Future War

Guybrush

Dittohead
Apparently, after the ambush where two Humvees were blowned up, the first military unit at the scene was one of those straight-outta-Terminator drones. Sounds like 5GW to me. Imagine them equipped with proper weapons.
 

JP Nut

Wild Horses
Mr Nutt -

I don't fully understand the reference to game theory or modelling human behaviour, but I don't think 4GW has anything to do with either. It's about understanding how the enemy fights.

It's the analysis and labelling of activity that reminded me of game theory.

In order to fight a successful campaign you would have to define what constitutes success? I would think that understanding how the enemy fights is part of that and deciding on strategy/tactics must surely require some modelling of human behaviour?


4GW marks the end of the states monoploy on armed force. Radically decentralisaed non-state actors wage moral warfare, seeking to hit the enemy right in his political motivation, the battlefield is dispersed, civilian and soldiers collapse into one another....

how is this different to say the afrikaner commandos during the second boer war or low level irregular guerilla activity in the american civil war?



To be honest mate, I think you're being sentimental. Of course there will be winners, and that's the whole problem - they might not be who we would want to win, Iran, al Qaeda, the Kurdish separatists, etc. I 'm sure you can think of groups who are benefiting from the invasion of Iraq. And just because groups can project victory doesn't mean that they are fighting 4GW, nor does it mean that they have fought a successful campaign.

Maybe, I suspect that there will be elements who achieve minor victories and certainly some short term gains, but in the long term I'm pretty sure that the losses (political and financial aswell as lives) to the main protagonists will outweigh any real achievements.

As it goes I don't see how there is a viable solution in the foreseeable future that could possibly constitute a realistic victory for anyone.
 

vimothy

yurp
It's the analysis and labelling of activity that reminded me of game theory.

In order to fight a successful campaign you would have to define what constitutes success? I would think that understanding how the enemy fights is part of that and deciding on strategy/tactics must surely require some modelling of human behaviour?

Yeah, I guess so. I don't think of the generational theory of warfare in terms of modelling human behaviour, although that's obviously what it is. Each generation reacts against the last, in concert with social, political and technological developments. But it's more to do with how armies fight - for e.g the US is very heavily reliant on its massive amounts of firepower (2GW), it doesn't do the lightening raids, light infantry stuff (3GW). Is there a psychological reason for this? Could we learn something from behavioural models? I don't know. A lot of people have called WoT the sociologist's war, or the anthropologists war, and clearly 4GW calls for increased "defense in depth" as it were, so going deeper into enemy culture certainly makes sense.

how is this different to say the afrikaner commandos during the second boer war or low level irregular guerilla activity in the american civil war?

Well, the simple answer is that I don't know. It's not necessarily any different, or perhaps it shares some elements in common and introduces others which are unque. Can you describe the campaigns in any more depth? How do they fit into the 4GW framework?

It's worth remembering that not all 4GW tactics are new, but that their combination represents a new paradigm, a new method of fighting. Globalisation has a lot to do with this, and certaiinly has introduced something different to the (I assume) more classical insurgencies you allude to.

Maybe, I suspect that there will be elements who achieve minor victories and certainly some short term gains, but in the long term I'm pretty sure that the losses (political and financial aswell as lives) to the main protagonists will outweigh any real achievements.

As it goes I don't see how there is a viable solution in the foreseeable future that could possibly constitute a realistic victory for anyone.

Still think you're being sentimental. There's one protagonist who practically can't loose: Iran. Then there are the jihadist groups who're provided with a theatre for training, and a region in which they can set up their virtual caliphate, the Islamic State of Iraq. There are the Kurds who have finally got a measure of autonomy, and the Shiites who have escaped Saddam's rule. It's a pity that so many of these interests are in direct contradiction with one another, but I don't believe that they will all lose.
 

Guybrush

Dittohead
A good way to win a 4G war is not to let your soldiers enter a house, execute the family elders and their seven-year-old daughter, gang-rape the family’s fourteen-year-old daughter, and finish off with setting fire to her after having murdered her with a bullet to the forehead. It will come back to haunt you. Kind of makes you realise why some Iraqis are wary of the U.S. soldiers. That Green guy appears to be somewhat of a prick. (I’m sorry for being a party-pooper, but this story made me upset.)
 

Mr. Tea

Let's Talk About Ceps
What the fuck? How did one of them get "27 months confinement" after admitting "premeditated murder, conspiracy, rape"?
 

Mr. Tea

Let's Talk About Ceps
3.5 years' house arrest. Fucking hell.
One thing that pisses me off about things like this - Lindsey English and all that - is that you often get people saying "yeah, well, what do you expect? Most American grunts come from poor families and aren't very clever/educated". Since when do you need to be middle-class and Harvard-educated to realise that Torturing, Raping And Murdering Civilliians Is Wrong?

And in the Abeer case, it seems strange that one guy got two years while two others got life sentences - well, a life sentence and a 100 year sentence, which possibly has even less likelihood of appeal?
 

vimothy

yurp
great site!!! i've been reading through the articles. some really intelligent commentary

thanks for the link, vimothy
No problems mate. Here's a short list of what I would say are the most important/influential papers.

The original article, by Lind et al, published in the Marine Corps Gazette, 1989. Still one of the best pieces of writing dealing with 4GW. "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation" http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm

The Col. Hammes piece is a another early (1994) trailblazer for 4GW. "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation", also published in the Marine Corps Gazette. http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/hammes.htm

These are the origins of 4GW. Obviously there's a lot more about now. Hammes' book, "The Sling and the Stone" (which expands on "The Evolution of War") is well worth a look, as is Lind's "On War" column, Chet Richards, Greg Wilcox, GI Wilson and Fabius Maximus. John Robb seems to have emerged as one of the most widely cited 4GW writers, through his great site Global Guerillas, and through his book, just published and widely reviewed in the blogosphere, "Brave New War".

The most important writer in all of this (IMO), however, is not even really a 4GW theorist. Martin van Creveld is a Dutch-Israeli military historian, and 4GW is inconceivable without his work, even though he doesn't refer to it. In particular his books, "The Transformation of War" and "The Rise and Decline of the State" are the two works which both Lind and Hammes build on to develop their ideas of generational shifts in warfare. Check out:
http://www.d-n-i.net/creveld/the_fate_of_the_state.htm
http://www.d-n-i.net/creveld/through_ a_glass_darkly.htm
 
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vimothy

yurp
A good way to win a 4G war is not to let your soldiers enter a house, execute the family elders and their seven-year-old daughter, gang-rape the family’s fourteen-year-old daughter, and finish off with setting fire to her after having murdered her with a bullet to the forehead. It will come back to haunt you. Kind of makes you realise why some Iraqis are wary of the U.S. soldiers. That Green guy appears to be somewhat of a prick. (I’m sorry for being a party-pooper, but this story made me upset.)

Actually though Guybrush, that's not strictly true.
 

vimothy

yurp
Are you on that Stalinesque «no people, no problem» tip? ;)

No, I'm just thinking about 4GW. It depends on how you are fighting it, really. For e.g. al Qaeda are waging 4GW in Iraq and horrendously massacring civilians is a tactic to acheive their strategic goal - they hope to weaken enemy resolve and so to convince US (in particular) policy makers to abandon Iraq by performing acts of extreme savagery.

But that's not the only way to do it. The first Intifada was 4GW which took the exact opposite tack, facing Israeli armour with slings and stones and causing very few casualties.
 

Mr. Tea

Let's Talk About Ceps
But that's not the only way to do it. The first Intifada was 4GW which took the exact opposite tack, facing Israeli armour with slings and stones and causing very few casualties.
Are you saying they wouldn't have used more effective weapons if they'd had them? That they had strategy meetings and said "Right, we've got to appear as pathetic as possible"?
 

vimothy

yurp
Are you saying they wouldn't have used more effective weapons if they'd had them? That they had strategy meetings and said "Right, we've got to appear as pathetic as possible"?

Do you think the image of an authentic, entirely homegrown (it wasn't run by the "Tunisians" in the PLO) Palestinian youth rebellion, with teenage protagonists facing the might of Israeli armour with nothing more than stones and their bodies, is pathetic?

For a comparison to the alternative, consider the disastrous al-Aqsa intifada.

Edit: It's hard to imagine that they could have found more effective weapons. The first Intifada took the Palestinians to the very verge of nationhood at the Oslo Accords. Only the combined efforts of Arafat and extremists on both sides could destroy the Palestinians' victory. Part of the problem was that when the PLO returned from Tunisia, they took control of the Intifada and had armed, uniformed security forces fighting the IDF, playing straight to the strengths of a conventional army. No longer were the IDF fighting kids, they were fighting a credible or semi-credible threat. In fact, the original methods of the first Intifada would have been much more successful. It's all about van Creveld (and after all, he should know), "the strong who fight the weak become weak". Arafat took a great hand and threw it away.
 
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Mr. Tea

Let's Talk About Ceps
Do you think the image of an authentic, entirely homegrown (it wasn't run by the "Tunisians" in the PLO) Palestinian youth rebellion, with teenage protagonists facing the might of Israeli armour with nothing more than stones and their bodies, is pathetic?

For a comparison to the alternative, consider the disastrous al-Aqsa intifada.

I didn't mean 'pathetic', like that, I meant it as in 'deserving of sympathy because hopelessly out-gunned'.
Obviously in terms of bravery it's the exact opposite of pathetic. As I'm sure you're away the majority of my sympathy in this sorry situation lies with the Palestinians.
 
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