global financial crash yay!

vimothy

yurp
It makes me really wish I had a CDS trading desk. I'd be selling those swaps by the truckload.

Yep

It is pretty ironic though that after the financial sector has swallowed loads of public wealth and brought these deficits into being, it's representatives are appearing and demanding that no help be extended to anyone else--that would be irresponsible, after all.
 
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rumble

Well-known member
"Investment is simultaneously spending and saving for no change to net wealth but positive contribution to AD and total income.
"

Yeah I think you've basically got it. The problem is that it's not necessarily a 1-for-1 relationship in the S=I sense. If the savings rates go up, but the banks don't want to lend, spending will fall.

People like Vickrey and myself argue that the banks can almost never fully recycle all of the savings into investment, because they first need to ensure that they get all of the money back, and there usually aren't enough clearly profitable lending opportunities for them to lend to an extent that would maximize output. That's where a sustainable deficit comes in. It would basically pick up the slack in spending where the financial system falls short.
 

rumble

Well-known member
haha yeah, the gall of the corporate welfare/deficit hawk crowd is really something, but I'm fairly desensitized to it now.

Dean Baker wrote a pretty good book on the subject that's available for free online:

The Conservative Nanny State:
How the Wealthy Use the Government to Stay Rich and Get Richer
http://www.conservativenannystate.org/
 

vimothy

yurp
Despite their much vaunted intelligence, it's clear that they have no self-awareness and consequently, no shame.

The vampire squid are actually fucking offering us advice now!
 
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vimothy

yurp
Yeah I think you've basically got it....

So basically, S = I describes two flows in balance, like when G = T, where no spending is "leaking" out of or into the economy.

And if S + T + M = I + G + X, there are no AD leakages. If, however, S increased but I did not, ceteris paribus, the economy would contract.

That said, I'm still unsure of how an aggregate increase in saving can occur without some offsetting flow, since any fall in C will reduce income and lead to a fall in private sector saving by an equivalent amount, or a fall in total income.
 
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rumble

Well-known member
GDP decreases

In Y = C + I + G + NX, if there is a fall in C that is not offset by those savings being recycled into I (or by G or NX), Y decreases.
 
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rumble

Well-known member
The overall sum in that equation isn't held constant

For instance you could have y(100) = C(50) + I(30) + G(10) + NX(10)

Then the Fed lowers interest rates to stimulate the economy, raising consumption and investment:

y(120) = C(60) + I(40) + G(10) + NX(10)

Government spending could also have the same effect:

y(120) = C(50) + I(30) + G(30) + NX(10)

Or an export boom:

Y(120) = C(50) + I(30) + G(10) + NX(30)

The flip side is that a cut in any of these categories, if not offset, can result in a fall in nominal GDP (all of this is in nominal terms btw).
 
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vimothy

yurp
Yeah, that all seems pretty straightforward. Obviously, Y is the dependent variable and so it falls if any of the determinates of Y fall.

I'm stil having trouble getting my head round where that aggregate saving comes from, since spending influences income, which influences saving.

I'll try to formulate a coherent question when I get some spare time...
 
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vimothy

yurp
The CDS spreads, the bets on a default in the US government are going up. Does anybody believe that the US government is going to default??? The fact is, the US government CAN PRINT MONEY

It's quite amusing to see Taleb constantly droning on about how everyone should be massively short the US govt.
 

vimothy

yurp
Okay, what about this:

Economy is fine and at full employment. Suddenly, consumers decide to increase saving. In the first instance (i.e. the short run), there is a reduction in demand with only two possible outcomes:

1, producers, facing a fall in income, maintain their spending patterns and draw down their savings for no net change to aggregate savings, total income or output. Or,

2, ouput and total income fall, and unemployment rises.

In either case, there is no immediate increase in the stock of loanable funds. Furthermore, there is no one available who can read this change in saving preferences as any kind of desire for more investment of whatever kind, so that even in the long run things look dodgy (obviously price and wage adjustments have a role to play in the long run too).

???
 
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vimothy

yurp
This paper explores the effects of saving at both a personal and aggregate level. I begin by considering questions about the personal and aggregate concepts of wealth. What constitutes wealth? Why do people strive to accumulate it? Why is higher investment (broadly defined) necessary to raise national wealth? I then examine the theory that explains how saving at the personal level is typically assumed to translate into higher investment that adds to aggregate wealth. Simply put, higher saving raises the supply of “loanable funds” in the capital markets, which reduces the rate of interest, lowers the cost of capital, and encourages firms to invest more in durable assets. According to this theory, a penny saved must necessarily be a penny earned in the form of tangible assets.

As I discuss next, however, the conventional loanable funds theory assumes away a fundamental problem. Additional saving, by definition, must result in lower spending by the saver. All savers recognize this point explicitly. But it is not so obvious that an increase in someone’s saving lowers others’ incomes (because one person’s spending is another’s income). Those whose incomes fall cannot accumulate personal wealth in the way that they planned; they become, in a sense, the victims of other peoples’ saving: their saving falls as the result of increase in saving by others. From this perspective it becomes clear that the supposed increased supply of loanable funds that is typically assumed to lower the cost of capital and stimulate investment in the conventional theory does not exist in any direct sense.

For a higher desire to save in the aggregate to translate into higher investment requires the operation of a subtle and potentially fragile string of economic phenomena relying on adjustments to wages and prices and the effects of these adjustments on aggregate spending. Unemployed resources arising from lower spending must cause wages and prices to fall (or at least to inflate more slowly), and the resulting disinflation must raise aggregate spending through indirect channels. I summarize theoretical and empirical evidence that raise serious doubts about whether these complex phenomena operate effectively, thereby questioning the assumption that policies that encourage saving actually lead to higher investment and higher wealth. I conclude, in sharp contrast to conventional wisdom, that it is more likely for an increased desire to save, other things equal, to reduce investment, and thereby reduce social wealth.

http://artsci.wustl.edu/~fazz/saving.pdf
 

rumble

Well-known member
the problem with that article (and most of the Chartalist stuff) is that it ignores banks, and substitutes capital markets for banks - not the same thing at all. When people save they don't necessarily buy bonds, when people borrow they don't necessarily issue bonds. Banks create money (and NFAs in MMTspeak), capital markets don't. From what I've seen, the Chartalists seem to have some sort of radical doubt about the existence of any monetary channel (unless of course you call it fiscal - then they seem OK with it (?))

If you don't like mainstream econ, you should check this stuff out:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monetary_circuit_theory

The reason that Godley & Lavoie are far superior to either the Chartalists (Bill Mitchell) or the circuitists (Steve Keen) is that they incorporate the good parts of both, but get rid of the half-baked aspects, which you must be noticing by now
 

vimothy

yurp
Fazzari is not a Chartalist--he's a Kaleckian (according to Lavoie, at least).

Back to my example: what happens when we decide on aggregate not to spend all of our income? Does output fall in the short run, or is that money immediately reallocated to investment spending by business?
 

rumble

Well-known member
"Fazzari is not a Chartalist--he's a Kaleckian (according to Lavoie, at least)."

Haha, well don't blame me for not being able to keep track of all the nuances and contradictions of heterodox economics. Davidson and Lavoie can't even agree on what "Post-Keynesian" means.

"Back to my example: what happens when we decide on aggregate not to spend all of our income? Does output fall in the short run, or is that money immediately reallocated to investment spending by business?"

"In either case, there is no immediate increase in the stock of loanable funds. Furthermore, there is no one available who can read this change in saving preferences as any kind of desire for more investment of whatever kind, so that even in the long run things look dodgy (obviously price and wage adjustments have a role to play in the long run too)."

Yes there is: the Fed and the banking system. That's the point of having a central bank.

When the Fed sees demand falling and savings rising, they will lower rates, encouraging borrowing and investment, and discouraging saving, in the hopes of heading off a fall in output and prices. They always keep the pump primed (2% inflation) so there is a buffer between drops in demand and falling prices, where the real trouble comes in. If it doesn't work, and no one wants to spend or invest or borrow/lend, and people still want to save at 0% (ZLB) then you will start seeing big falls in prices and output, unless offset by demand from somewhere else.

The banking system doesn't really have a "loanable funds" constraint. It can just create the money by crediting it to accounts, if there are creditworthy borrowers who want to borrow at the offered rate.
 

vimothy

yurp
In that presentation, Lavoie even managed to divde PKE into Post Keynesian Post Keynesians and non-Post Keyensian Post Keynesians!

Anyway, think it's making sense now: as demand drops, CB reduces rates disincentivising saving and incentivitsing consumption and investment spending, ensuring that S = I for the most part and that output and employment isn't bouncing around all over the place every time consumer spending patterns change...?
 

vimothy

yurp
The banking system doesn't really have a "loanable funds" constraint. It can just create the money by crediting it to accounts, if there are creditworthy borrowers who want to borrow at the offered rate.

Yeah, I grok this, of course--it's why I've been having trouble seeing how a rise in saving could lead to an offsetting rise in investment, since no additional savings are needed to fund additional investments in the first place.

But it doesn't, because the CB is there to ensure limited AD leakages, by raising the cost of saving and lowering the cost of investment, so that the flow of saving is directly offset by the flow of investment.
 
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rumble

Well-known member
yeah that's right

Also since there is growth in real output (rgdp growth) and in the nominal price level (2% inflation) under normal circumstances, the Fed usually stimulates more investment than savings in order for the price level to track output plus desired inflation.
 
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