why must your asymmetrical contradictions resolve progressively toward higher syntheses, if not because you have smuggled hegel's teleological absolute into materialism?
again, I do not believe so:
Heavy objects move downward. Objects that do not move downward are not heavy: is the weight of the pendulum heavy or not?
This is what the old aristotelians struggled with, and they could not resolve it because they merely proposed negations as affirmations.
But we know that a heavy object accelerates when it goes downwards, and decelerates when it goes upwards.
Thus we can now say that the pendulum is always a heavy object, and that the original question was erroneously posed, but we can also now say that heaviness is the cause of acceleration, of an increased velocity, not of motion.
Now it would be clearly absurd to say that Galileo figured this out by practicing the dialectic (that would be a cold formalism) the dialectic in and of itself cannot tell us the new point at which a negation as (determinate) negation arises, that can only be established by experimental research. The dialectic is not a substitute for research, it is a destructivist power that shatters the once great and supposedly immutable forms of thought.
Here Marx shattering Hegel is important. What Marx gets from Hegel is not teleology, but that there are no fixed categories, that all categories inter-penetrate each other, that everything in motion reciprocally influences everything else. Modern science would agree with this, and it did this through experimental research (not through Hegel, thank God!) but then becomes agnostic on the question of history, of human societies, and the erroneously labelled 'social sciences' which are neither social nor scientific.
In the old metaphysical method, the contradictions can neither mix nor touch. But just as when one mixes in cooking one flabour predominates and also additionally a new taste is formed, in scientific research, one proceeds by taking hypotheses and their potential falsifications, and then arriving at an understanding.
If your argument is that Hegel dissolves the logical categories in the theological absolute, then yes, I would agree with that, but that is where he pushes idealism to its limits. He wants to speak of multilateral relation of all things, but then cannot overcome the limitations of God. Ideas exist for us and by way of us, and thus the search for the absolute idea or the absolute truth cannot be carried out. because he only starts with the idea, of consciousness and self-consciousness.
For scientists (or let us say researchers) consciousness has to come later, truth first must come through initial misrecognition (all experiments must misrecognise) then it is only through an evaluation of the past that a greater clarity and understanding of it arises. Precisely because our mind must perceive the past in its relations to the passage of time.