Iranian democracy

[vimothy]

Which is precisely A. Evans point.

I disagree. On the contrary, A. Evans' point (in the post you link to at 03:42 PM) is that a win for Mousavi would improve the west's strategic position vis-a-vis Iran, which is actually precisely the opposite of my point.

Why?

"Most likely with the usrging of the Obama administration"...? Come on you don't believe that, do you? I can't believe that the Obama administration is so strategically illiterate to 1, attempt this, 2, believe that it would have the desired effect of producing a "coup d'etat" in the form of a Mousavi win, 3, believe that a Mousavi win equals regime change / "coup d'etat", and 4, believe that a Mousavi win would improve their strategic position WRT Iran.

 

[vimothy]

Anyway, why is Craner busy in the 2-step thread instead of posting here where the action is, eh?!

 

[vimothy]

I see the extreme western reaction (including the present Dissensus thread) as something that is produced, and skillfully produced, by the same people who produced the "weapons of mass destruction" outrage in Iraq. I find this interesting and worrying.

I can see how outrage over the election protests and the Iranian state's reaction to them could have been used to create the atmosphere in which an attack on Iran with the goal of regime was possible, but the moment to do that was during the protests. And I don't see a way for America to invade without having Iran's Fatah 110s (or whatever surface-to-surface missiles are available and have the range) decimating Ras Tanura, which is surely the most obvious response for Iran, and one that would probably end all three wars in a single day. And I don't see any real stomach for another "war of choice" on the part of the American people.

 

[3 Body No Problem]

I disagree. On the contrary, A. Evans' point (in the post you link to at 03:42 PM) is that a win for Mousavi would improve the west's strategic position vis-a-vis Iran, which is actually precisely the opposite of my point.

That's not how I understand him. I think he means that a Mousavi win would allow Obama to start negotiating with Iran because the symbolic bad guy has gone. This would be in everybody's interest including Iran.

"Most likely with the usrging of the Obama administration"...? Come on you don't believe that, do you? I can't believe that the Obama administration is so strategically illiterate to 1, attempt this, 2, believe that it would have the desired effect of producing a "coup d'etat" in the form of a Mousavi win, 3, believe that a Mousavi win equals regime change / "coup d'etat", and 4, believe that a Mousavi win would improve their strategic position WRT Iran.

I do in fact think that that's a possibility. You assume that detailed policy decisions are made by Obama and other public figures. They are not. 99.99% of all policy decisions are made by more low-level staffers. I think it would have been a policy that was worked out under the GW Bush administration and carried over, maybe in watered down form. The figure of $400 M is usually quoted as current funding for anti-iranian activities. Such policies have worked before (e.g. support for Solidarity in communist Poland).

Money finds its way.

 

[3 Body No Problem]

I can see how outrage over the election protests and the Iranian state's reaction to them could have been used to create the atmosphere in which an attack on Iran with the goal of regime was possible, but the moment to do that was during the protests. And I don't see a way for America to invade without having Iran's Fatah 110s (or whatever surface-to-surface missiles are available and have the range) decimating Ras Tanura, which is surely the most obvious response for Iran, and one that would probably end all three wars in a single day. And I don't see any real stomach for another "war of choice" on the part of the American people.

There are many ways a country can be destabilised.

 

[vimothy]

That's not how I understand him. I think he means that a Mousavi win would allow Obama to start negotiating with Iran because the symbolic bad guy has gone. This would be in everybody's interest including Iran.

That's what I said -- he suggests that a Mousavi win would improve the west's strategic position WRT Iran. I doubt that it would. It would weaken the west's position because the symbolic bad guy has gone -- reducing the west's leverage and dividing its decision makers. Which is why Israel -- the only thing approaching a "pro-war" party, IMO -- was very clear (at least initially, before the protests and before it got wind of public opinion) that it wanted AN to win.

I do in fact think that that's a possibility. You assume that detailed policy decisions are made by Obama and other public figures.

Hmm -- not sure that I do assume that. It would be rather naive.

They are not. 99.99% of all policy decisions are made by more low-level staffers. I think it would have been a policy that was worked out under the GW Bush administration and carried over, maybe in watered down form. The figure of $400 M is usually quoted as current funding for anti-iranian activities. Such policies have worked before (e.g. support for Solidarity in communist Poland).

But we're confusing the issue here. Let's try to disaggregate -- your contention is that the Bush admin decided that with Mousavi, who is perceived internationally as a "moderate", as president, it would be able to "back down" and negotiate with Iran, that this was carried over into the Obama administration who continued the policy and pressured Mousavi into contesting the election result.

Furthermore, that the protests were engineered or seized on by "Empire", who desires war with Iran, or at the very least, regime change.

None of this explains the logic of this policy. A Mousavi win would not have been good for the US from a realist / Machiavellian perspective. Nor does it explain the contradiction in the heart of these two urges -- to de-escalate on the one hand, and to escalate on the other.

 

[3 Body No Problem]

But we're confusing the issue here. Let's try to disaggregate -- your contention is that the Bush admin decided that with Mousavi, who is perceived internationally as a "moderate", as president, it would be able to "back down" and negotiate with Iran, that this was carried over into the Obama administration who continued the policy and pressured Mousavi into contesting the election result.

I would imagine that Bush and now Obama run a promiscous strategy and talk to anybody who's an enemy of Ahmedi-Nejad and Chamenei. Support all of them a little bit, and see what happens. Moreover, Iran is demonised in the western media.

Furthermore, that the protests were engineered or seized on by "Empire", who desires war with Iran, or at the very least, regime change.

I don't think the protests were engineered directly. I think infrastructure would have been in place that increases the probability of protests. For example Solidarity in communist Poland was supported with printing presses and photocopiers. This is fairly unspecific. Moreover, Iran itself has fairly developed political fractions.

None of this explains the logic of this policy.

The logic is a multi-pronged approach to regime change.

 

[3 Body No Problem]

A Mousavi win would not have been good for the US from a realist / Machiavellian perspective.

This I disagree with. I think both the Bush and the Obama administration have been thinking that a regime change in Tehran is genuinely in their interest.

 

[vimothy]

By logic, I mean two things:

Firstly, that a strictly Machiavellian regime would not have supported Mousavi as someone who could help it to advance its goals in either international negotiations or regime change. It doesn't make sense. Of course, that's not necessarily the same as it not happening, but it does imply a strategic myopia that I don't find creditable.

Secondly, that the Obama administration, or Empire, or whatever, can't simultaneously want to go to war with Iran / change the regime and back down and negotiate.

 

[vimothy]

This I disagree with. I think both the Bush and the Obama administration have been thinking that a regime change in Tehran is genuinely in their interest.

Regime change and a Mousavi presidency are two completely different things.

 

[padraig (u.s.)]

If only this was true. The pro-war camp very much exists politically

I've yet to read through the rest but fair play to this point at least. Charles Krauthammer, John Bolton etc. (to say nothing of right-wing Israelis) were calling for the bombing of Iran pretty much right up to the election, when they magically changed tone to berate Obama etc. for not being supportive enough of the same people they wanted to bomb 5 minutes ago. strategic concerns aside - I dunno how powerful that pro-war camp is, seems their credibility has been badly damaged by the last decade of blundering, which they're largely connected to.

find it quaintly hilarious that 3body subs in "empire" for U.S. every single time.

disagree that Iraq is "doing badly", more like mediocre (important distinction), tho it could it certainly get worse in a hurry. this:

The de fact government of Irak is the US, notelected by Irak's population.

is absolute bollocks. surely you're aware how much Americans, civilians & military, had/have to battle with Maliki/underlings to get things done? in this situation it is similar to Vietnam, & likely other wars w/a foreign power propping up an indigenous govt - just b/c you hold the purse strings & the military power doesn't mean you actually have political power. witness the ineffectual U.S. response to the de facto Sunni-Shiite (& Shiite/Shiite in some cases) civil war from 2004-2006/7. you could definitely point to problems w/Iraqi "democracy" - the Sunnis largely don't participate, nor do the Kurds who are trying to set up their own autonomous state, there's a serious blur between politician & warlord (tho not as bad as some places) etc. - but yeah, I don't think it's very hard to call it more democratic than Iran which, whatever the outcome of elections, is effectively a security state under the control of the IRGC.

 

[scottdisco]

Nina Power​

I'm not interested in what a mouth piece for the communist international has to say.

fair enough; i know she's an acquaintance of yours and your similar usage of empire struck me.

some reasonable points you raise in as much as we both freely acknowledge we are agnostic on some of these matters; though AFAIK the authors of pieces i linked to are not Mousavi supporters in the way Afrasiabi has publicly stated he supports Ahmadinejad. if you know different, i'm happy to be updated.

BTW i like DeAnne Julius about as much as you do but i don't think throwing mud at an entire organisation on the basis of one person's background is supportable in the slightest.

I'm interested in truth.

aren’t we all.

Regime change and a Mousavi presidency are two completely different things.

true that.

is effectively a security state under the control of the IRGC.

yup

 

[vimothy]

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/12/world/middleeast/12nuke.html

 

[crackerjack]

Kicking off again.

The Guardian's former Iran correspondent Robert Tait is monitoring events from Istanbul. He writes:


Ahmadinejad was giving a live interview on IRIB's Channel Two from the
scene of Quds Day. As he spoke, viewers could clearly hear the chants of "Ahmadi, Ahmadi, resign, resign" - this all over live TV.

Apparently Ahmadinejad was aware of the chants and their effect on the interview. He is said to have become flustered and quickly wrapped up the interview.

 

[scottdisco]

no messing about

The office of the Association for the Defence of Prisoners' Rights was also ransacked, and evidence of the torture, rape and killing of detainees confiscated. An Amnesty International statement points out that "the seized records contain information which would enable the judicial authorities to identify the former detainees who were prepared to speak out on a confidential basis due to their fear of reprisals and the shocking nature of their ordeal."

A number of top advisers to the opposition are among the thousands of people arrested in the post-election crackdown. The highest-profile of the later detainees is Alireza Beheshti, a senior adviser to Moussavi and the son of Iran's first head of the judiciary after the 1979 revolution - who was subsequently released on bail.

a short behind-the-scenes-look at Press TV here

Since before the revolution, the public has reserved a special name for those in the employ of the state’s ideological apparatus: mozdoor, or mercenary. But graduates of UPenn, SOAS, and other top schools – usually the children of affluent families – cannot be written off as just money-hungry. It must be something about walking under that sign day after day, something in the air inside … and in rare cases, the prospect of graduating to the Ministry of Intelligence.

 

[polystyle]

post - G 20, UN week >

Pressure from within , pressure from outside ...
Even Chavez says 'Iran' is not helping us'

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/world/middleeast/27nuke.html?hp

X- protestors on the run ...
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/world/middleeast/27iran.html?hpw

 

[scottdisco]

The Utopian

in dialogue with Gary Sick, former member of the US National Security Council; Richard Bulliet, Professor of History at Columbia University; and Dr. Eden Naby, Iranian dissident and commentator.

 

[vimothy]

Anti-democratic puppets of Empire face justice in Iran.

 

[vimothy]

That was needlessly snarky, apologies.

 

[scottdisco]

Anti-democratic puppets of Empire face justice in Iran.

i am still wondering which Empire i am a sycophant for. w so many sexy empires around the world today, some emergent some more established, i don't want to restrict myself.

feel free to add your views on who i should rep for.

so far i'm open to whoring myself for the following : -

Amerikkka and its Zionist lapdog
Resurgent Russian
Aspirational & Ambitious Persian
Ethnic Han CCP
Riverine Khartoum elite
Blue Sky Caliphate
Moroccan incursion