) itself.
Whose interests are served in preserving state structures which are not functioning according to the criteria that the international community expects? How durable can such structures be? And how legitimate can they be in the face of alternative possibilities for order?
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
Is it an imperative of the liberal world order that these states remain as states? The economic interests of Western firms in Africa for example rather depends on the preservation of some kind of legitimate order. Or does it.....? (I am thinking of mineral extracting MNC's who perhaps profit from the existence of various different factions that they deal with in places like Sierra Leone)
And then there's security. The dreaded empty spaces on the map, not belonging to any sovereign power and thus..... obviously a breeding ground for terrorism, organised crime networks etc :slanted:
So is it the case that poorly functioning states must be propped up to serve Western imperatives rather than for the wellbeing of their subjects?
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