Richard Dawkins

[IdleRich]

I agree with Ollie on that. Part of me has more respect for the fire and brimstone preachers or whatever who actually follow the word of the Lord (amen) than those lily-livered types such as Rowan Williamson who attempt to sugar the pill. I think that if you really believe it's the fucking word of the lord you had better fucking follow it and get stoning some people who've let cut their forelock hair or eaten a bat.
That's obviously not a subtle response but I don't want my religion to be subtle in that way. Though I guess - no playa the game no maka the rules so I'll shut up.

 

[Mr. Tea]

Also, I'm puzzled by the insistence that 'something' has to 'replace' religion (with an implicit assumption, for a lot of people, that this must be - dun dun DUHH! - capitalism, or consumerism, or something along those lines). I'm not aware of any particular gaping hole in my psyche left by an absence of religious belief, and I don't think most of the people I know have one, either.

 

[comelately]

I don't think that was what I was talking about there. But obviously the statement "It is a fact that there are facts" is not nonense - though maybe tautological.

I don't think either statement is nonsense. I, today, can sort of see that 'it is a fact that there is facts' is more persuasive than 'it is a fact that there are no facts'. I think as humans we are more inclined to spot the problem with the second statement more easily than the first - i.e. we are naturally inclined towards meaning-making. But both are equally question begging, the assertion of the fact that there are facts just leads you back to an infinite regress of justification. But I have come to appreciate that this is not easy to spot, and the 'family resemblance' narrative presents this issue in way that is much easier to grasp.

So we should just stick with what we have even though we don't believe in it and we don't think it does us any good? Seems more than defeatist.

That's obviously a massively questionable of the word 'we' and I think the 'stick with what we've got' thing is an obvious strawman.

 

[IdleRich]

"I don't think either statement is nonsense. I, today, can sort of see that 'it is a fact that there is facts' is more persuasive than 'it is a fact that there are no facts'. I think as humans we are more inclined to spot the problem with the second statement more easily than the first - i.e. we are naturally inclined towards meaning-making. But both are equally question begging, the assertion of the fact that there are facts just leads you back to an infinite regress of justification. But I have come to appreciate that this is not easy to spot, and the 'family resemblance' narrative presents this issue in way that is much easier to grasp."

Ah, I see what you're saying. As an argument "it's a fact that there are facts" is question begging of course, I'm just saying that it's not a nonsensical statement in a world where we already accept that we have facts.

 

[comelately]

Also, I'm puzzled by the insistence that 'something' has to 'replace' religion (with an implicit assumption, for a lot of people, that this must be - dun dun DUHH! - capitalism, or consumerism, or something along those lines). I'm not aware of any particular gaping hole in my psyche left by an absence of religious belief, and I don't think most of the people I know have one, either.

Some people will be puzzled by this insistence but Dawkins does seem to acknowledge it, even though I think it puzzles him too. Humans are meaning makers, meaning making is non-scientific. There doesn't need to be 'gaping holes in the psyche' - if you persuade people that their metaphysical beliefs are wrong, they are going to be pretty much instantly replaced. Now these new metaphysical beliefs may be less stable, and be replaced again more quickly - but there doesn't need to be a 'hole' for any significant period of time. Your psyche imagining a hole in your psyche is obviously going to be problematic anyway, so it just seems like another strawman to me.

 

[Mr. Tea]

meaning making is non-scientific.

I'd dispute that.

And I don't think it's a straw man, a lot of people have worried about the "hole left by religion" in a secular society. Eliot was writing about this a hundred years ago.

 

[comelately]

I'd dispute that.

Please do

And I don't think it's a straw man, a lot of people have worried about the "hole left by religion" in a secular society. Eliot was writing about this a hundred years ago.

Okay, but it's a strawman if you are asserting that as a position I have to take.

 

[IdleRich]

The trouble is, when man stops believing in God, he doesn't believe in nothing, he believes in everything.

 

[IdleRich]

Or is it "anything"?

 

[comelately]

No, evidence is not the same as a fact. The observation of any one fossil is not the same thing as the fact of evolution.

I'm coming back to this because it pertains to your idea that meaning-making can be scientific. By 'observing a fossil', you're essentially drawing conclusions about that fossil, i.e. facts. By evidence you mean facts.

What you've infact outlined is the problem of induction, also troubling from your pov - because although scientists are prepared to say that they are falsificationists, best approximators etc when it's expedient for them to act humble; they don't act like that really. They naturally tend towards induction; it may be pragmatic to do so but it is not scientific.

 

[Mr. Tea]

Please do

A meaningless universe is one in which everything happens randomly, by pure chance. But that's not the case. Meaning is inherently linked to reason. Noticing that things happen for a reason is the first step towards trying to see patterns and to discern cause and effect. And that's the basis of science.

Meaning is only non-scientific if you interpret it specifically as 'spiritual meaning' - but that's begging the question.

 

[comelately]

A meaningless universe is one in which everything happens randomly

So we're talking about the meaning of meaning now? And I'm the one accused of being pomo!

How is it scientific to do so and how do you get away from the infinite regress problem?

 

[Mr. Tea]

I'm coming back to this because it pertains to your idea that meaning-making can be scientific. By 'observing a fossil', you're essentially drawing conclusions about that fossil, i.e. facts. By evidence you mean facts.

What you've infact outlined is the problem of induction, also troubling from your pov - because although scientists are prepared to say that they are falsificationists, best approximators etc when it's expedient for them to act humble; they don't act like that really. They naturally tend towards induction; it may be pragmatic to do so but it is not scientific.

I think science uses a combination of induction and deduction. I don't see the problem with induction - I mean, it works, doesn't it? What, in so many words, is "the problem of induction"?

No disrespect meant, but I've read some 'critiques' of science by continental philosophers who either clearly don't understand science or have chosen to misrepresent it in order to attack it.

 

[Mr. Tea]

So we're talking about the meaning of meaning now? And I'm the one accused of being pomo!

How is it scientific to do so and how do you get away from the infinite regress problem?

Sorry, what infinite regress problem? I don't see that there's a huge problem in defining facts in terms of other facts.

I think you're making the mistake of treating science as if it were a branch of philosophy. It may have been called 'natural philosophy' in the past but it's not really an applicable label. Science is an attempt to describe and explain the phenomena of the natural world by natural (as opposed to supernatural or metaphysical) means. It doesn't pretend to a deep epistemological or ontological rigour, and to criticize it for lacking that is a category error.

 

[comelately]

I think science uses a combination of induction and deduction. I don't see the problem with induction - I mean, it works, doesn't it? What, in so many words, is "the problem of induction"?

No disrespect meant, but I've read some 'critiques' of science by continental philosophers who either don't understand science or have chosen to misrepresent it in order to attack it.

The critique of induction is hardly restricted to continental philosophy so you really are burning a strawman now.

it works, doesn't it?

Either you can test that claim, or it isn't scientific and your project fails. And you can't. If you propose examples, then you're relying on the inductive method you're trying to prove and thus begging the question. I think this is the bit where I get called petty and disingenuous, but we're back to infinite regress.

 

[Mr. Tea]

Okay, but it's a strawman if you are asserting that as a position I have to take.

Oh yeah, I'm not ascribing this position to you - just saying that it is a position I've heard a lot of other people take.

 

[comelately]

Sorry, what infinite regress problem?

If meaning has a meaning, then what is the meaning of that meaning, and what is the meaning of the meaning, and what is the meaning of that meaning etc etc ad infinitum.

I think you're making the mistake of treating science as if it were a branch of philosophy. It may have been called 'natural philosophy' in the past but it's not really an applicable label.

Can you prove any of that scientifically?

Science is an attempt to describe and explain the phenomena of the natural world by natural (as opposed to supernatural or metaphysical) means.

Again, where is your test?

[/QUOTE]

Pragmatism, resemblance, induction. Metaphysics.

Spouting a load of words about 'continental philosophy' and category errors shows that you are trying to create meaning through narrative, persuasion and rhetoric - not through science in itself. Meaning is non-scientific.

EDIT: To put it another way - you're stating the meaning is scientific, denying science is philosophy, and then using philosophical arguments to attempt to create meaning.

What we are doing now is going round in circles, which is amusing to me as it only serves to highlight infinite regression, but I think we're reaching the 'agree to disagree' point. I hope Luka thinks I did better in the last day or so.

 

[Mr. Tea]

The critique of induction is hardly restricted to continental philosophy so you really are burning a strawman now.

I was talking about critiques in general, which AFAIK have come mainly from philosophers of the continental sciences.

Either you can test that claim, or it isn't scientific and your project fails. And you can't. If you propose examples, then you're relying on the inductive method you're trying to prove and thus begging the question. I think this is the bit where I get called petty and disingenuous, but we're back to infinite regress.

Again, you're applying the standards of philosophical critique to science. The basis of science is empiricism; observing phenomena and noticing patterns. By its own standards, science has been incredibly successful in describing the natural world. Science isn't going to provide you with a rigorous, infinite-regress-free definition of the word 'fact', because that's the realm of linguistics and philosophy.

 

[comelately]

By its own standards, science has been incredibly successful in describing the natural world.

How do you test that exactly? You're making a philosophical/metaphysical claim. A fairy absurd one I think, but it's kinda nice that Mr Science is all self-actualised and shit.

The basis of science is empiricism

So you're saying it's not legitimate to philosophically critique something based on its philosophical assumptions? That to do so is to make a category error? I'm tempted to ask how you would test that, but......

Science isn't going to provide you with a rigorous, infinite-regress-free definition of the word 'fact', because that's the realm of linguistics and philosophy.

Thus meaning is not scientific, it's the realm of linguistics and philosophy.

 

[Mr. Tea]

If meaning has a meaning, then what is the meaning of that meaning, and what is the meaning of the meaning, and what is the meaning of that meaning etc etc ad infinitum.

Well talking about the meaning of (say) DNA, or quantum probability, which falls within the remit of science, is different from talking about the meaning of the word "meaning", which doesn't.

Can you prove any of that scientifically?

No, and that's not a problem because science doesn't have the same reflexivity that philosophy does.

Spouting a load of words about 'continental philosophy' and category errors shows that you are trying to create meaning through narrative, persuasion and rhetoric - not through science in itself. Meaning is non-scientific.

The kind of meaning we're talking about now is non-scientific, yes. What do you expect me to do - produce a graph showing that I'm right and you're wrong?