vimothy
yurp
yeah that's right
At last.
yeah that's right
This paper deploys a simple stock-flow consistent (SFC) model in order to examine
various contentions regarding fiscal and monetary policy. It follows from the model
that if the fiscal stance is not set in the appropriate fashion that is, at a well-defined
level and growth rate—then full employment and low inflation will not be achieved in
a sustainable way. We also show that fiscal policy on its own could achieve both full
employment and a target rate of inflation. Finally, we arrive at two unconventional
conclusions: first, that an economy (described within an SFC framework) with a real
rate of interest net of taxes that exceeds the real growth rate will not generate
explosive interest flows, even when the government is not targeting primary
surpluses; and, second, that it cannot be assumed that a debtor country requires a trade
surplus if interest payments on debt are not to explode.
Niall Ferguson is not given to understatement. So I was not surprised by the claim last week that the US will face a Greek crisis. I promptly dismissed this as hysteria.
Abstract: Using a VAR model of the American economy from 1984 to 2003 we find that,
contrary to official claims, the Federal Reserve does not target inflation or react to
“inflation signals.” Rather, the Fed reacts to the very “real” signal sent by unemployment;
in a way that suggests that a baseless fear of full employment is a principal force behind
monetary policy. Tests of variations in the workings of a Taylor Rule, using dummy
variable regressions, on data going back to 1969 suggest that after 1983 the Federal
Reserve largely ceased reacting to inflation or high unemployment, but continued to react
when unemployment fell “too low.” We further find that monetary policy (measured by the
yield curve) has significant causal impact on pay inequality–a domain where the Federal
Reserve refuses responsibility. Finally, we test whether Federal Reserve policy has
exhibited a pattern of partisan bias in presidential election years, with results that suggest
the presence of such bias, after controlling for the effects of inflation and unemployment.
a) Repo 105 – Executive Summary
Lehman employed off‐balance sheet devices, known within Lehman as “Repo
105” and “Repo 108” transactions, to temporarily remove securities inventory from its
balance sheet, usually for a period of seven to ten days, and to create a materially
misleading picture of the firm’s financial condition in late 2007 and 2008.2847 Repo 105
transactions were nearly identical to standard repurchase and resale (“repo”)
transactions that Lehman (and other investment banks) used to secure short‐term
financing, with a critical difference: Lehman accounted for Repo 105 transactions as
“sales” as opposed to financing transactions based upon the overcollateralization or
higher than normal haircut in a Repo 105 transaction.2848 By recharacterizing the Repo
105 transaction as a “sale,” Lehman removed the inventory from its balance sheet.
Lehman regularly increased its use of Repo 105 transactions in the days prior to
reporting periods to reduce its publicly reported net leverage and balance sheet.2850
Lehman’s periodic reports did not disclose the cash borrowing from the Repo 105
transaction – i.e., although Lehman had in effect borrowed tens of billions of dollars in
these transactions, Lehman did not disclose the known obligation to repay the debt.2851
Lehman used the cash from the Repo 105 transaction to pay down other liabilities,
thereby reducing both the total liabilities and the total assets reported on its balance
sheet and lowering its leverage ratios.2852 Thus, Lehman’s Repo 105 practice consisted of
a two‐step process: (1) undertaking Repo 105 transactions followed by (2) the use of
Repo 105 cash borrowings to pay down liabilities, thereby reducing leverage. A few
days after the new quarter began, Lehman would borrow the necessary funds to repay
the cash borrowing plus interest, repurchase the securities, and restore the assets to its
balance sheet.2853
Lehman never publicly disclosed its use of Repo 105 transactions, its accounting
treatment for these transactions, the considerable escalation of its total Repo 105 usage
in late 2007 and into 2008, or the material impact these transactions had on the firm’s
publicly reported net leverage ratio.2854 According to former Global Financial Controller
Martin Kelly, a careful review of Lehman’s Forms 10‐K and 10‐Q would not reveal
Lehman’s use of Repo 105 transactions.2855 Lehman failed to disclose its Repo 105
practice even though Kelly believed “that the only purpose or motive for the
transactions was reduction in balance sheet;” felt that “there was no substance to the
transactions;” and expressed concerns with Lehman’s Repo 105 program to two
consecutive Lehman Chief Financial Officers – Erin Callan and Ian Lowitt – advising
them that the lack of economic substance to Repo 105 transactions meant “reputational
risk” to Lehman if the firm’s use of the transactions became known to the public.2856 In
addition to its material omissions, Lehman affirmatively misrepresented in its financial
statements that the firm treated all repo transactions as financing transactions – i.e., not
sales – for financial reporting purposes.
The obvious conundrum is thus WTF can the countries on the right hand side of the 09 graph do to reign in their public sector deficits given the fact of their trade deficits? Germany can't run trade surpluses without trading parters somewhere taking the deficit position.
I haven't read much of the LEH bankruptcy report. I just read the summary of the "Repo 105" and "Repo 108" deals whereby they arranged repo (short term sale and repurchase agreements for securities) for toxic assets for the purposes of serious accounting fraud all under the supervision of the NY Fed.
Geithner's got to go