The Political Economy of Democracy
- Thread starter vimothy
- Start date
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
I can't remember if that has come up at all although it certainly feeds into the whole debate. Just had my options fair - choosing my modules for next year - and my two IR modules will be: Globalization and Contemporary Conflict, and Capitalism and Geopolitics, with the latter looking at the origins and development of the Westphalian system and its relationship to capitalism.
vimothy
yurp
Think that Western interests are definitely at work, but you have to concede the widely held belief that if the choice is repression or chaos, repression is the more humane choice (e.g. the natural state vs anarchy).
EDIT: Just to make myself a bit more clear, it's that this is a widely held belief that I think makes it influential, regardless of its truth, and that therefore there is also at least an element of altruism in the West's support for existing states, and an element of internal support for the same reason.
EDIT: Just to make myself a bit more clear, it's that this is a widely held belief that I think makes it influential, regardless of its truth, and that therefore there is also at least an element of altruism in the West's support for existing states, and an element of internal support for the same reason.
Last edited:
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
Nice dichotomy: repression -- chaos? Like I said in an earlier post:
If there is no state then there is anarchy :slanted:
vimothy
yurp
I'm thinking specifically of the distinction that North et al make, i.e. that the choice facing most of humanity for most of history has not been the liberal open access order vs the repressive natural state, but the repressive natural state vs bloody chaos.
I do agree that "anarchy" represents a proxy term for a different type of (internally contested?) social order, but in the context of this debate "anarchy" is viewed with disdain for a reason: higher transaction costs, i.e. the problems with anarchy are the problems that drive state formation in the first place. I don't mean to be moralistic.
Did you ever read the issue of Cato Unbound where Dani Rodrik is arguing with someone from GMU and that anarcho-capitalist, Bruce Benson, about whether Somalia would be better off with no government at all?
I do agree that "anarchy" represents a proxy term for a different type of (internally contested?) social order, but in the context of this debate "anarchy" is viewed with disdain for a reason: higher transaction costs, i.e. the problems with anarchy are the problems that drive state formation in the first place. I don't mean to be moralistic.
Did you ever read the issue of Cato Unbound where Dani Rodrik is arguing with someone from GMU and that anarcho-capitalist, Bruce Benson, about whether Somalia would be better off with no government at all?
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
No I totally appreciate that. Clearly in terms of stimulating economic growth and substantial and sustainable improvements in terms of living standards, a consolidated 'Westphalian' state represents the most desirable form of political organisation.
But in much of the post-colonial world where the creation of states was both recent and fairly arbitrary, the state is still highly contested. Do 'we' let the internal dynamics of order creation play out in these regions, or do 'we' intervene and choose (again) who will wield power and how power will be structured -- to suit 'our' best interests?
Yeah, I was thinking about that earlier today.... need to reread it though.
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
I think perhaps North overstates the case a bit in terms of this binary between the natural state and 'bloody chaos'. In the absence of coercive force a new actor wielding coercive force will emerge IMHO. In a situation where multiple parties seeking to use coercive force exist, then institutionalised order is likely to emerge to some degree reflecting the benefits which will accrue to all parties if such an environment can be created --> i.e. a natural state.
Natural states are natural states whether we in the 'West' choose to recognise them or not. Somalia could be considered to be a natural state despite the fact that it has no (or at least went for a long time without an) internationally legitimate head of state/governmental structure.
Last edited:
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
It seems popular to refer to internal/intra-state war in Africa as a 'new barbarism' or the 'end of civilization' in that region. Always framed in terms of a backwards movement along the linear trajectory of human development. But i think this is bullshit. One institutionalised order declines.... another rises. Seems its just a question of which orders 'we' want to recognise as legitimate and which 'we' don't. Development involves violence. Conflict either through force or on a symbolic level is an inherent part of the developmental process. Conflict in e.g. Africa does not represent a return to some primordial state of nature but is in fact a constitutive part of moving forwards. Or at least thats what I think right now
Last edited:
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
IMAGINING FRESH STARTS
What, then, could lie beyond collapse, and what lessons can be drawn from past experiences? Historically speaking, one would expect a new political order to surface from amidst the ruins of the old, possibly building on elements that had been suppressed or ignored. As noted above, the connections between the old and the new can be extremely important in under-standing the emergence and evolution of new political forms. In European history, state formation processes often re-started in new directions and in new constellations following the demise of a previous order. Today in various settings in the South it is important that political re-starts should be given a realistic chance of succeeding, as well as the space they may require for working out new and viable arrangements. This implies, among other things, that whatever well-intentioned plans are being made for inter-national assistance to rehabilitation, a key point of departure must be that internal social and political actors and dynamics play a central, not a spectator's role. Another implication is a need on all sides to recognize that fundamental political change, including that involved in processes of state formation, may in the long run need to be reflected in revised political maps and atlases. Stifling such processes for the sake of global `stability' could in the end prove counter-productive.
What, then, could lie beyond collapse, and what lessons can be drawn from past experiences? Historically speaking, one would expect a new political order to surface from amidst the ruins of the old, possibly building on elements that had been suppressed or ignored. As noted above, the connections between the old and the new can be extremely important in under-standing the emergence and evolution of new political forms. In European history, state formation processes often re-started in new directions and in new constellations following the demise of a previous order. Today in various settings in the South it is important that political re-starts should be given a realistic chance of succeeding, as well as the space they may require for working out new and viable arrangements. This implies, among other things, that whatever well-intentioned plans are being made for inter-national assistance to rehabilitation, a key point of departure must be that internal social and political actors and dynamics play a central, not a spectator's role. Another implication is a need on all sides to recognize that fundamental political change, including that involved in processes of state formation, may in the long run need to be reflected in revised political maps and atlases. Stifling such processes for the sake of global `stability' could in the end prove counter-productive.
From: 'State Collapse and Fresh Starts: Some Critical Reflections', by Martin Doornbos
This looks excellent as well - 'Collapse or Order: Questioning State Collapse in Africa', by Timothy Raeymaekers. [EDIT: I've just read it and it is fucking brilliant - a must-read!!]
Last edited:
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
Paul Williams states this argument well:
When analysing state failure in Africa in this first sense, analysts and practitioners would thus do well to reject a statecentric ontology in favour of a neo-Gramscian frame of reference, wherein the world is not simply made up of clashing states in an anarchic international system but, instead, is constituted by the complex inter-relationships between states, social forces and ideas within specific world orders. Adopting this ontology is far more useful for analysing state failure because as Timothy Raeymaekers correctly observed, what we are witnessing in several cases of so-called ‘state failure’ is actually better understood as ‘neopatrimonialism without the state’. That is, systems of patron-client relations that may or may not be linked to the official institutions of state power. Arguably the closest Western officialdom has come to adopting such a perspective is the US Government’s anxiety about what it terms ‘ungoverned spaces’, ‘defined as geographic areas where governments do not exercise effective control.’ Unfortunately, this misses the crucial point that just because official governments do not control these areas it does not necessarily mean that they are completely lacking other structures of governance.
Read the whole peice here.
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
I think the Williams peice is worth quoting at length because he puts the whole debate surrounding the idea of statehood (and thus state collapse) into its historical context:
Understood in these two senses, state failure on the African continent is a widespread phenomenon but the failure to promote human flourishing has arguably been greater than the failure to control. Nevertheless, it is important to note that both these views of failure are based upon a particular conception of statehood: what Rotberg calls ‘the fundamental tasks of a nation-state in the modern world’ and what William Zartman refers to as ‘the basic functions of the state’. The particular idea of statehood that dominates discussions about state failure was born in Europe and is usually associated with the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648. That year is thus commonly understood within mainstream international relations theory as representing the birth of modern interstate relations. Yet while this specific date of origin makes for neat theory it rests upon a dubious and mythical history. As Benno Teschke has argued, even in its European birthplace the practice of Westphalian statehood as opposed to the ideal of Westphalian statehood did not emerge until well after 1648. Specifically Teschke has shown how modern international relations based on the Westphalian ideal of statehood only began with the conjunction of the rise of capitalism and modern state formation in England. Thereafter, the English model influenced the restructuring of the old regimes of the European continent, a process that was incremental and highly uneven and was not completed until the First World War.
The relevant point for this discussion is that the nature of statehood itself is contested rather than obviously apparent. Specifically, as Christopher Clapham has argued, the Westphalian ideal rests on ‘unsure foundations’, not least because in some parts of the world ‘the essential conditions for statehood cannot plausibly be met.’ The ‘fundamental tasks’ of statehood envisaged in this Westphalian ideal revolved around the provision of security, welfare and representation. In particular, the defining characteristic of the Westphalian ideal of statehood has been the right of states to exercise five monopoly powers:
Understood in these terms, the issue of ‘failed states’ in Africa is largely about the extent to which the Westphalian ideal of statehood has taken root in the rather different and in many ways inhospitable conditions found on the continent. As the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) charter made abundantly clear, the ideal of Westphalian statehood clearly attracted many advocates among Africa’s first generation of post-colonial elites. It was also helped by the willingness of the great powers within international society to grant these states international recognition. The practical realization of this ideal, however, has been far more contested and uneven. As a result, from the outside, African states often looked like the Westphalian ideal in that they were recognized members of international society and their representatives sat on the councils of various international organizations. On the inside, however, these governments were often considered illegitimate by much of the local population and wielded the institutions of state to subdue political opponents and benefit their supporters. These were, in Robert Jackson’s famous phrase, quasi-states: legal fictions that rarely commanded much in the way of national loyalty or the power to control developments throughout their designated territory.
What this means for an analysis of state failure is simply that depending on the local conditions, ‘failure’ is far more likely in certain parts of the continent than others. More specifically, as Clapham has argued ‘those areas of Africa that maintained reasonably settled and effective state structures during the period prior to colonialism are proving best able to do so as the institutional legacies of colonialism fade.’ Where these structures were weak other forms of authority (familial, spiritual, ethnic etc.) have filled the vacuum.
The relevant point for this discussion is that the nature of statehood itself is contested rather than obviously apparent. Specifically, as Christopher Clapham has argued, the Westphalian ideal rests on ‘unsure foundations’, not least because in some parts of the world ‘the essential conditions for statehood cannot plausibly be met.’ The ‘fundamental tasks’ of statehood envisaged in this Westphalian ideal revolved around the provision of security, welfare and representation. In particular, the defining characteristic of the Westphalian ideal of statehood has been the right of states to exercise five monopoly powers:
the right to monopolize control of the instruments of violence;
the sole right to tax citizens;
the prerogative of ordering the political allegiances of citizens and of enlisting their support in war;
the sovereign right to adjudicate in disputes between citizens;
the exclusive right of representation in international society which has been linked with the authority to bind the whole community in international law.
Even in Europe, as Teschke observed, the practical acquisition of these monopoly powers sometimes took centuries of often violent turmoil and social upheaval. Compared with Europe and viewed from the perspective of the longue dure´e it is clear that most states in Africa are still mired in the relatively early stages of state formation. Consequently, it should come as little surprise that the practical acquisition of these monopolies has been uneven across the continent. Although it has been similarly traumatic and drawn out, the process of state building has unfolded differently in Africa than it did in Europe. Unlike in Europe where state borders were demarcated with reference to their neighbours, in Africa state power tended to radiate from a focal core (usually the capital city) that only rarely came into direct confrontation with its neighbouring governments. As a basic rule of thumb, the further one travelled from this core, the weaker the state’s control became. This fact rendered the state borders drawn up by the European colonial powers in Berlin in 1884–85 relatively meaningless, or at least highly porous, for many practical aspects of the local inhabitants’ daily existence, including commerce or communicating with individuals, who were officially ‘foreigners’ but who belonged to the same ethnic or tribal groups.the sole right to tax citizens;
the prerogative of ordering the political allegiances of citizens and of enlisting their support in war;
the sovereign right to adjudicate in disputes between citizens;
the exclusive right of representation in international society which has been linked with the authority to bind the whole community in international law.
Understood in these terms, the issue of ‘failed states’ in Africa is largely about the extent to which the Westphalian ideal of statehood has taken root in the rather different and in many ways inhospitable conditions found on the continent. As the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) charter made abundantly clear, the ideal of Westphalian statehood clearly attracted many advocates among Africa’s first generation of post-colonial elites. It was also helped by the willingness of the great powers within international society to grant these states international recognition. The practical realization of this ideal, however, has been far more contested and uneven. As a result, from the outside, African states often looked like the Westphalian ideal in that they were recognized members of international society and their representatives sat on the councils of various international organizations. On the inside, however, these governments were often considered illegitimate by much of the local population and wielded the institutions of state to subdue political opponents and benefit their supporters. These were, in Robert Jackson’s famous phrase, quasi-states: legal fictions that rarely commanded much in the way of national loyalty or the power to control developments throughout their designated territory.
What this means for an analysis of state failure is simply that depending on the local conditions, ‘failure’ is far more likely in certain parts of the continent than others. More specifically, as Clapham has argued ‘those areas of Africa that maintained reasonably settled and effective state structures during the period prior to colonialism are proving best able to do so as the institutional legacies of colonialism fade.’ Where these structures were weak other forms of authority (familial, spiritual, ethnic etc.) have filled the vacuum.
vimothy
yurp
Finally catching up on some of this reading!
So,
First, consider that the role of the powers was not only as a constraint upon warfare in the name of state building, but also as an encouragement to, and a provider of legitimacy for, inter and intra-state violence. The USSR at the very least fits this description, viz. its activities in support of various different types of Arab socialist and Arab nationalist regimes and movements, which operated under the rubric of establishing an Arab Great Power.
Next, consider that though the barriers to entry into the “Market of the Powers”, to coin a phrase, were higher than they had been previously, those barriers in any case existed before the rise of imperial Europe. Did the ill-fated union of Egypt and Syria fail because of Western intervention, or because it was simply unsustainable?
Finally, let’s imagine that the critical juncture of Middle Eastern history at the end of the World War II did produce an Arab Great Power state. What would it have looked like? It would have been an ally of the USSR. It would have been facilitated by the USSR, which would have represented a Great Power actually reducing transaction costs for state conquest. It would have been driven by totalitarian ideologies developed in Europe. It would have been fed by oil rents and consequently without restraint. Successful, it would have acquired the same moment that all Great Powers acquired, and expanded as it could. It’s hard to imagine that the world would be more peaceful today, unless you think that we would have already had another Great Power war or conflict with the Arab nation-state.
Of course, it is possible that the world would be more peaceful today, but hard to judge how to properly cost global conflagration. I wonder, if the world was more peaceful, but we’d fought another Great Power war, would you call that a fair trade off? Is Russia better off now than before the revolution? I mean, I’m sure that it is, but was it worth it?
So,
From this perspective both civil and regional interstate wars should be seen as part of the developmental process leading in the long-run to consolidation of effective political, administrative and fiscal control over larger territorial spaces. Would this have happened in the Middle East without 'Western' interventions (both military and international-legal) during the 20th C? And if so, would the region be more stable today?
I would advise caution here. This proposition, which seems to me implicit in Lustick’s paper, is strictly hypothetical, contingent upon numerous different factors, and subject to problems of etymological definition. First, consider that the role of the powers was not only as a constraint upon warfare in the name of state building, but also as an encouragement to, and a provider of legitimacy for, inter and intra-state violence. The USSR at the very least fits this description, viz. its activities in support of various different types of Arab socialist and Arab nationalist regimes and movements, which operated under the rubric of establishing an Arab Great Power.
Next, consider that though the barriers to entry into the “Market of the Powers”, to coin a phrase, were higher than they had been previously, those barriers in any case existed before the rise of imperial Europe. Did the ill-fated union of Egypt and Syria fail because of Western intervention, or because it was simply unsustainable?
Finally, let’s imagine that the critical juncture of Middle Eastern history at the end of the World War II did produce an Arab Great Power state. What would it have looked like? It would have been an ally of the USSR. It would have been facilitated by the USSR, which would have represented a Great Power actually reducing transaction costs for state conquest. It would have been driven by totalitarian ideologies developed in Europe. It would have been fed by oil rents and consequently without restraint. Successful, it would have acquired the same moment that all Great Powers acquired, and expanded as it could. It’s hard to imagine that the world would be more peaceful today, unless you think that we would have already had another Great Power war or conflict with the Arab nation-state.
Of course, it is possible that the world would be more peaceful today, but hard to judge how to properly cost global conflagration. I wonder, if the world was more peaceful, but we’d fought another Great Power war, would you call that a fair trade off? Is Russia better off now than before the revolution? I mean, I’m sure that it is, but was it worth it?
Last edited:
vimothy
yurp
Also been doing a bit of blogging on this:
I’m currently thinking of these newer, post-Westphalia, “market barriers” as a variety of binding and non-binding price floors, in that the binding price-floors determine the market outcome, and the non-binding do not. Where a state is unable to produce (war) at the level of the price floor, it is prevented from entering the market. In the Middle East, this means that, because of Western state interventions pursuing Western state interests at the expense of Arab nationalists, regional violence is very expensive. For example, the high cost of acting against the interests of the Great Powers defeated Ali Muhammad of Egypt in the 19th Century. Where those price floors are close to the market price, they are irrelevant. In terms of being able to administer internal violence at the discretion of the leader, Middle Eastern states have, even today, a large degree of freedom. For example, the ease with which Assad put down the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion in Hama reflects a general lack of interest and of constraint from the international order. In addition, the price floors still operate at a national level, and therefore are binding for some insurgent forces within the state. Internal rebellion is consequently more expensive and difficult to undertake. For example, the failure of the Egyptian Islamists to overthrow Nasser and Sadat was, at least in part, thanks to the patronage of the Powers, who provided the regimes with aid, weapons and other assistance.
All of this is an unfair advantage from the perspective of a free market where the regime and challenger compete for power and legitimacy. We have effectively institutionalised a system whereby we guarantee the state against internal overthrow but prevent the state from engaging in cross-border wars of conquest. Violence can flow downwards but not across.
All of this is an unfair advantage from the perspective of a free market where the regime and challenger compete for power and legitimacy. We have effectively institutionalised a system whereby we guarantee the state against internal overthrow but prevent the state from engaging in cross-border wars of conquest. Violence can flow downwards but not across.
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
Good stuff man - a really interesting synthesis of ideas - i like!
So this:
is effectively a normative view of the state. It is descriptive only insofar as some states do indeed meet these basic requirements. But to build an analysis of the world around a state-centric model is of dubious value given the the actual reality of certain regions. As Williams says, 'the nature of statehood itself is contested rather than obviously apparent'.
What do you think of this:
[EDIT: Wiki on neo-gramscianism]
So this:
the right to monopolize control of the instruments of violence;
the sole right to tax citizens;
the prerogative of ordering the political allegiances of citizens and of enlisting their support in war;
the sovereign right to adjudicate in disputes between citizens;
the exclusive right of representation in international society which has been linked with the authority to bind the whole community in international law.
the sole right to tax citizens;
the prerogative of ordering the political allegiances of citizens and of enlisting their support in war;
the sovereign right to adjudicate in disputes between citizens;
the exclusive right of representation in international society which has been linked with the authority to bind the whole community in international law.
is effectively a normative view of the state. It is descriptive only insofar as some states do indeed meet these basic requirements. But to build an analysis of the world around a state-centric model is of dubious value given the the actual reality of certain regions. As Williams says, 'the nature of statehood itself is contested rather than obviously apparent'.
What do you think of this:
When analysing state failure in Africa in this first sense, analysts and practitioners would thus do well to reject a statecentric ontology in favour of a neo-Gramscian frame of reference, wherein the world is not simply made up of clashing states in an anarchic international system but, instead, is constituted by the complex inter-relationships between states, social forces and ideas within specific world orders.
[EDIT: Wiki on neo-gramscianism]
Last edited:
vimothy
yurp
Something that struck me last night, that I think is pretty important, is the realisation that the "Lustick hypothesis" effectively assumes that transaction costs before the advent of the Great Powers were zero, and that this has policy implications, in that we should reduce transaction costs for inter-state wars to allow the formation of stronger states in our own image. I think that's pretty obviously not true. Instead, I'm interested in how this might be solved or conceptualised using NIE type analysis: transaction costs are less than zero --> institutions are important.
I certainly don't think reducing transaction costs for empire building is the right way to go.
I certainly don't think reducing transaction costs for empire building is the right way to go.
vimothy
yurp
Interesting to think of Kosova, the world's newest state, in relation to all this. From the NYT:
At a deeper level, the story of little Kosovo is the story of changing notions of sovereignty and international law.
After the above-mentioned genocides, one perpetrated by the late Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, both revealing a U.N. Security Council too divided to stop mass slaughter, NATO circumvented the council in 1999. It waged war for the first time to prevent Milosevic doing his worst again in Kosovo.
The war, in the words of Thomas Weiss, a political scientist at the City University of New York, ”had legitimacy even if its legality was questioned.” This legitimacy stemmed from an evolving consensus that, as Tony Blair once put it, ”acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter.”
Sovereignty, after Bosnia, after Rwanda, in a globalized world, was more than authority over territory and people. It was also responsibility....
In 2005, the World Summit adopted the ”responsibility to protect,” known by that acronym. R2P formalized the notion that when a state proves unable or unwilling to protect its people, and crimes against humanity are perpetrated, the international community has an obligation to intervene — if necessary, and as a last resort, with military force.
Member states declared that, with Security Council approval, they were prepared "to take collective action in a timely and decisive manner" when "national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."
After the above-mentioned genocides, one perpetrated by the late Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, both revealing a U.N. Security Council too divided to stop mass slaughter, NATO circumvented the council in 1999. It waged war for the first time to prevent Milosevic doing his worst again in Kosovo.
The war, in the words of Thomas Weiss, a political scientist at the City University of New York, ”had legitimacy even if its legality was questioned.” This legitimacy stemmed from an evolving consensus that, as Tony Blair once put it, ”acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter.”
Sovereignty, after Bosnia, after Rwanda, in a globalized world, was more than authority over territory and people. It was also responsibility....
In 2005, the World Summit adopted the ”responsibility to protect,” known by that acronym. R2P formalized the notion that when a state proves unable or unwilling to protect its people, and crimes against humanity are perpetrated, the international community has an obligation to intervene — if necessary, and as a last resort, with military force.
Member states declared that, with Security Council approval, they were prepared "to take collective action in a timely and decisive manner" when "national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
This thread seems to have become a private conversation between me and you Vim. Not sure why though as the material is highly topical - the formation of the state, state breakdown, society-state relations, socio-economic development etc. I appreciate that sometimes it can be highly theoretical but this is rarely seems to put people off when the theory is of the post-modern strain (which some of the arguments put forward here are leaning towards anyway IMO).
Whats going on people? Everyone's view is welcomed, in fact it's positively encouraged
Whats going on people? Everyone's view is welcomed, in fact it's positively encouraged
Last edited:
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
Well Vim still interested to know what you make of the neo-gramscian perspective - as a fusion of realist and liberal schools of thought on IR? Yes this is critical theory building on some aspects of historical materialism but nevertheless very useful IMO.
vimothy
yurp
On a level other than the theoretical, is it useful? How would states interact with non-states or quasi-states?