global financial crash yay!

DWD

Well-known member
Seems like a less hyperbolic assessment. That's kind of what I was getting at before - instead of selling they may just change what they do (for a while), although you may argue that they will no longer be an investment bank if they do.

Well, they do have a long track record of doing exactly that.

I may be mis-remembering, but I think it's a relatively recent development that saw the investment banks rely on trading businesses for such a big chunk of their profits. As I recall, after the losses they suffered in 1998, they reined in their trading desks and really beefed up their "traditional" investment banking areas - equity and debt capital markets issuance / investment analysis / M&A advisory.

That model then ran into a brick wall in the early years of this decade: the dot-com bust and resulting Spitzer investigation into stock analysis really crimped the equity capital markets business. Then Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing etc sparked a lot of corporate de-leveraging, so that killed off a lot of the debt capital markets business. With the economy struggling, there wasn't much M&A going on.

But the sliding economy also caused the Fed to slash interest rates and the investment banks immediately jumped on the massive opportunity this created for carry trading and for selling products that would yield more than the crappy money being paid by traditional investments. In other words, they just resurrected their trading businesses. I still remember their VaR numbers winding down post-1998 and then steadily winding back up again from about 02/03.

The thing is, where do they go this time? It's not like they can switch back to equity and debt underwriting because I can't see the markets supporting much fresh financing - for anyone. The M&A market's going to be quiet for a while, I'd guess. And trading isn't going to be easy.

I'd guess that if their shareholders will put up with a couple of years of (relatively) underwhelming returns, then they'll muddle through and wait for the next opportunity to emerge. It's not like anyone else is going to be raking in bumper profits after all.
 

IdleRich

IdleRich
"So, there is absolutely definitely nothing wrong with HBOS

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7620483.stm"
In fairness it looks as though HBOS is being slowly destroyed by a lack of confidence more than anything else. Rumours have been going on for ages and despite their (and, uniquely, the government's) denials that there any serious problems no-one really trusts anyone any more.

"American International Group will get an $85 billion bridge loan from the federal government in exchange for an 80 percent stake in itself, sources have told CNBC."
I guess that something like that was inevitable though wasn't it?
 

Algierstwin

Well-known member
In what way do you think this current situation is going to change the amount of graduates these banks are taking on board?

and yes. . i'l be graduating in the next few years!!
 

Algierstwin

Well-known member
...well with the amount of people who are out, or rumoured to be soon out of work the pool of potential workers in the sector is going to be sizeable to say the least. .

not really the amount of graduates they take on, i just wonder about the scale of change the sector is about to go through, and whether its still going to be an attractive place to work at the end of it. . & whether there will be the same type of demand for new people entering workforce as there has been in recent years.
 

IdleRich

IdleRich
"...well with the amount of people who are out, or rumoured to be soon out of work the pool of potential workers in the sector is going to be sizeable to say the least. .
not really the amount of graduates they take on, i just wonder about the scale of change the sector is about to go through, and whether its still going to be an attractive place to work at the end of it. . & whether there will be the same type of demand for new people entering workforce as there has been in recent years."
I think that Vimothy was implying that it's obvious that the number of graduates (and others) that investment banks will be taking on will be much smaller in the next few years. Especially at Lehman.
As for the scale, and more interestingly, type of changes - that's the big question I guess. Personally, I've got a suspicion that there will be a few years of retreat, consolidation and low risk taking and then everyone will forget the lessons of the middle noughties and banks will want to find more ways to make juicier profits and the sector will expand recklessly again. That's just a gut feeling though and I seem to be in the minority with that viewpoint. Depends to what extent the powers that be seize their opportunity to introduce regulation I suppose.
 

vimothy

yurp
I read a thing in the WEF report on financial stability that posited a relationship between asset bubbles and the "great moderation" (i.e., longer business cycles; shorter, shallower recessions). Basically, easy money and growth lead to credit bubbles, which cause asset bubbles, which feed back into the credit bubbles (as increased collateral), and so one, while the central banks refuse to do anything on the way up, only acting after the bubble has inevitably burst (and thereby causing a fresh bubble: tech & dotcom -> real estate -> commodities, etc).

So, according to this view, after the contraction, we will inevitably be in a simlar (but not identical) situation, in that the upswing of the business cycle (and lower interest rates) will bring a fresh credit bubble and associated fat profits for financial firms to gorge on.
 

stevied

Well-known member
On the latest from Wall St. Democracy Now is worth watching. With Nomi Prins and Michael Hudson :


For the Economic background these are excellent :

Robert Brenner analyses the post-war economy. Podcast here :

http://www.international.ucla.edu/euro/podcasts/article.asp?parentid=61402

Robin Blackburn article on the roots of the Subprime crisis and the Shadow Banking system :

http://www.newleftreview.org/?page=article&view=2715

David Harvey talk on Neoliberalism :

http://chiasmos.uchicago.edu/events/harvey.shtml

Thanks very much.
 

crackerjack

Well-known member
Well this is all cheerfully apocalyptic, at least if you're a Leninist.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/anatole_kaletsky/article4776149.ece

Can someone explain this to me:

It is clear that most of the actions taken recently by regulators and governments have exacerbated the crisis. Instead of using his Government's unlimited financial firepower to defend the financial system, Henry Paulson, the US Treasury Secretary, turned his guns on his own side, wiping out long-term investors who tried to support leading financial institutions, while rewarding speculators who tried to bring them down.

Mr Paulson was activating a financial Doomsday Machine, driven by a chain reaction of actions by stock market speculators, regulators, credit-rating agencies and accountants. The details of this mechanism are complex, but the gist is simple - if a bank's share price falls below a critical level, its credit is downgraded; it has to sell assets at fire-sale prices; this further weakens its capital, leading regulators to question its solvency; this drives down its share price and the vicious circle takes another turn. What Mr Paulson did ten days ago was to hand to stock market speculators the key to this Doomsday machine.

This may seem an outlandish accusation - especially against a supposed financial mastermind who was a chairman of Goldman Sachs - but consider the event that triggered the market attacks on Lehman Brothers, AIG and HBOS. They all followed Mr Paulson's punitive decision on September 7 essentially to expropriate the $20billion of capital injected into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by shareholders over the previous 12 months. Long-term shareholders made these investments, with the encouragement of the US Government, to stabilise Fannie and Freddie. Meanwhile, a host of short-term speculators were selling these same securities, convinced that the two companies would be driven into bankruptcy.

By rewarding short-sellers while wiping out investors who reckoned on a long-term recovery that would restore the mortgage giants to profitability, Mr Paulson sent the clearest possible message to financial markets around the world. Any investor who puts money into a US financial institution that might run short of capital would have it expropriated by the US Government. On the other hand, sellers of US bank and insurance shares would be richly rewarded if they could destabilise any financial institution sufficiently to force it to turn to the Government for help.

I thought the point of short selling wsa to cause panic, drive down the share price and then scoop them back up on the cheap. But if they're just selling and driving the banks into nationalisation, where are the "rich rewards"? So explanation, please. And feel free to express it in the most condescendingly layman's terms imaginable.
 
D

droid

Guest
What happened to the free market 'regulating itself'? I thought massive state interference in the private sector and the nationalisation of banks was verboten?

Why should gamblers who made bad bets (and in many cases, huge profits) be bailed out?

Forbes - December 1th 2007 Lehman Brothers reported total compensation of $9.5 billion for 2007 , a 9.5 % increase over last year, and bonuses of $5.7 billion. CEO Richard Fuld Jr. received a $35 million stock bonus. According to Forbes, Fuld’s five-year compensation total, excluding this latest bonus, is nearly $312 million.
Five other top executives at Lehman received a total of $58 million in stock, according to separate filings. President Joe Gregory was awarded $29 million and Vice Chairman Thomas Russo was given $9 million.

Just to give one of many examples of the hypocrisy at work here, when Venezuela nationalised Banco de Venezuela in '94, what did Goldman Sachs have to say?

"It's looking like a negative development, I don't see why the banking sector needs to be under the purview of the public sector," said Alberto Ramos, a senior economist with Goldman Sachs. "The private sector does a much more efficient job of running that type of business."

"socialism for the rich and free enterprise for the poor"....

NOMI PRINS: The bailout of AIG is an example of the government having to step in and clean up a mess. It is not so much that subprime mortgages fell and that caused some losses to AIG. AIG was acting not simply as an insurance company; it was acting as a speculative investment bank/hedge fund, as was Bear Stearns, as was Lehman Brothers, as is what will become Bank of America/Merrill Lynch. So you have a situation where it’s bailing out not just the money, but taking on the risk of items it cannot even begin to understand, because if it had understood them, this would never have gotten to the point to which it has gotten.

AMY GOODMAN: How did it get to this point? How did it go beyond insurance?

NOMI PRINS: In AIG and in Lehman and with Merrill and every other company on Wall Street that has faltered or is faltering, it’s about taking on too much leverage and borrowing to take on the risk and borrowing again and borrowing again, twenty-five to thirty times the amount of capital, the amount of money that they had to basically back the borrowing that they were doing. Human regular borrowers cannot do this. This is something that is an item only of the banking industry.

And not only was all that borrowing happening, but there was no transparency to the Fed, to the SEC, to the Treasury, to anyone who would have even bothered to look as to how much of a catastrophe was being created, so that when anything fell, whether it was the subprime mortgage or whether it was a credit complex security, it was all below a pile of immense interlocked, incestuous borrowing, and that’s what is bringing down the entire banking system.

AMY GOODMAN: Michael Hudson, we’re talking government bailout, which means taxpayers stuck with the bill. Do you think this is the right move?

MICHAEL HUDSON: No, it’s the worst possible move, and it puts the class war back in business with a vengeance. Wall Street has been preparing for this for years, because every financial analyst knows that the debts can’t be paid. And the question that Wall Street has, if you’re going to take a gamble on bad debts that can’t be paid, how are you going to come out a winner? And there’s only one way of coming out a winner, and that’s to make the government bail you out. This has been known for years, because it’s inherent almost in the mathematics of compound interest. Every banker I know knew that the loans they were making were going to go bad. They were trying to sell them to somebody else, ultimately expecting them to end up with some sovereign wealth fund.

And now, you had at the beginning of the show, McCain saying that this is the result of fraud and incompetence. The government has now bailed them out. But by bailing them out—Wall Street was coming to terms with the bad debts. When Bear Stearns went under and when Lehman Brothers went under, this began to wipe away the bad debts. And when the debts exceed the ability to pay, there’s only one thing any economy can do, and that’s wipe them out. Instead, the government is trying to keep the fiction alive. And what Paulson did yesterday, in bailing out AIG, was to try to lock in whoever is the next president not only to further bailouts of Wall Street, ostensibly to protect the public money, but to make it impossible to write down the debts of the four million homeowners that are expected to default this year, impossible to write down the debts of companies that have issued junk bonds, impossible for the country to get rid of this excess of debts that can’t be repaid. And you’re having really a war now of creditors against debtors. And this is what Wall Street has been preparing for. It needed an emergency to do it. It’s really not an emergency at all. This has been building up for many years. Everybody expected it. And breathlessly now, the Secretary of Treasury has done it.

AMY GOODMAN: But, of course, the argument was, if you don’t bail out AIG, it could lead to a global financial meltdown.

MICHAEL HUDSON: What you—it’s a meltdown of the gamblers, as Nomi said. These are people who’ve gambled. You had McCain saying they’re gamblers. If these people have gambled, we’re talking about derivative trades, billions of dollars of bets on which way interest rates will go, billions of dollars of bad loans beyond the ability of debtors to pay. Why on earth would you want to bail out these creditors?

AMY GOODMAN: So, what would happen if you didn’t?

MICHAEL HUDSON: Then you would prepare the ground for writing down the debts of the homeowners that have no way of repaying the exploding mortgages. Those interest rates are going to be jumping up this year. You would be able to bring the debts down to the ability of the economy to pay, and you would save these four million homeowners from defaulting and being kicked out of their houses. Now they’re going to be kicked out of the houses. The houses will be vacant. The cities are going to now say, “Gee, we’re going to have to cut the property taxes to enable the debts to be paid to save the financial system.” So, if they cut the property taxes, they’re going to have to cut back local expenditures, local infrastructure. The economy is being sacrificed to pay the gamblers....

 
D

droid

Guest
...

The fruit of hypocrisy
Dishonesty in the finance sector dragged us here, and Washington looks ill-equipped to guide us out

Joseph Stiglitz
The Guardian, Tuesday September 16 2008
Article history

Houses of cards, chickens coming home to roost - pick your cliche. The new low in the financial crisis, which has prompted comparisons with the 1929 Wall Street crash, is the fruit of a pattern of dishonesty on the part of financial institutions, and incompetence on the part of policymakers.

We had become accustomed to the hypocrisy. The banks reject any suggestion they should face regulation, rebuff any move towards anti-trust measures - yet when trouble strikes, all of a sudden they demand state intervention: they must be bailed out; they are too big, too important to be allowed to fail.

Eventually, however, we were always going to learn how big the safety net was. And a sign of the limits of the US Federal Reserve and treasury's willingness to rescue comes with the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers, one of the most famous Wall Street names.

The big question always centres on systemic risk: to what extent does the collapse of an institution imperil the financial system as a whole? Wall Street has always been quick to overstate systemic risk - take, for example, the 1994 Mexican financial crisis - but loth to allow examination of their own dealings. Last week the US treasury secretary, Henry Paulson, judged there was sufficient systemic risk to warrant a government rescue of mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; but there was not sufficient systemic risk seen in Lehman.

The present financial crisis springs from a catastrophic collapse in confidence. The banks were laying huge bets with each other over loans and assets. Complex transactions were designed to move risk and disguise the sliding value of assets. In this game there are winners and losers. And it's not a zero-sum game, it's a negative-sum game: as people wake up to the smoke and mirrors in the financial system, as people grow averse to risk, losses occur; the market as a whole plummets and everyone loses.

Financial markets hinge on trust, and that trust has eroded. Lehman's collapse marks at the very least a powerful symbol of a new low in confidence, and the reverberations will continue.

The crisis in trust extends beyond banks. In the global context, there is dwindling confidence in US policymakers. At July's G8 meeting in Hokkaido the US delivered assurances that things were turning around at last. The weeks since have done nothing but confirm any global mistrust of government experts.

How seriously, then, should we take comparisons with the crash of 1929? Most economists believe we have the monetary and fiscal instruments and understanding to avoid collapse on that scale. And yet the IMF and the US treasury, together with central banks and finance ministers from many other countries, are capable of supporting the sort of "rescue" policies that led Indonesia to economic disaster in 1998. Moreover, it is difficult to have faith in the policy wherewithal of a government that oversaw the utter mismanagement of the war in Iraq and the response to Hurricane Katrina. If any administration can turn this crisis into another depression, it is the Bush administration.

America's financial system failed in its two crucial responsibilities: managing risk and allocating capital. The industry as a whole has not been doing what it should be doing - for instance creating products that help Americans manage critical risks, such as staying in their homes when interest rates rise or house prices fall - and it must now face change in its regulatory structures. Regrettably, many of the worst elements of the US financial system - toxic mortgages and the practices that led to them - were exported to the rest of the world.

It was all done in the name of innovation, and any regulatory initiative was fought away with claims that it would suppress that innovation. They were innovating, all right, but not in ways that made the economy stronger. Some of America's best and brightest were devoting their talents to getting around standards and regulations designed to ensure the efficiency of the economy and the safety of the banking system. Unfortunately, they were far too successful, and we are all - homeowners, workers, investors, taxpayers - paying the price.

· Joseph E Stiglitz is university professor at Columbia University and recipient of the 2001 Nobel prize in economics josephstiglitz.com
 

vimothy

yurp
Look at the yield on a 3 month T-bill -- nothing at all:

no-one-wants-to-hold-risk.JPG


Gold:

gold.gif
 
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vimothy

yurp
I thought the point of short selling wsa to cause panic, drive down the share price and then scoop them back up on the cheap. But if they're just selling and driving the banks into nationalisation, where are the "rich rewards"? So explanation, please. And feel free to express it in the most condescendingly layman's terms imaginable.

It's the price differential that's important, not buying up companies cheap per se. (Remember that short-sellers borrow the shares they are shorting).
 

IdleRich

IdleRich
"I thought the point of short selling wsa to cause panic, drive down the share price and then scoop them back up on the cheap. But if they're just selling and driving the banks into nationalisation, where are the "rich rewards"? So explanation, please. And feel free to express it in the most condescendingly layman's terms imaginable."
I don't understand what he's saying there to be honest. Firstly, in my experience, short selling isn't necessarily anything like so sinister as the way it is portrayed in the press. Selling short isn't necessarily trying to force the share price down any more than buying is an attempt to force it up - it may just be that you think it is already going down and you want to bet on it going in that direction, just as if you think it is going up you want to bet on it going that way by buying a share. Short selling is riskier though because you have to pay interest on the borrowed shares and, theoretically at least, your losses are potentially infinite because there is no limit to the level share price can rise. Then again if you buy millions of shares at x pounds each then your potential loss is the total money invested if the share goes right to zero so your possible losses may well be enough to wipe you out anyway.
Also, short selling is often used as a hedge. Suppose you buy a number of futures relating to a share, as each future (in the UK) is related to a thousand shares (I think) you can hedge this by selling a thousand times as many of the stock as you bought of the future, the idea being that there is such a direct relationship between the two things that, assuming you execute the trades at favourable prices then you can lock in a profit. What I mean is, if the share price increases you make money on the future but lose it on the stock, if it goes down you make it on the stock but lose it on the future - if by watching the two prices constantly you can buy and sell the two securities as soon as they move outside of a certain relationship you may well short sell but you are not even taking a directional view on the stock.
I guess short selling can be used to attack share price, but it's risky if it doesn't work (if you've sold a massive amount of shares you don't have to push the price down and it goes up you've got to buy back a massive amount of shares for more than you sold them). However I don't see what he's complaining about in this case, if short selling did force the price down then the sellers made their own profit with no help from Paulson. The government buy-out may have hurt the share-holders but wouldn't they have been hurt equally by letting it go bankrupt? I can only think that he's saying that short selling should have been prevented in the first place - but that seems a bit ad hoc - another example of people loving the free market when it's making them money but crying foul when it goes against them I think.
 

vimothy

yurp
I guess short selling can be used to attack share price, but it's risky if it doesn't work (if you've sold a massive amount of shares you don't have to push the price down and it goes up you've got to buy back a massive amount of shares for more than you sold them). However I don't see what he's complaining about in this case, if short selling did force the price down then the sellers made their own profit with no help from Paulson. The government buy-out may have hurt the share-holders but wouldn't they have been hurt equally by letting it go bankrupt? I can only think that he's saying that short selling should have been prevented in the first place - but that seems a bit ad hoc - another example of people loving the free market when it's making them money but crying foul when it goes against them I think.

Yeah, what's he going on about? It's not the government's fault (directly, at least) that the share price of FRE and FNM fell. I think that Kaletsky is actually blaming the short-sellers (Fuld would be happy to read that, I'm sure) and claiming that the government should have somehow suppported the banks' shareholders by propping up the share price and keeping asset values high?
 
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