Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
it's totally possible that both are happening simultaneously -- two sides of the same coin?
The Political Economy of Democracy
- Thread starter vimothy
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vimothy
yurp
But look at those reasserted distinct identities -- take the neofundamentalists: they're obviously the opposite of secular, but the language they use to express themselves, the values that they appeal to, are solidly secular (hijab as women's right, etc).
vimothy
yurp
^^^Hahaha -- cross-post! Yes, that's exactly it, I think.
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
Don't know it mate, what's he say?
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
So Charles Tilly's logic as applied to state-formation in Europe - simply defined is: "war made the state, and the state made war". Here, Ian Lustick takes this theory and applies it to the Middle East:
And;
From this perspective both civil and regional interstate wars should be seen as part of the developmental process leading in the long-run to consolidation of effective political, administrative and fiscal control over larger territorial spaces. Would this have happened in the Middle East without 'Western' interventions (both military and international-legal) during the 20th C? And if so, would the region be more stable today?
A broader but weaker version of my argument is that states, anywhere in the world, that could not by the end of the nineteenth century credibly contend at the highest strategic level and project power beyond their own geographical regions were much less likely to gain the capability to do so subsequently. A stronger but narrower version of the argument, and that is what I am advancing here, is that this factor - latecomer status - is the most important element explaining the failure of great powers, or a single great power, to emerge in the Middle East. In either case, I attribute this differential likelihood to the potential for existing great powers to interrupt the dynamic interaction of war and state building that had helped bring them into existence as such and to the new, dense, and increasingly constraining network of antibelligerency norms in the international arena.
And;
I now turn to a brief account of three attempts by Middle Eastern state builders to use aggrandizing wars and subversion to expand their states - accounts that highlight the importance of extraregional interventions and firmly established international norms as obstacles to the successful construction of a new great power. The importance of these cases is not in the failure of Egyptian and Iraqi elites to weld the entire Arab Muslim Middle East into a single state. After all, despite German, Austrian, Spanish, and French attempts to unite all of Europe under one political sovereignty, that never occurred. Rather, the importance of these three cases is that they reveal how, through relatively small exertions of their tremendous power, the existing (European and North American) great powers repeatedly and decisively intervened to prevent successfully fought wars from being used by Middle Eastern state builders as a means of doing what their European and North American predecessors had done. Although a creative anarchy could work in the European and North Atlantic state systems to produce great powers, the Middle Eastern state system-whose leading members were in absolute terms at least as well organized, as populous, and as militarily potent as early modern England or France-was not allowed to operate by the same rules as had the European system.
From this perspective both civil and regional interstate wars should be seen as part of the developmental process leading in the long-run to consolidation of effective political, administrative and fiscal control over larger territorial spaces. Would this have happened in the Middle East without 'Western' interventions (both military and international-legal) during the 20th C? And if so, would the region be more stable today?
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vimothy
yurp
Former World Bank economist and NYU professor Bill Easterly interviewed at EconTalk (my favourite economics podcast), discussing growth, poverty and aid.
mixed_biscuits
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Fascinating stuff - it's making my early evening drudgery a great deal more pleasant!
vimothy
yurp
A bit depressing though...
vimothy
yurp
This is genius -- school failure as COIN battleground:
The principal enlisted teachers in an effort to “take back the hallways” from students who seemed to have no fear of authority. He enlisted the students, too, by creating a democratically elected student congress.
“It’s just textbook counterinsurgency,” he said. “The first thing you have to do is you have to invite the insurgents into the government.” He added, “I wanted to have influence over the popular kids.”
“It’s just textbook counterinsurgency,” he said. “The first thing you have to do is you have to invite the insurgents into the government.” He added, “I wanted to have influence over the popular kids.”
vimothy
yurp
Charles Tilly paper:-
What exactly is the connection between Ronald Coase's theory of the firm and the Institutional Economics of North et al? I can see that there are transaction costs to using the price mechanism and therefore advantages to be gained from non-market organisation of resourses. How is this related to the monopoly of force achieved by states, to the (hopeful) advantage of their citizens? Do the market set prices for protection influence the size of the state?
The Westphalian state is a new equilibrium. Natural states and open access orders are alternative equilibria and Tilly's conception of the (modern) state is no different, which is why it is so lethal.
What exactly is the connection between Ronald Coase's theory of the firm and the Institutional Economics of North et al? I can see that there are transaction costs to using the price mechanism and therefore advantages to be gained from non-market organisation of resourses. How is this related to the monopoly of force achieved by states, to the (hopeful) advantage of their citizens? Do the market set prices for protection influence the size of the state?
The Westphalian state is a new equilibrium. Natural states and open access orders are alternative equilibria and Tilly's conception of the (modern) state is no different, which is why it is so lethal.
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
Some thoughts - Firms arise to take advantage of economies of scale and to reduce transaction costs. There certainly are parallels with this 'theory of the firm' and the Tilly thesis on the rise of the modern state. As Tilly argues (drawing on the work of Frederic Lane):
the very activity of producing and controlling violence favored monopoly, because competition within that realm generally raised costs, instead of lowering them. The production of violence... enjoyed large economies of scale.
Although this quote is written in the past tense it is arguably just as true today as ever. In the pre/early-state era, kings or rulers did not have a monopoly on the (legitimate) use of violence and thus had to buy the support of other parties - lords, bandits, pirates etc. These potential allies were also potential rivals and thus social order rested on unstable foundations. The systematic elimination of local rivals and the subsequent consolidation of a monopoly of coercive instruments ensured a more stable internal peace - good for citizens in general terms. This order reduces transaction costs associated with uncertainty and allows for more efficient/productive economic performance. Sound right?
The connection between Coase and North is the insight into transaction costs as a key aspect in understanding economic (and political) interactions. North in this paper argues:
In a world of instrumental rationality institutions are unnecessary; ideas and ideologies don't matter; and efficient markets--both economic and political--characterize economies. In fact, we have incomplete information and limited mental capacity by which to process information. Human beings, in consequence, impose constraints on human interaction in order to structure exchange. There is no implication that the consequent institutions are efficient. In such a world ideas and ideologies play a major role in choices and transaction costs result in imperfect markets.
[....]
The incomplete information and limited mental capacity by which to process information determines the cost of transacting which underlies the formation of institutions. At issue is not only the rationality postulate but the specific characteristics of transacting that prevent the actors from achieving the joint maximization result of the zero transaction cost model. The costs of transacting arise because information is costly and asymetrically held by the parties to exhange. The costs of measuring the multiple valuable dimensions of the goods or services exchanged or of the performance of agents, and the costs of enforcing agreements determine transaction costs.
Institutions are formed to reduce uncertainty in human exchange. Together with the technology employed they determine the costs of transacting (and producing). It was Ronald Coase (1937 and 1960) who made the crucial connection between institutions, transaction costs and neo-classical theory; a connection which even now has not been completely understood by the economics profession. Let me state it baldly. The neoclassical result of efficient markets only obtains when it is costless to transact. When it is costly to transact, institutions matter. And because a large part of our national income is devoted to transacting, institutions and specifically property rights are crucial determinants of the efficiency of markets. Coase was (and still is) concerned with the firm and resource allocation in the modern market economy; but his insight is the key to unraveling the tangled skein of the performance of economies over time, which is my primary concern.
[....]
The incomplete information and limited mental capacity by which to process information determines the cost of transacting which underlies the formation of institutions. At issue is not only the rationality postulate but the specific characteristics of transacting that prevent the actors from achieving the joint maximization result of the zero transaction cost model. The costs of transacting arise because information is costly and asymetrically held by the parties to exhange. The costs of measuring the multiple valuable dimensions of the goods or services exchanged or of the performance of agents, and the costs of enforcing agreements determine transaction costs.
Institutions are formed to reduce uncertainty in human exchange. Together with the technology employed they determine the costs of transacting (and producing). It was Ronald Coase (1937 and 1960) who made the crucial connection between institutions, transaction costs and neo-classical theory; a connection which even now has not been completely understood by the economics profession. Let me state it baldly. The neoclassical result of efficient markets only obtains when it is costless to transact. When it is costly to transact, institutions matter. And because a large part of our national income is devoted to transacting, institutions and specifically property rights are crucial determinants of the efficiency of markets. Coase was (and still is) concerned with the firm and resource allocation in the modern market economy; but his insight is the key to unraveling the tangled skein of the performance of economies over time, which is my primary concern.
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Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
Agreed. But can you elaborate more on this:
Did my previous post answer your questions?
vimothy
yurp
I totally grok this:
I want to go back and re-read the North paper, I think, but I see that firms are no different to states, in many important aspects.
Regarding the modern state as new equilibrium, with North et al's conception of natural state and open access orders as different equilibria, movement from one to the other is difficult presisely because they are equilibria and so give off a measure of something like gravity. I'm thinking of how rare it is to move in either direction on the state failure J Curve and stay there. The third world hasn't been able to properly achieve this new equilibrium yet, and so remains mired in Hobbesian violence. It requires some sort of additional institutional momentum.
Just tossed off thoughts really. I probably need to re-read Tilly's paper.
The neoclassical result of efficient markets only obtains when it is costless to transact. When it is costly to transact, institutions matter.
I want to go back and re-read the North paper, I think, but I see that firms are no different to states, in many important aspects.
Regarding the modern state as new equilibrium, with North et al's conception of natural state and open access orders as different equilibria, movement from one to the other is difficult presisely because they are equilibria and so give off a measure of something like gravity. I'm thinking of how rare it is to move in either direction on the state failure J Curve and stay there. The third world hasn't been able to properly achieve this new equilibrium yet, and so remains mired in Hobbesian violence. It requires some sort of additional institutional momentum.
Just tossed off thoughts really. I probably need to re-read Tilly's paper.
Mr BoShambles
jambiguous
Not had a chance to listen to that yet (or the Romer one for that matter) but yeah from what I've read elsewhere i think its fair to say that there's no love lost between Collier and Easterly.
grok? typo or whatever... i don't understand
