what should we do about our embaressing nazis?
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- baggy bumhole due to heroin bring back hmlt to shout at them call lombard direct dj controversial talking point hamas are absolutely brilliant limp biscuits maggie the sodomite me and hamas in a copse full of wildflowers perpetual motion romanian orphanage sub-kantian sub-kantian even tired contrarianism we are the hegelian e-girls your weird
william_kent
Well-known member
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the egirls are on my side. we've been having plenty of hot steamy nights.
first ran into the Hegelian E-Girls at Sovereign House earlier this summer. It must have been at the Confessions readings that the other e-girl, Cassidy, hosts. They stopped me as I was leaving and introduced themselves. “We are the Hegelian E-Girls.” Their names were Anna and Sanje, and Anna was from Philadelphia and Sanje from Singapore. They seemed excited to meet me with a nerdy enthusiasm reminiscent of of the Rationalist subculture. They asked if I was familiar with them. Yes, I had seen some of their tweets. They’re basically Leftbook posters and Instagram meme page admins who’d been going semi-viral on weird theory Twitter lately for jargony tweets that try to imitate Žižek. I was mostly knew them through people making fun of them online
as ever I defer to my favourite englishman, Thomas Hobbes on this question.
the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” If this is the state of nature, people have strong reasons to avoid it, which can be done only by submitting to some mutually recognized public authority, for “so long a man is in the condition of mere nature, (which is a condition of war,) as private appetite is the measure of good and evill.”
the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” If this is the state of nature, people have strong reasons to avoid it, which can be done only by submitting to some mutually recognized public authority, for “so long a man is in the condition of mere nature, (which is a condition of war,) as private appetite is the measure of good and evill.”
hey now, you wouldn't have your atheism without protestantism and islam. sacrament and decoration is the poison of mental austerity. stop placing yourself in cuckold dilemma!
Also the ayatollahs are closer to the roman and eastern churches than good old hanafi, and hence to be scorned equally.
Murphy
cat malogen
submit to the sodomy
germaphobian
Well-known member
Protestantism, islam and later atheism are themselves results of certain material reality and not its cause. You keep conflating cause and effect all the time, it's a big misstep for someone claiming to be a materialist (as I understand). You may as well say that you wouldn't have atheism without man discovering fire or without Petrarch climbing the mountain or without shoes or printing press or something like that.
germaphobian
Well-known member
I hardly care about race, probably somewhat less than the average person, my reason for being against mass immigration are much more prosaic - it's a weapon in the hands of the ruling class that is used to bludgeon their subjects. Quite simple. Left with all their insanities is also such a weapon (I do disagree with rightists who claim that the left is somehow in charge, they are too stupid for that, so they are just a tool being used to advance the system, their support and insistence on mass immigration is actually a very good example of this).
germaphobian
Well-known member
But essentially your problem is that, and I don't mean it in any kind of offensive way, can't grasp the actual power relations within our society. Many such cases.
The realignment of the elite with the underclass, particularly its non-white components, was a necessary part of the period of acceleration. In order to resume the expansion and extension of the mass organizations of the regime, the elite was obliged to revive the Caesarist tactics of the period of managerial emergence. The crystallization of local and private power bases by the bourgeois subelite in the period of consolidation acted as a constraint on acceleration, and these non-managerial centers of power had to be overcome if the regime were to expand and if the interests of its elite were to be enhanced. The Caesarist tactic requires for its efficacy an alliance with a mass base as a means of challenging the intermediary power centers of an elite or sub-elite, and while the working class had served as a mass base for managerial Caesarism in the period of managerial emergence, by the late 1960s it was no longer suitable for this role. The working class of the early 20th century had come to constitute a substantial part of the post-bourgeois proletariat, which in the early 1960s had few economic or social grievances and sought mainly to conserve the affluence that it derived, at least indirectly, from the economic policies of the regime. Post-bourgeois elements, especially their working class components, provided the political base of the elite in the periods of emergence and consolidation through the political influence of organized labor under managerial control, but their support of the elite and its regime was conditional upon the economic security they received, and they were not an adequate base for accelerating the regime. Only the underclass could serve as a mass political base for further acceleration, and in supporting its aspirations and sponsoring the demands of its leaders, the soft managerial elite in the 1960s essentially abandoned its historic post-bourgeois constituency in favor of a constituency composed of the underclass. Responding to the social and economic problems of the underclass involved a dramatic expansion of the social engineering functions of the managerial state and its elite and an opportunity for virtually limitless enhancement of the powers and rewards of the elite. The realignment of the elite with the underclass also involved the formulation of policies that could be rationalized only with the environmentalist, cosmopolitan, and relativist premises of progressivist managerial liberalism. Environmentalism explained the inferior performance and conditions of the underclass, offered a course of action in the form of social engineering by the state for their amelioration, challenged the prevalent values and ideas that rationalized discrimination against and negative judgments of the underclass, and provided a critique of racial solidarity while defending a cosmopolitan fraternalism among racial groups.
Sam Francis, Leviathan and Its Enemies
The realignment of the elite with the underclass, particularly its non-white components, was a necessary part of the period of acceleration. In order to resume the expansion and extension of the mass organizations of the regime, the elite was obliged to revive the Caesarist tactics of the period of managerial emergence. The crystallization of local and private power bases by the bourgeois subelite in the period of consolidation acted as a constraint on acceleration, and these non-managerial centers of power had to be overcome if the regime were to expand and if the interests of its elite were to be enhanced. The Caesarist tactic requires for its efficacy an alliance with a mass base as a means of challenging the intermediary power centers of an elite or sub-elite, and while the working class had served as a mass base for managerial Caesarism in the period of managerial emergence, by the late 1960s it was no longer suitable for this role. The working class of the early 20th century had come to constitute a substantial part of the post-bourgeois proletariat, which in the early 1960s had few economic or social grievances and sought mainly to conserve the affluence that it derived, at least indirectly, from the economic policies of the regime. Post-bourgeois elements, especially their working class components, provided the political base of the elite in the periods of emergence and consolidation through the political influence of organized labor under managerial control, but their support of the elite and its regime was conditional upon the economic security they received, and they were not an adequate base for accelerating the regime. Only the underclass could serve as a mass political base for further acceleration, and in supporting its aspirations and sponsoring the demands of its leaders, the soft managerial elite in the 1960s essentially abandoned its historic post-bourgeois constituency in favor of a constituency composed of the underclass. Responding to the social and economic problems of the underclass involved a dramatic expansion of the social engineering functions of the managerial state and its elite and an opportunity for virtually limitless enhancement of the powers and rewards of the elite. The realignment of the elite with the underclass also involved the formulation of policies that could be rationalized only with the environmentalist, cosmopolitan, and relativist premises of progressivist managerial liberalism. Environmentalism explained the inferior performance and conditions of the underclass, offered a course of action in the form of social engineering by the state for their amelioration, challenged the prevalent values and ideas that rationalized discrimination against and negative judgments of the underclass, and provided a critique of racial solidarity while defending a cosmopolitan fraternalism among racial groups.
Sam Francis, Leviathan and Its Enemies
germaphobian
Well-known member
Ever since the political philosopher James Burnham published his seminal book The Managerial Revolution in 1941, theorists of the managerial regime have noted strong underlying similarities between all of the major modern state systems that emerged in the 20th century, including the system of liberal-progressive administration as represented at the time by FDR’s America, the fascist system pioneered by Mussolini, and the communist system that first appeared in Russia and then spread to China and elsewhere. The thrust of all of these systems was fundamentally managerial in character. And yet each also immediately displayed some, uh, quite different behavior. This difference can, however, be largely explained if we distinguish between what the political theorist Sam Francis classified as soft and hard managerial regimes.
The character of the soft managerial regime is that described in the previous section. In contrast, a hard managerial regime differs somewhat in its mix of values. Hard managerial regimes tend to reject two of the seven values of the (soft) managerial ideology described above, discarding hedonism and cosmopolitanism (though homogenization and centralization remain a priority). Instead they tend to emphasize managing the unity of the collective (e.g. the volk, or “the people”) and the value that individual loyalty, strength, and self-sacrifice provides to that collective.[4]
Most importantly, hard and soft managerial regimes differ in their approach to control. Hard managerial regimes default to the use of force, and are adept at using the threat of force to coerce stability and obedience. The state also tends to play a much more open role in the direction of the economy and society in hard systems, establishing state-owned corporations and taking direct control of mass media, for example, in addition to maintaining large security services. This can, however, reduce popular trust in the state and its organs.
In contrast, soft managerial regimes are largely inept and uncomfortable with the open use of force, and much prefer to instead maintain control through narrative management, manipulation, and hegemonic control of culture and ideas. The managerial state also downplays its power by outsourcing certain roles to other sectors of the managerial regime, which claim to be independent. Indeed they are independent, in the sense that they are not directly controlled by the state and can do what they want – but, being managerial institutions, staffed by managerial elites, and therefore stakeholders in the managerial imperative, they nonetheless operate in almost complete sync with the state. Such diffusion helps effectively conceal the scale, unity, and power of the soft managerial regime, as well as deflect and defuse any accountability. This softer approach to maintaining managerial regime dominance may lead to more day-to-day disorder (e.g. crime), but is no less politically stable than the hard variety (and arguably has to date proved more stable).
Despite these differences, every form of managerial regime shares the same fundamental characteristics and core values, including a devotion to technocratic scientism, utopianism, meliorism, homogenization, and one form or another of liberationism aimed at uprooting previous systems, norms, and values. They all pursue the same imperative of expanding mass organizations and the managerial elite, of growing and centralizing their bureaucratic power and control, and of systematically marginalizing managerialism’s enemies. They all have the same philosophical roots. And all their elites share similar deep anxieties about the public.
theupheaval.substack.com
The character of the soft managerial regime is that described in the previous section. In contrast, a hard managerial regime differs somewhat in its mix of values. Hard managerial regimes tend to reject two of the seven values of the (soft) managerial ideology described above, discarding hedonism and cosmopolitanism (though homogenization and centralization remain a priority). Instead they tend to emphasize managing the unity of the collective (e.g. the volk, or “the people”) and the value that individual loyalty, strength, and self-sacrifice provides to that collective.[4]
Most importantly, hard and soft managerial regimes differ in their approach to control. Hard managerial regimes default to the use of force, and are adept at using the threat of force to coerce stability and obedience. The state also tends to play a much more open role in the direction of the economy and society in hard systems, establishing state-owned corporations and taking direct control of mass media, for example, in addition to maintaining large security services. This can, however, reduce popular trust in the state and its organs.
In contrast, soft managerial regimes are largely inept and uncomfortable with the open use of force, and much prefer to instead maintain control through narrative management, manipulation, and hegemonic control of culture and ideas. The managerial state also downplays its power by outsourcing certain roles to other sectors of the managerial regime, which claim to be independent. Indeed they are independent, in the sense that they are not directly controlled by the state and can do what they want – but, being managerial institutions, staffed by managerial elites, and therefore stakeholders in the managerial imperative, they nonetheless operate in almost complete sync with the state. Such diffusion helps effectively conceal the scale, unity, and power of the soft managerial regime, as well as deflect and defuse any accountability. This softer approach to maintaining managerial regime dominance may lead to more day-to-day disorder (e.g. crime), but is no less politically stable than the hard variety (and arguably has to date proved more stable).
Despite these differences, every form of managerial regime shares the same fundamental characteristics and core values, including a devotion to technocratic scientism, utopianism, meliorism, homogenization, and one form or another of liberationism aimed at uprooting previous systems, norms, and values. They all pursue the same imperative of expanding mass organizations and the managerial elite, of growing and centralizing their bureaucratic power and control, and of systematically marginalizing managerialism’s enemies. They all have the same philosophical roots. And all their elites share similar deep anxieties about the public.
The China Convergence
Yes, the West is becoming more like China. Here is the real reason why.
theupheaval.substack.com
germaphobian
Well-known member
ah yes. elites and bureaucrats, back to hoary old American post-trotskyism of the burnam/schachtman kind. What's next, an alliance with Hitler to destroy this new bureaucratic élite class, unforeseen by Marx? and what the hell is a post-bourgeois proletariat anyway? A manifest contradiction in terms. quoting authors you like does not for good analysis.
Or is it necessary to go full Heideggerian and reunite the élite with the fiction of authentic rootedness of the people and become lost in the morass of the there-being (dasein?)
Sounds a lot like the absurd spectacle of maga communism. You accuse me of mystification and yet your materialism remains at the level of 18th century schematism, plastering pre-given categories onto the world with no heed to whether the world can actually be understood in such a static way. sub-Kantian even.
I never said they were the cause. I'm merely observing that you are trinitycucked. You must go much harder into vigorous protestant austerity to penetrate to inward subjectivity.
what you fail to understand (and I absolutely do mean this in an offensive way) is that the bourgeoisie had entrusted production and exchange to the state as early as the 19th century and made the private capitalist surplus to requirements. It is the impersonal domination of capital, bitch! There was no need to lucubrate weird and wonderful classes without that for reading anti-dühring, presumably only due to a lack of lube. Capitalism was never a new form of private property, or private initiative, this is idiotic bourgeois leftism, but precisely associated labour and the suppression of the freedom of the producer. Property is not a simple act of theft a la proudhon but force sanctified by legal right, and thus a relationship. The bureaucracy or if you will, the élite is just an apparatus for holding class power, bourgeois power that is, the same capitalism and the same state, and what else would this managerial élite do if it only represented itself? spend its hard earned cash at the brothel? It must be such a useless élite that keeps constituting itself as a new class in all the successive stages of development of the tributary mode of production, and then in capitalism, likewise, only to be a class that is defunct from the beginning and a floating metaphysical signifier!
what these people fail to understand (and even Trotsky didn't go this far) is that Stalinism and the Chinese models are no aberrations to capitalism, but precisely its 20th century outcome, relevant to the necessary geospatial conditions which required expansion on a far greater quantitative level. what is reversed here are all the ordering of concepts and an indigestible word salad is left out to go mouldy. Liberalism, if you will, was apologetics for the anti-feudal revolutions, not what caused them. Liberalism only became their motive and goal much later, as a form of ideological consciousness of the new class in power. It is quite clear: capitalism can easily get rid of liberalism without renouncing its nature.
as far as i know it means rich new york brats who are supposed to be sexually desirable, if you will, through the electronic world wide web.
Mr. Tea
Let's Talk About Ceps
Oh, I've heard of that. I think it's meant to be some kind of next big thing.
woops
is not like other people
woops
is not like other people
@germaphobian are you a fan of grime music?
many of us here on this forum are big fans of grime music.
here is an early example of grime music that we all enjoy, and like a lot.
many of us here on this forum are big fans of grime music.
here is an early example of grime music that we all enjoy, and like a lot.