scottdisco
rip this joint please
i had Bordieu coming out of my ass at the mid-level English midlands university i attended as an undergrad, but there again that was for sociology modules, the perennial dosser discipline 
What is Deleuze?
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nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
i had Bordieu coming out of my ass at the mid-level English midlands university i attended as an undergrad, but there again that was for sociology modules, the perennial dosser discipline
Teehee. One of my good friends is a sociology professor. I don't know how he does it. I'd rather jump off the Brooklyn Bridge right now than teach sociology.
Less Deceived
(another x-post)
Returning to Bowman’s piece, the main thrust is directed less against Badiou himself than against others’ pleasure or interest in Badiou. Those who find Badiou a rewarding read are entering into a transaction with the pleasures and rigours of his texts: they are being rewarded for something, with something else. It is the proper business of “cultural studies” to analyse the system of rewards that sustains conceptions of cultural value. This analysis will generally reach, by direct or circuitous paths, the following verdict: the reasons people give for valuing some cultural product X are in fact mystifications of their real reasons, which invariably have to do with social position on the one hand (product-affiliation as an operator of cultural distinction) and narcissistic gratification on the other.
Accordingly, for Bowman, Badiou’s cultural function is to “reassure” an anxious elite of the enduring value of their investments. “[A]rt, maths, love, militancy. Yeah, right”. He is a “conservative” philosopher insofar as he seeks to restore the waning lustre of these antique trophies, mournfully buffing them up in the desolate attic of his philosophy. One can imagine a kind of demotic inverse of Badiou, for whom the Four Discourses would be Fashion, Entertainment, Sport and Sex. In place of the forbidding “matheme” and the Pierian springs of poetry, this cheery, accessible figure would alternate between celebrity gossip and earnest exposition of the offside rule. Perhaps he would reach the same conclusions: fair-weather supporters are a bad lot, and that goal of Gascoigne’s against Scotland in ‘96 is a treasure for the ages*.
I would suggest that Bowman’s attack here is particularly focused on Badiou’s “legitimation” of “Art”, and his supposed popularity among “Art PhDs”, because of the “four discourses” art is the most easily reducible - against any pretensions to the contrary - to a cultural form amongst other cultural forms. It’s reasonably uncontroversial to say that elite notions of artistic Importance are outmoded - hardly any practising artists subscribe to such notions, although they always seem to manage to find some way of extolling the dynamism and radicality of their own practices. But “maths” really doesn’t belong on the same terrain: it simply doesn’t make sense to position mathematics as a supposedly “higher” form of culture afflicted by declining prestige as a result of the democratising proliferation of new media (or whatever the story is these days).
Because of its intrinsic formal emptiness, mathematics is very difficult to plug into the networks of signification that sustain the production of cultural “value” - arguably it only signifies at all through proxies, either philosophical (Badiou’s transliteration of axiomatic set theory as “ontology”) or pedagogical (GCSE maths textbooks, say). Cultural studies can certainly talk about mathematics through examination of these proxies, and the roles they play in - once again - formatting social hierarchies and participating in the identity-construction of cultural consumers, but maths wouldn’t be maths if it was just dressing like a schizophrenic and writing incomprehensible sequences of Greek characters in chalk on a dusty blackboard (”I’m not a number theorist, but I play one on TV”).
More seriously, while there are undoubtedly “cultures of mathematics” (and one can and should understand an enterprise like Bourbaki as involving a variation on a cultural form found in other fields - Amir Aczel’s account draws direct and convincing parallels with OuLiPo, for example), there is nevertheless a real sense in which mathematics marks the limit of the (often useful) culturalist intuition that “everything is culture”. Mathematics is not “above” or “beyond” culture, in the sense of bearing an absolute signification above the fray of contending discourses and practices, but - to use a favourite word of Badiou’s - “subtracted” from culture, in the sense that it bears, by itself, no signification at all.
Badiou’s mathematical ontology is thus a cultural artifact - a proxy - that functions as an exit from the dimension of culture, a portal to the “inhuman” domain of pure formalism. (If you aren’t visualising the engine room of the Event Horizon at this point, let me encourage you to do so. Where we’re going, you won’t need eyes to see…). This is one of the things that particularly rattles people about Badiou, because - unlike the “working” mathematician who just tends to his theorems and minds his own business philosophically speaking - Badiou explicitly (and quixotically) attempts to articulate the domains of “value” and “form”.
From the “culturalist” side, this can look very much like an attempt to secure particular cultural values by tying them to mathematical invariants. Hence Bowman’s suggestion that Badiou is especially vulnerable to the twin critical insights of “Bourdieu” (cultural value as operator of social differentiation) and “deconstruction” (contingency and constructedness of supposed invariants). I think that on the latter point, there is simply no case to answer: mathematics fully avows its own contingency and constructedness, building its empty scaffolds on axioms that are purely “chosen” for their ability to support elegant and powerful systems. (The weak norms governing axiom choice are another matter - in the spirit of Ray Brassier’s challenge to the Churchlands, I think it’s worth asking whether these norms have any metaphysical authority, or whether they’re simply projections of human cognitive - or cultural, which is close to the same thing - bias).
From the “philosophical” side, it’s evident that Badiou is a lot less interested in cultural value than in the articulation of figures: he reads poetry, for example, not for its moral signification but for its analogical structure, which is then typically abstracted in the direction of ontological “thought”. F. R. Leavis has an anecdote somewhere about Wittgenstein doing much the same thing, with a poem of Empson’s; for Leavis, this “analogical” reading is emblematic of Wittgenstein’s tendency to “understand” the poem but miss the real point (of reading poetry). The irony is the Wittgenstein is fairly obviously much more Empson’s implied reader than Leavis (and one can readily imagine a “Badiouvian” reading of “Slowly the poison the whole bloodstream fills”). On this particular axis, Badiou is much more a Wittgensteinian than a Leavisite; which is one reason why I think the “culturalist” reading of what he’s about misses the mark.
* It is, actually.
(another x-post)
Returning to Bowman’s piece, the main thrust is directed less against Badiou himself than against others’ pleasure or interest in Badiou. Those who find Badiou a rewarding read are entering into a transaction with the pleasures and rigours of his texts: they are being rewarded for something, with something else. It is the proper business of “cultural studies” to analyse the system of rewards that sustains conceptions of cultural value. This analysis will generally reach, by direct or circuitous paths, the following verdict: the reasons people give for valuing some cultural product X are in fact mystifications of their real reasons, which invariably have to do with social position on the one hand (product-affiliation as an operator of cultural distinction) and narcissistic gratification on the other.
Accordingly, for Bowman, Badiou’s cultural function is to “reassure” an anxious elite of the enduring value of their investments. “[A]rt, maths, love, militancy. Yeah, right”. He is a “conservative” philosopher insofar as he seeks to restore the waning lustre of these antique trophies, mournfully buffing them up in the desolate attic of his philosophy. One can imagine a kind of demotic inverse of Badiou, for whom the Four Discourses would be Fashion, Entertainment, Sport and Sex. In place of the forbidding “matheme” and the Pierian springs of poetry, this cheery, accessible figure would alternate between celebrity gossip and earnest exposition of the offside rule. Perhaps he would reach the same conclusions: fair-weather supporters are a bad lot, and that goal of Gascoigne’s against Scotland in ‘96 is a treasure for the ages*.
I would suggest that Bowman’s attack here is particularly focused on Badiou’s “legitimation” of “Art”, and his supposed popularity among “Art PhDs”, because of the “four discourses” art is the most easily reducible - against any pretensions to the contrary - to a cultural form amongst other cultural forms. It’s reasonably uncontroversial to say that elite notions of artistic Importance are outmoded - hardly any practising artists subscribe to such notions, although they always seem to manage to find some way of extolling the dynamism and radicality of their own practices. But “maths” really doesn’t belong on the same terrain: it simply doesn’t make sense to position mathematics as a supposedly “higher” form of culture afflicted by declining prestige as a result of the democratising proliferation of new media (or whatever the story is these days).
Because of its intrinsic formal emptiness, mathematics is very difficult to plug into the networks of signification that sustain the production of cultural “value” - arguably it only signifies at all through proxies, either philosophical (Badiou’s transliteration of axiomatic set theory as “ontology”) or pedagogical (GCSE maths textbooks, say). Cultural studies can certainly talk about mathematics through examination of these proxies, and the roles they play in - once again - formatting social hierarchies and participating in the identity-construction of cultural consumers, but maths wouldn’t be maths if it was just dressing like a schizophrenic and writing incomprehensible sequences of Greek characters in chalk on a dusty blackboard (”I’m not a number theorist, but I play one on TV”).
More seriously, while there are undoubtedly “cultures of mathematics” (and one can and should understand an enterprise like Bourbaki as involving a variation on a cultural form found in other fields - Amir Aczel’s account draws direct and convincing parallels with OuLiPo, for example), there is nevertheless a real sense in which mathematics marks the limit of the (often useful) culturalist intuition that “everything is culture”. Mathematics is not “above” or “beyond” culture, in the sense of bearing an absolute signification above the fray of contending discourses and practices, but - to use a favourite word of Badiou’s - “subtracted” from culture, in the sense that it bears, by itself, no signification at all.
Badiou’s mathematical ontology is thus a cultural artifact - a proxy - that functions as an exit from the dimension of culture, a portal to the “inhuman” domain of pure formalism. (If you aren’t visualising the engine room of the Event Horizon at this point, let me encourage you to do so. Where we’re going, you won’t need eyes to see…). This is one of the things that particularly rattles people about Badiou, because - unlike the “working” mathematician who just tends to his theorems and minds his own business philosophically speaking - Badiou explicitly (and quixotically) attempts to articulate the domains of “value” and “form”.
From the “culturalist” side, this can look very much like an attempt to secure particular cultural values by tying them to mathematical invariants. Hence Bowman’s suggestion that Badiou is especially vulnerable to the twin critical insights of “Bourdieu” (cultural value as operator of social differentiation) and “deconstruction” (contingency and constructedness of supposed invariants). I think that on the latter point, there is simply no case to answer: mathematics fully avows its own contingency and constructedness, building its empty scaffolds on axioms that are purely “chosen” for their ability to support elegant and powerful systems. (The weak norms governing axiom choice are another matter - in the spirit of Ray Brassier’s challenge to the Churchlands, I think it’s worth asking whether these norms have any metaphysical authority, or whether they’re simply projections of human cognitive - or cultural, which is close to the same thing - bias).
From the “philosophical” side, it’s evident that Badiou is a lot less interested in cultural value than in the articulation of figures: he reads poetry, for example, not for its moral signification but for its analogical structure, which is then typically abstracted in the direction of ontological “thought”. F. R. Leavis has an anecdote somewhere about Wittgenstein doing much the same thing, with a poem of Empson’s; for Leavis, this “analogical” reading is emblematic of Wittgenstein’s tendency to “understand” the poem but miss the real point (of reading poetry). The irony is the Wittgenstein is fairly obviously much more Empson’s implied reader than Leavis (and one can readily imagine a “Badiouvian” reading of “Slowly the poison the whole bloodstream fills”). On this particular axis, Badiou is much more a Wittgensteinian than a Leavisite; which is one reason why I think the “culturalist” reading of what he’s about misses the mark.
* It is, actually.
nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
Four_five_one, if you're still reading, correct me if I'm wrong; I'm just trying to get a firmer handle on this political economy of yours.
So you can be a coward who does nothing for your own greater political goals than pontificate on the internet, but by deciding on a truism (specifically, that we need to decide on what our absolute truths are in order to act politically) you will be uniquely "redeemed" over and against anyone who is as yet not sure what the best course of action might be for humanity. Philosophers will play a key role in this type of redemption because they have somehow flipped the script and found an Archimedian axis point that is suspended outside of the ideological world and which will ultimately form a Truth-lever that Philosophers (anybody who is into naming Forms) will use to move the globe politically.
In that case, I'm golden. I mostly just read books, lie around, sleep till at least noon, write stuff on the internet, and never get involved in politics unless I have to. (Well, unless voting for Obama counts...) I think everything I say is absolutely true and I hate almost everyone who disagrees with me.
So you can be a coward who does nothing for your own greater political goals than pontificate on the internet, but by deciding on a truism (specifically, that we need to decide on what our absolute truths are in order to act politically) you will be uniquely "redeemed" over and against anyone who is as yet not sure what the best course of action might be for humanity. Philosophers will play a key role in this type of redemption because they have somehow flipped the script and found an Archimedian axis point that is suspended outside of the ideological world and which will ultimately form a Truth-lever that Philosophers (anybody who is into naming Forms) will use to move the globe politically.
In that case, I'm golden. I mostly just read books, lie around, sleep till at least noon, write stuff on the internet, and never get involved in politics unless I have to. (Well, unless voting for Obama counts...) I think everything I say is absolutely true and I hate almost everyone who disagrees with me.
four_five_one
Infinition
Well Zizek certainly urges us to do nothing... ;P Obviously, once one has his absolute truths, he should be able to take action. You won't be redeemed just by deciding what the truths are. Though this step is perhaps the most vital one; allowing us to feel guilty again. We can only be delivered once we have sinned.
Anyway, my point has nothing to do with absolute ethical truths which I don't believe in, but merely to highlight how psychologically beneficial guilt and redemption are. So I might praise Badiou in the same way I'd praise liberation theology as a mobilizing agent, despite not believing in God myself. The 'Truth-lever' is just a point of departure.
But I should really read the source texts before I say much more. I heard Ethics is a good one to start with?
four_five_one
Infinition
(Belatedly) Nice to meet you too.
I'm not claiming any universal insight; I'm not even sure I have greater access than a heterosexual does to any sort of queer subjectivity. But I do suppose that most people start a family when they feel some lack in their own lives, it's the only thing that will give them something to live for... so I can't help feeling suspicious that people might be ruled by selfishness here, and wishing that gay people were somehow radically outside that.
Having children seems to me something like proclaiming yourself dead. (Though I quite agree with you regards adoption)
nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
Haha.
Well, I'd say Badiou's work to prove that "the One is not" (which incidentally relates to Deleuze and the subject of the thread quite well) is certainly much more interesting to me than anything else in Badiou's work that might relate to liberation theology.
I don't know what psychologists you've been studying, but the idea that guilt is valuable is a little oldfashioned at this point, isn't it? Better to take responsibility and live with consequences than to wallow in guilt (which is generally considered a counter-productive and reactionary feeling rather than a positive and productive emotion), no?
Well, I'd say Badiou's work to prove that "the One is not" (which incidentally relates to Deleuze and the subject of the thread quite well) is certainly much more interesting to me than anything else in Badiou's work that might relate to liberation theology.
I don't know what psychologists you've been studying, but the idea that guilt is valuable is a little oldfashioned at this point, isn't it? Better to take responsibility and live with consequences than to wallow in guilt (which is generally considered a counter-productive and reactionary feeling rather than a positive and productive emotion), no?
nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
Interesting...
I would say that most people I know who have kids, straight or gay, do so simply because, well, that's what's done to complete the "picture" or outward appearance of a happy life. There's sometimes an element of oops! to it (which is the downside to having heterosexual intercourse, let me assure you).* But most couples who do have children very much on purpose have naive illusions about how it will build their relationship or fulfill it, rather than strain it and leave them holding the bag of responsbility for someone else's welfare. Sometimes they aren't altogether disappointed.
My mother tells me she wanted kids at the time very much but she'd never do it over again if she only knew then what she was getting herself into.
*I'm bisexual just to avoid further confusion
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four_five_one
Infinition
I haven't really been studying any psychologists lol (I am probably decidedly undereducated compared to everyone else on this thread) ;P But I strongly feel that many people need to feel much more guilt than they do. Though at the same time, I feel I've spent far too much time feeling guilty and yes, it has prevented me from taking action that I might otherwise have taken - it could be an unproductive emotion - my feelings toward it are ambivalent.
Anyway, I've been watching a lot of The Sopranos recently, and I don't know, you've probably seen it, but Tony, who's a gangster that suffers anxiety attacks; his psychologist is in a total-bind because she knows he should be unhappy, since, after all, he's a no-good murderer and downright scoundrel, but at the same time, her job is to make him feel better about himself, to shore up his ego and allow him to be 'productive'...
nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
Oh yes, I've seen the series, and it's a near perfect reference point for a discussion of guilt and psychoanalysis in contemporary culture. On top of the mitigating factors you already mentioned, there's also the lingering influence of Roman Catholicism on Tony, which is what contributes to his cripling anxiety in the first place. Tony isn't quite a sociopath, which is why he can feel this anxiety, and which is why his treatment isn't a complete failure, but Dr. Melfi is pathologically enmeshed in Tony's transference process. She enjoys Tony's power and exploits by-proxy, especially after her rape, and finds that even against her own psychologist's advice, and against professional guidelines (anxiety disorders respond best to CBT past a certain point in treatment), she can't bring herself to "dump" him. This keeps him from getting the treatment that might really help him realize his own guilt and find a way out of his dysfunctional behavior patterns.
So Tony's anxiety never translates into guilt in his life, only in Melfi's. Transference gone dangerous.
four_five_one
Infinition
Great explication.
Also interesting is Carmella who demonstrates explicit Roman Catholic guilt. Interesting when Dr Melfi sends her to an older psychologist, who refuses to treat her, 'of course you're guilty, you're taking blood money' - does Melfi do this to assuage some of her own guilt, knowing that this is what the old school analyst complete with morals would say? - after which she entertains serious doubts about her marriage.
But it's paradoxically it's the church that offers her succor, she needn't feel guilty for Tony's actions, nor even complicit, as long as she finds whatever is good in her husband, and cherishes that. And as long as she lives upon whatever earnings that he's gained lawfully.
Sartre: "Children are the mirror of death."
nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
One of my favorite scenes in the entire series is when Carmela finally tells off the priest whose barely sublimated yearnings for the poor, longsuffering wives of the perish become clear to her (and to Tony, who is such a pig that he very quickly picks up on this and is even jealous of the Father.)
four_five_one
Infinition
Disillusioned with Badio: "...Badiou is revealed as a pathological system-builder, but to what end- to what avail does he build his awkward tower? These fragments he shores against his ruins, a ziggurat of ruins, the ruin of a thought…"
Splintering Bone Ashes: http://splinteringboneashes.blogspot.com/2009/06/why-i-will-never-be-clean-again.html
Splintering Bone Ashes: http://splinteringboneashes.blogspot.com/2009/06/why-i-will-never-be-clean-again.html
nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
awesome SBA post, of course
That's really interesting, I liked the fact that it's a "full-circle" critique from lover to hater. I could probably write one of those about Deleuze, as an exercise, but I don't know if I'd really mean it (since I can't muster enough love or hate for him) as much as it would be healthy to do it.
I just read Emancipation(s) and I can't help but formulate my reaction in Laclau's terms. I really like this Laclau guy. I think he's the only person I've ever read who bridged the gap between the sorts of things Badiou tries to set up in the political field (but imo fails) and a more critical (though not at all dismissive) deconstructionist view of the universal as a co-grounder of the political.
That's really interesting, I liked the fact that it's a "full-circle" critique from lover to hater. I could probably write one of those about Deleuze, as an exercise, but I don't know if I'd really mean it (since I can't muster enough love or hate for him) as much as it would be healthy to do it.
I just read Emancipation(s) and I can't help but formulate my reaction in Laclau's terms. I really like this Laclau guy. I think he's the only person I've ever read who bridged the gap between the sorts of things Badiou tries to set up in the political field (but imo fails) and a more critical (though not at all dismissive) deconstructionist view of the universal as a co-grounder of the political.
nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
scottdisco
rip this joint please
OT but k-punk's post on the UK EU elections (Now the party's over) is quite useful