The Political Economy of Democracy

[vimothy]

If this is true, whence all the talk about democracy being the "best" system in the world?

If you cannot see the difference between a regime with a winning coalition of, e.g., one-in-two (in a directly contested presidental election) and a winning coalition of, e.g., one-in-ten thousand (like North Korea's rigged system), then you are an idiot.

Yes, and I disagree with it.

You are an idiot. Bueno de Mesquita's work clearly demonstrates that democracy is exactly the same shit sandwich as dictatorship -- the institutional dimensions are identical (which is the whole point of my initial post) -- but merely a lot smaller, and with more bread and less shit.

FFS

 

[nomadologist]

If you cannot see the difference between a regime with a winning coalition of, e.g., one-in-two (in a directly contested presidental election) and a winning coalition of, e.g., one-in-ten thousand (like North Korea's rigged system), then you are an idiot.



You are an idiot. Bueno de Mesquita's work clearly demonstrates that democracy is exactly the same shit sandwich as dictatorship -- the institutional dimensions are identical (which is the whole point of my initial post) -- but merely a lot smaller, and with more bread and less shit.

FFS

Clearly demonstrates that, does it? How, by *claiming* that this is true?

I just said that I think winning coalitions and selectorates can work well in a form of democracy not run by a free market capitalist economy and all its demands. This was in reponse to Mr. BoShambles, who claimed that democracy was "clearly" the best system of government we've ever had throughout history. I don't think that democracy *need* resemble a dictatorship. Not at all. Maybe the one I live in does now, but bowing to its status quo is not a very lofty political goal.

 

[vimothy]

Clearly demonstrates that, does it? How, by *claiming* that this is true?

*sighs*

Let's take this slowly:

Terms like "selectorate" and "winning coalition", though they seem useful and sound in describing a process that already exists, are being used here in such a way that they're supposed to be examples that prove that the phenomena they describe are inherently "good" and "superior" to other potential processes or systems.

These terms are supposed to be nuetral, positive descriptions for institutional predicates, not normative statements or trojan-horses for ideology. Terms like "selectorate" and "winning coalition" can only be understood as proving "that the phenomena they describe are inherently "good" and "superior" to other potential processes or systems" if you haven't read the post in question. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita applies these terms to democracy and distatorship alike. It is not a question of superiority, because the only difference is one of scale. Democracy is flawed, but much less flawed than dictatorship, because it guarantees a larger group of constituents is served by the ruler.

The way that a selectorate or winning coalition works sure has a lot of potential to be part of a wonderful, just, and glorious system of government

Not true -- politics everywhere is characterised by the same power hungry bastards. The only difference between democracy and dictatorship is the differing institutional contexts that incentivise different behaviour.

Specifically circumstances in which the candidates the selectorate had to choose from were actually interested in running in order to effect change on the level of policy, and weren't simply part of an American aristocracy.

I give up...

I just said that I think winning coalitions and selectorates can work well in a form of democracy

^^Meaningless statement

This was in reponse to Mr. BoShambles, who claimed that democracy was "clearly" the best system of government we've ever had throughout history.

You obviously haven't understood what Bueno de Mesquita is saying.

I don't think that democracy *need* resemble a dictatorship. Not at all. Maybe the one I live in does now, but bowing to its status quo is not a very lofty political goal.

Ditto

:slanted:

 

[noel emits]

The point of the analytical framework as I understand it is that all systems of governance and selection have 'selectorates' and 'winning coalitions', with the differences between a democracy and a dictatorship being quantitative rather than qualitative. The implication then is that constitutional and institutional systems must be put in place that ensure that the actions performed by incumbents to please their 'winning coalitions' also coincide with the wider interests of the population. It does on the face of it appear to be pragmatic, and might possibly point to towards a way forward for many states. The big problem of course is that what we see clearly even in 'democracies' is how there are many ways that enshrined constitutions and protective institutions are undermined and subverted by those in power. Still, I think it could definitely be of benefit for selectorates themselves to understand this process in these terms.

 

[Mr BoShambles]

Clearly demonstrates that, does it? How, by *claiming* that this is true?

I just said that I think winning coalitions and selectorates can work well in a form of democracy not run by a free market capitalist economy and all its demands. This was in reponse to Mr. BoShambles, who claimed that democracy was "clearly" the best system of government we've ever had throughout history. I don't think that democracy *need* resemble a dictatorship. Not at all. Maybe the one I live in does now, but bowing to its status quo is not a very lofty political goal.

No Nomad, Bueno de Mesquita doesn't just *claim* this is true; rather he puts forward a cogent argument for this being the case... one which i am inclined to believe until someone puts something better on the table. Don't suppose you have any revelations on this front do you?

As for my assertion that democracy is the best system for organising large populations - this was meant in relative terms to any other system tried in the past/present to organize large populations (again I say large population to avoid facile arguments about the merits of hunter-gatherer type autonomus non-hierarchical systems). I freely admit that democracy is not perfect - in fact this was the whole point of Vim's peice in the first place - but it is clearly a damn site better than political systems where the selectorate and winning coalition are formed from a much smaller percentage of the population aka autocratic regimes of all varieties!

 

[Mr BoShambles]

Towards a working hypothesis on Pakistan --

It's obvious that the army elite form part of Musharraf's winning coalition, and recieve private goods in a similar manner to the CP in the USSR. However, I suspect that for a country of Pakistan's size, the selectorate is also quite large (relative to states like North Korea or Iraq under Saddam -- and this would be one of the reasons why Pakistan is not such a hell-hole as both of those). The selectorate might also include important clerics, business leaders, judges and so forth. Perhaps it is the case that America's bribes for WoT friendly policies are not large enough, and so alienate the clerical selectorate, and possibly other aspects of the selectorate. Perhaps it is also the case that the increase in private goods provision has alienated the non-fundamentalist, relatively more secular, elements of the selectorate (not in the winning coalition, or in the coalition (?))....

Any thoughts?

I reckon thats a fair assessment though I don't know too much about the internal dynamics of Pakistan. I assume that you are working on the basis that there would be no validity in the results of the elections - when and if they are held - i.e that continuity/change in power is sorted out entirely behind the scenes? Does Musharraf have the unwaivering support of the army generals? What part do the tribal leaders of Warizstan (not sure thats spelt right) play? And the clerics both moderate and extreme? Would you consider them to be part of the selectorate?

 

[vimothy]

Romer on Growth

"...given the state of knowledge about the economics of growth, the solution to poverty lies in the construction of political institutions that provide leaders with incentives to focus on the welfare of their citizens."

Which seems pragmatic, though cynical indeed. Not sure that the desirability of 'growth' should go unquestioned though I'm sure someone will explain.

It's a very important question, actually. I generally assume that we can all agree on the desirability of growth. However, if you are unconvinced that growth is a good thing that we should strive for in our own societies, and, even more urgently, encourage in the developing world, you should read this entry from the CEE, by one of the leading experts on growth, Paul Romer:

Compound Rates of Growth

In the modern version of an old legend, an investment banker asks to be paid by placing one penny on the first square of a chess board, two pennies on the second square, four on the third, etc. If the banker had asked that only the white squares be used, the initial penny would have doubled in value thirty-one times, leaving $21.5 million on the last square. Using both the black and the white squares would have made the penny grow to $92,000,000 billion.

People are reasonably good at forming estimates based on addition, but for operations such as compounding that depend on repeated multiplication, we systematically underestimate how quickly things grow. As a result, we often lose sight of how important the average rate of growth is for an economy. For an investment banker, the choice between a payment that doubles with every square on the chess board and one that doubles with every other square is more important than any other part of the contract. Who cares whether the payment is in pennies, pounds, or pesos? For a nation, the choices that determine whether income doubles with every generation, or instead with every other generation, dwarf all other economic policy concerns.

Growth in Income Per Capita

You can figure out how long it takes for something to double by dividing the growth rate into the number 72. In the 25 years between 1950 and 1975, income per capita in India grew at the rate of 1.8% per year. At this rate, income doubles every 40 years because 72 divided by 1.8 equals 40. In the 25 years between 1975 and 2000, income per capita in China grew at almost 6% per year. At this rate, income doubles every 12 years.

These differences in doubling times have huge effects for a nation, just as they do for our banker. In the same 40-year timespan that it would take the Indian economy to double at its slower growth rate, income would double three times, to eight times its initial level, at China's faster growth rate.

From 1950 to 2000, growth in income per capita in the United States lay between these two extremes, averaging 2.3% per year. From 1950 to 1975, India, which started at a level of income per capita that was less than 7% of that in the United States, was falling even farther behind. Between 1975 and 2000, China, which started at an even lower level, was catching up.

China grew so quickly partly because it started from so far behind. Rapid growth could be achieved in large part by letting firms bring in ideas about how to create value that were already in use in the rest of the world. The interesting question is why India couldn't manage the same trick, at least between 1950 and 1975.​

 

[vimothy]

I reckon thats a fair assessment though I don't know too much about the internal dynamics of Pakistan. I assume that you are working on the basis that there would be no validity in the results of the elections - when and if they are held - i.e that continuity/change in power is sorted out entirely behind the scenes? Does Musharraf have the unwaivering support of the army generals? What part do the tribal leaders of Warizstan (not sure thats spelt right) play? And the clerics both moderate and extreme? Would you consider them to be part of the selectorate?

Don't know about the validity of any future elections, but for now think we can assume that Musharraf does not have the unwavering support of the generals, merely their support insofar as they get their goodies (and they do -- the army has terrific clout in the Pakistani economy). We also know that many in the army, and especially the ISI, don't have any love for Bush, America and Musharraf's WoT friendly policies, and that there are plenty of hardliners itching to ressurect the Taliban / militant Deobandi effort in Afghanistan. I wonder -- is the bribe America is paying sufficient for the task? Hard to say without more knowledge (lol), both qualitative and quantitative. It will certainly alientate potential coalition members -- members who might form the part of an alternative winning coalition (like firebrand clerics, etc) -- who are not receiving any of the private goods benefits (though to the extent that there are public goods benefits (and I have no idea if there are) they receive them) of America's "aid", but are having to lump its results.

 

[Mr BoShambles]

If this is the case:

I assume that you are working on the basis that there would be no validity in the results of the elections - when and if they are held - i.e that continuity/change in power is sorted out entirely behind the scenes?

Then what would have been (a) the probability that Bhutto could have replaced Musharraf; (b) the effects if she had?

Is there any sign of progressive forces within Pakistan that could move the country towards the doorstep conditions of an open-access order? Or is this just a pipe dream at present?

Edit: see Douglass North et al: 'A Conceptual Framework For Interpreting Recorded Human History' for a description of Limited Access Orders and the transition to Open-Access Orders.

 

[vimothy]

If this is the case:

Then what would have been (a) the probability that Bhutto could have replaced Musharraf; (b) the effects if she had?

Is there a truly progressive force in Pakistan that could move the country towards the doorstep conditions of an open-order? Or is this just a pipe dream at present?

I don't think for a moment that Bhutto was any better than Musharraf. A Bhutto government was a definite possibility, but her assassination was hardly unexpected. Think that she also would have led the country into chaos sharp-ish...

From a J Curve perspective, I think it might have been a disaster.

Gotta go home though! More thoughts tomorrow.

 

[nomadologist]

These terms are supposed to be nuetral, positive descriptions for institutional predicates, not normative statements or trojan-horses for ideology. Terms like "selectorate" and "winning coalition" can only be understood as proving "that the phenomena they describe are inherently "good" and "superior" to other potential processes or systems" if you haven't read the post in question. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita applies these terms to democracy and distatorship alike. It is not a question of superiority, because the only difference is one of scale. Democracy is flawed, but much less flawed than dictatorship, because it guarantees a larger group of constituents is served by the ruler.

So I am wrong in stating that you-via-Mesquita are claiming that the selectorate and the winning coalition in a democracy, and their functions within it, amount to a "better" political system in the sense of a "less flawed" political system. You say that this is wrong, that these terms are neutral, positive descriptions. Mr. BoShambles, however, in his first response to your original post certainly did interpret these ideas in such a way that support the notion that democracy is "the best" system we've ever had in the history of the world. You disagree with Mr. BoShambles, then, as "It is not a question of superiority, because the only difference is one of scale."

Ok. I understand your point here. I simply don't agree that all political systems that involve a selectorate (Noel, would you really say that *all* systems of government include these? I can't think of many that don't now, but there used to be plenty) and a winning coalition fall on some point on the greyscale where "dictatorship" is pitch black and democracy is nearly white. This is an interesting rhetorical point to make in order to knock down the sacred cow of democracy as some people see it, while simultaneously salvaging it from condemnation by using some moral relativism to ensure it's still "better" than or prefereable to dictatorship, but I simply don't think that beyond having a selectorate and a winning coalition, that the democracies of the world and the dictatorships have enough in common to make this cut-and-dry assessment.

It seems somewhat simplistic to make these sorts of comparisons. Or at least a little too convenient. There are some major differences between the way a selectorate and a winning coalition operate in a democracy versus and dictatorship that should count for something.

 

[nomadologist]

I also have a huge problem with this idea:

It is abundantly clear that it is superior to dictatorial systems, because it guarantees a far larger group is involved in selecting and maintaining the government, because large absolute size of the selectorate contributes to more public goods and because large relative size of winning coalition (relative to the size of the selectorate) contributes to less private goods. A government that is supported by a large winning coalition will find it more efficient to reward that coalition by producing public goods, which can be consumed by all.

This seems pretty naive and strange. A larger group is involved in selecting and maintaining the government in, say, a democracy like the U.S., but the idea that more "public goods" (or any goods that are "consumed by all") are a result of a large winning coalition is pretty obviously only half the story. This is a gross oversimplification of the entire dynamic between the selectorate and the winning coalition in a democracy, mostly based on the fact that it's ignoring special interest as a motivating factor in political action, political discourse, political platforming, and so on.

This is a very one-dimensional analysis unless Mesquita somewhere addresses this.

 

[noel emits]

Noel, would you really say that *all* systems of government include these?

Difficult to say, it's an assumption in the thesis and has a good deal to do with my reservations about it. Definitely not the whole story though.

All governments want to survive, and all have the same basic functions: to set the tax rate, which generates revenue, and to keep their constituents happy, by allocating resources in the form of public goods, which benefit everybody, and private goods, which benefit the winning coalition.

The trouble with this is that it ignores the fact that many regimes maintain, or at least attempt to maintain, power by means of deception, fear and manipulation. Seems there's an odd kind of faith in the benevolence of government in this 'cynical' philosophy.

 

[Mr BoShambles]

So I am wrong in stating that you-via-Mesquita are claiming that the selectorate and the winning coalition in a democracy, and their functions within it, amount to a "better" political system in the sense of a "less flawed" political system. You say that this is wrong, that these terms are neutral, positive descriptions. Mr. BoShambles, however, in his first response to your original post certainly did interpret these ideas in such a way that support the notion that democracy is "the best" system we've ever had in the history of the world. You disagree with Mr. BoShambles, then, as "It is not a question of superiority, because the only difference is one of scale."

There is no difference of opinion here between me and Vimothy although you can continue trying to construct one if you like. This quote from Vim illustrates this perfectly:

If you cannot see the difference between a regime with a winning coalition of, e.g., one-in-two (in a directly contested presidental election) and a winning coalition of, e.g., one-in-ten thousand (like North Korea's rigged system), then you are an idiot.

The implication of this is huge.

In a state like North Korea - with a tiny selectorate relative to the population - the leader has little obligation to provide public goods for the masses (infrastructure, education etc) so can use the resources at his/her disposal to dish out private goods to his/her cronies in the winning coalition in order to preserve power.

By contrast, in a democratic state like the US - where everyone with a vote forms the selectorate - the winning coalition is by definition large. Thus the leader is obliged to provide public goods (since he can hardly reward a huge section of the population with bribes/corruption etc) and thus the benefits are available to all. This does not mean that corruption is not a problem in democracies, just that it is not institutionalised in the same way/to the same degree.

Vim made this point perfectly well in his original post so I don't know what you're driving at:

It is abundantly clear that [democracy] is superior to dictatorial systems, because it guarantees a far larger group is involved in selecting and maintaining the government, because large absolute size of the selectorate contributes to more public goods and because large relative size of winning coalition (relative to the size of the selectorate) contributes to less private goods. A government that is supported by a large winning coalition will find it more efficient to reward that coalition by producing public goods, which can be consumed by all. A government that is supported by a small coalition willl find it much more efficient to reward that coalition with corruption.

 

[vimothy]

The trouble with this is that it ignores the fact that many regimes maintain, or at least attempt to maintain, power by means of deception, fear and manipulation. Seems there's an odd kind of faith in the benevolence of government in this 'cynical' philosophy.

No, that's not true. And I think if you read and listen to Bueno de Mesquita, he doesn't have very much faith in the benevolence of government.

EDIT: In fact, he's quite explicit about recognising that.

 

[vimothy]

Some semi-random links about Pakistan:

Got home from work last night and monged out with this article from the Business. There are a lot of recommendations -- not necessarily relevant -- but also some interesting background on the geo-political situation.

Militants Escape Control of Pakistan, Officials Say By Carlotta Gall and David Rohde

SOF to Pakistan? By Abu Muqawama

US to Musharraf: Fight AQ, not India by Abu Muqawama

 

[vimothy]

 

[vimothy]

This guy looks interesting on Pakistan -- Frederic Grare, visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

SWJ has a lot of links to good op-eds on Pakistan, as well as this post by Clint Watts: Can the Anbar Strategy Work in Pakistan?

 

[noel emits]

No, that's not true. And I think if you read and listen to Bueno de Mesquita, he doesn't have very much faith in the benevolence of government.

EDIT: In fact, he's quite explicit about recognising that.

What I mean is that 'goods' is not the only way to keep people on side. Intimidation and lies can work too. I dunno, this whole philosophy seems hopelessly corrupt to me. Nothing good can come of it, mark my words. Anyway I'll let you lot debate the finer points, if it starts to make more sense to me I'll get back to you.

 

[IdleRich]

"The implication then is that constitutional and institutional systems must be put in place that ensure that the actions performed by incumbents to please their 'winning coalitions' also coincide with the wider interests of the population."

What I don't understand is who or what is going to ever be able to change the constitution (or whatever) so that it works automatically to incentivise those in power to work for the general good? If there was a body or person that had the power to change constitutions in such a way wouldn't that body also be more likely to work for its own good unless there was in turn some incentive for it to change constitutions in this way?