Ok, I lied, I looked at Hundredmillion's response.
Now there's a statement that not even I can argue with. Hehe. Looks like you do have a sense of humor. Please use it more, I like it
Whatever happened to the profusion of compliments, to the infinity of boundless flattery formerly parading in the form of abuse? Have you been suddenly denied hyper-privileged access to the enigmatic
The All-Purpose Dictionary of Toxic Abuse, a work so obscure and mysterious as to have a provenance that leaves no trace, a text so radically other that unlike Socrates'
Comedies or Lovecraft's
Necronomicon, you won't even find a reference to it in a Google search?
[Oh but maybe try a Yahoo search instead, as the CEO of this Google rival, the $200m-a-year Terry Semel, was the very guy who authorised the withdrawal of
A Clockwork Orange in 1973 when he was Warners' boss, so obviously he's privy to a copy ...]
But enough of that.
Some guy on Jameson, Deleuze, and why schizophrenia is not formalism (short answer: because the schizophrenic has no "I", no linear "self" narrative, rather than an overabundance of it, via Judith Butler)
Not sure how that changes anything, because nobody possesses an "I" (it is always Other).
gek-opel said:
Interesting, but somewhat of an overimplification to render a lack of empathy merely down to a simple neural reaction in the case of an audience not responding well to Baron-Cohen as Borat, surely? There must be plenty of more conscious mediation which intervene inbetween neural mimesis and the ultimate critical decision ("This is racist tosh").
LoL. My anti-racist "symptoms" are the result of my super-cooled neural networks playing havoc with a copy of themselves, better take some approved medication to correct the clinically diagnosed neuro-chemical imbalance, like maybe some chilled Franciskaner rice beer. Ah! That's better. Way to go Borat (hiccup)!! Chemically balanced empathetic racism now fully restored.
gek-opel said:
Its not Meta enough is it? Or perhaps too Meta? Hmm...
On the other hand, if Cohen were to play a black dude pretending to be a white dude dressed up as a black dude doing his best Sacha Baron Cohen impression ...
Borderpolice said:
Goedel's theorems in no way defeat mathematical formalism. In fact they are perfectly compatible with formalism. What you presumably mean is that they refute Hilbert's programme, but even that is debatable (and debated), if only for the simple reason, that Hilbert never actually spelled out his programme in sufficient detail for the question of its veracity or falisity to be a directly mathematical mathematical problem.
The earlier Badiou quote aside, let's summarise via this review of Rebecca Goldstein's Incompleteness:
Positivism started as a kind of intellectual housecleaning following World War I. In Vienna, Goldstein writes, "the overall topic was the moral and intellectual death and decay of all that had come before, and the need to construct entirely new methodologies, forms and foundations." The Vienna Circle celebrated empirical science as the basis for those new foundations, but as the ideas of positivism evolved and filtered into such disciplines as literary theory, anthropology and linguistics, science itself became a target of skepticism. Enter, postmodernism. Every form of knowledge came to be analyzed as a set of rules created by flawed human beings whose biases inevitably infected those rules. The relativity, uncertainty and incompleteness of Einstein, Heisenberg and Godel became metaphors for the unreliability of what we once took to be truth.
Einstein, whose famous theory is so often misrepresented in the maxim "Everything is relative," might not have been so ardent a Platonist as Godel, but he was no subjectivist. According to Goldstein, "Einstein interpreted his theory as representing the objective nature of space-time, so very different from our human, subjective point of view of space and time." Both men believed that an objective, abstract reality existed and that the human mind could behold and grasp this reality. As Godel saw it, we achieve this through a faculty called mathematical intuition.
Godel's faith in mathematical intuition put him in opposition to the mathematical equivalent of positivism, a movement called formalism. Formalism, led by the mathematician David Hilbert, believed that mathematics was, in Hilbert's words, "a game played according to certain simple rules with meaningless marks on paper." Or, as Goldstein describes it, "mathematicians, according to formalism, are not in the business of discovering descriptive truths, whether of the real world of things in physical space or the trans-empirical world of numbers and sets ... They are simply in the business of manipulating the mechanical rules of self-enclosed formal systems."
If formalism were correct, then it followed that mathematics could also be overhauled so that every part of it was "consistent" and the entire system was "complete." It could be boiled down to a set of rules or axioms and procedures so basic and ironclad that a machine -- the computers that were just beyond the historical horizon -- could perform it. It could be finally purged of the paradoxes that had been plaguing the field for hundreds of years. Mathematical intuition, the source of ideas that can't be formally proven but possessing what Goldstein calls, "the urgent cogency that compels belief," has no place in such a system.
Godel's theorem undermined the rules of formalism by using those rules to prove that the formalist scheme was doomed. In what Goldstein calls "one of the most astounding pieces of mathematical reasoning ever produced," he demonstrated that in the kind of system that the formalists aspired to, it was possible to make a statement that was both unprovable and yet also true. This works a little like the famous "liar's paradox," in which the statement "This statement is false," can only be true if it is also false and vice versa. But Godel's theorem was not a paradox, precisely because it pointed to the difference between what could be proven and what was true.
It's easy to see why the distinction confuses people. While Godel might seem to be challenging reason itself, he was, to put a finer point on it, actually demonstrating the inherent problem in a particularly limited form of reasoning. He never abandoned his own faith in another, broader form of reason that includes intuition.
Borderpolice said:
...there is no known connection whatsoever between Goedel's theorem and "political and social domains.
Philosophy and psychoanalytic theory have been doing just this for many decades. But none of that counts, of course. Anyway, must rush, gotta go there and forge in the smitty of the human the real of subjective destitution ...