critiques of science
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IdleRich
IdleRich
It does for us but the point of the example (or at least other versions I've seen without the cynical chicken) is that what actually does happen is completely outside of their conception. Just like the purple gas is for us I guess.
All agreed, you are arriving at your theory without induction.
All true but (I think) you are still missing the deeper point. Given that we have (deductively, analytically, whatever) arrived at this theory, how do we generalise it to all time (and one second in the future and tomorrow)? Only by induction.
Ah, just read what Tea said - think it agrees with what I've said above right?
That's my point, we can't deduce that the laws won't magically change, only induct (or induce?).
I think that you (Edward) are tacitly acknowledging that with your Razor and by saying that "yes that theoretically may happen but there isn't any point in worrying about it because it probably won't and we can't predict it if it will anyway" - something with which I of course agree.
IdleRich
IdleRich
Sorry Edward, I missed this bit from your reply, but I would say that you are not avoiding using induction, you are actually using induction (because you generalise the theory to the future) but being aware that that may be logically flawed - I think that is subtly different in theory if not in practice.
Anyway, time to go home, have a good weekend all.
If you really want to push it, I am using "induction" in that I am using my theory with no way of knowing that everything could change at any moment.
But I am doing it with my eyes open. I am not saying "my theory will remain true in the future because it was true in the past".
So I am not saying induction is true and valid.
I am using my theory as if induction were valid even though I know it isn't because it seems the best course of action open to me.
I'm happy with that because I know my theory wasn't arrived at by induction. This would not be a cool way to get to a good theory, as pointed out by Kuhn who thinks that scientific theories are reached by inductive means and that forms a large part of his critique of the basis of scientific knowledge.
But I am doing it with my eyes open. I am not saying "my theory will remain true in the future because it was true in the past".
So I am not saying induction is true and valid.
I am using my theory as if induction were valid even though I know it isn't because it seems the best course of action open to me.
I'm happy with that because I know my theory wasn't arrived at by induction. This would not be a cool way to get to a good theory, as pointed out by Kuhn who thinks that scientific theories are reached by inductive means and that forms a large part of his critique of the basis of scientific knowledge.
hundredmillionlifetimes
Banned
Oh dear, oh dear! Popper, Kuhn - and no Foucault, no Badiou? [though I must confess that, as a teenager, I did read the former two, and much, much later, the latter two].
So, for example, what about the episteme, the condition of knowledge's possibility within a particular epoch, the historical a priori that grounds knowledge and its discourses?
"I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I won’t say a scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false. The episteme is the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific."===Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 1980.
Interesting how many here talk of "the one best current explanation" of phenomenon X, forgetting that in most cases contradictory theories of phenomenon X can very comfortably now co-exist: "While Kuhn's paradigm shifts are a consequence of a series of conscious decisions made by scientists to pursue a neglected set of questions, Foucault's epistemes are something like the 'epistemological unconscious' of an era; the configuration of knowledge in a particular episteme is based on a set of fundamental assumptions that are so basic to that episteme so as to be invisible to people operating within it. Moreover, Kuhn's concept seems to correspond to what Foucault calls theme or theory of a science, but Foucault analysed how opposing theories and themes could co-exist within a science. Kuhn doesn't search for the conditions of possibility of opposing discourses within a science, but simply for the (relatively) invariant dominant paradigm governing scientific research (supposing that one paradigm always is pervading, except under paradigmatic transition)."
Is it any wonder that the real of science, for so many, is increasingly the scientific method, the form, and not the seemingly meaningless equations it produces?
So, for example, what about the episteme, the condition of knowledge's possibility within a particular epoch, the historical a priori that grounds knowledge and its discourses?
"I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I won’t say a scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false. The episteme is the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific."===Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 1980.
Interesting how many here talk of "the one best current explanation" of phenomenon X, forgetting that in most cases contradictory theories of phenomenon X can very comfortably now co-exist: "While Kuhn's paradigm shifts are a consequence of a series of conscious decisions made by scientists to pursue a neglected set of questions, Foucault's epistemes are something like the 'epistemological unconscious' of an era; the configuration of knowledge in a particular episteme is based on a set of fundamental assumptions that are so basic to that episteme so as to be invisible to people operating within it. Moreover, Kuhn's concept seems to correspond to what Foucault calls theme or theory of a science, but Foucault analysed how opposing theories and themes could co-exist within a science. Kuhn doesn't search for the conditions of possibility of opposing discourses within a science, but simply for the (relatively) invariant dominant paradigm governing scientific research (supposing that one paradigm always is pervading, except under paradigmatic transition)."
Is it any wonder that the real of science, for so many, is increasingly the scientific method, the form, and not the seemingly meaningless equations it produces?
borderpolice
Well-known member
Neither Foucault nor Badiou have produced a serious investigation of science, when one understands the term science as referring to the physical sciences.
well, what about the episteme then?
noting "retrospectively" that not every conveivable scientific theory that could have been put forward, had been put forward, is banal.
Going beyond the obvious and putting forward a convincint theory that connects social structure and scientific results -- while surely interesting --
is not something that Foucault got anywhere near (his contributions to a historical analysis of sexuality nonwithstanding).
What is this supposed to say?
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man I don't have the time to read this whole thread
so I'll keep it simple
science (or should I say modern science) for me causes more trouble than whatever its original aims intend....and for another point I'll quote proverbs in the bible
"the first to speak is always correct till another come forward and question him" (I think that's it anyway lol)
sorry for interrupting another dissensian 'debate' lol
so I'll keep it simple
science (or should I say modern science) for me causes more trouble than whatever its original aims intend....and for another point I'll quote proverbs in the bible
"the first to speak is always correct till another come forward and question him" (I think that's it anyway lol)
sorry for interrupting another dissensian 'debate' lol
Mr. Tea
Let's Talk About Ceps
Umm...whut? Care to be a little more specific?
Nice to see a good level of rationality being displayed in this thread!
Mr. Tea
Let's Talk About Ceps
SEEMINGLY meaningless? To whom? Well, the answer to that is "anyone not trained in that branch of science/mathematics", I suppose.
Russian and Arabic are "seemingly meaningless" to me because I don't speak them, but I wouldn't be so stupid as to claim that they actually are!
Also, I'm not too sure where you get this:
Firstly, why "now"? Surely this situation was far more likely in the past, when empirical data was far scarcer and generally less precise? To ancient man, there was no test that could distinguish between heliocentric and geocentric astronomies, because they explained the observable facts equally well: from the late middle ages onwards, geocentric models had to be made more and more complicated to explain facts (eccentricities of orbits) that sat very comfortably with heliocentric models. Ever since then, people championing geocentric models have justifiably been derided as loonies.
Contradictory theories can only co-exist when there is insufficient data to decide between them. At the moment there is a debate as to whether neutrinos are Dirac or Majorana particles (obscure example, I know, but it's something I know a bit about), and experiments are underway that should answer the question in the next few years. Then one theory will become accepted (or, at any rate, more accepted, for the time being) and the other will be discarded, pending any future discoveries.
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Been reading more about Kuhn and Popper over the weekend....
I have yet to read Kuhn's "Structure" but I mean to.
For now, all I was attacking was his description of how new paradigms are arrived at - ie. he claims hypotheses are arrived at by induction. I wanted to show how scientific knowledge can move forward without resorting to induction as a means of selecting between hypotheses or generating them. I think some of what Popper wrote on this subject helped to find a way out of the induction problem.
I was interested in discussing epistemology more than "Kuhn vs Popper" -the famous debate in regard to how scienctists behave within academia, the more "sociological" or human aspects of scientific practise. It seems to have been blown out of all proportion in retrospect but I need to read more....
But I do want to read "Structure" because it seems to me that Kuhn is not what he is made out to be by his admirers... need to read the source and make up my own mind.
Reading about the Kuhn/Popper debate has made me think more about the way science is done in the real world, who decided what gets done, who are the important voices in the "peer group" that reveiews each others' work etc.
So I have more sympathy now to Zhao's initial point.
I still the the problem is not with Science (capital S) but with science (ie Tryptych's definition of science) ad I am coming to appreciate his point of view that you can't have one without the other (if that's what he was saying).
I have yet to read Kuhn's "Structure" but I mean to.
For now, all I was attacking was his description of how new paradigms are arrived at - ie. he claims hypotheses are arrived at by induction. I wanted to show how scientific knowledge can move forward without resorting to induction as a means of selecting between hypotheses or generating them. I think some of what Popper wrote on this subject helped to find a way out of the induction problem.
I was interested in discussing epistemology more than "Kuhn vs Popper" -the famous debate in regard to how scienctists behave within academia, the more "sociological" or human aspects of scientific practise. It seems to have been blown out of all proportion in retrospect but I need to read more....
But I do want to read "Structure" because it seems to me that Kuhn is not what he is made out to be by his admirers... need to read the source and make up my own mind.
Reading about the Kuhn/Popper debate has made me think more about the way science is done in the real world, who decided what gets done, who are the important voices in the "peer group" that reveiews each others' work etc.
So I have more sympathy now to Zhao's initial point.
I still the the problem is not with Science (capital S) but with science (ie Tryptych's definition of science) ad I am coming to appreciate his point of view that you can't have one without the other (if that's what he was saying).
hundredmillionlifetimes
Banned
That it is not (scientific) knowledge itself - which is always fragile and contingent (and forever disputed) ie. is always "untrue" - but the method of science [and in spite of Feyerabend] that is regarded as The Truth (but which is actually the realm of - the metaphysics of - Desire).
To [very quickly] give two pertinent instances of this problematic under postmodernity:
From a review of Isabelle Stengers’ Cosmopolitiques:
Stengers, like Bruno Latour, wants us to give up the claim to absolute supremacy that is the greatest legacy of post-Enlightenment modernity. The point is not to abandon science, nor to see it (in cultural-relativist terms) as lacking objective validity. The problem is not with science’s actual, particular positive claims; but rather with its pretensions to universality, its need to deny the validity of all claims and practices other than its own. What Stengers, rightly, wants to take down is the “mobilization” of science as a war machine, which can only make its positive claims by destroying all other discourses and points of view: science presenting itself as rational and as objectively “true,” whereas all other discourses are denounced as superstitious, irrational, grounded in mere “belief,” etc. Stengers isn’t opposing genetics research, for instance, but she is opposing the claim that somehow the “truth” of “human nature” can be found in the genome and nowhere else.
[Stengers is trying to characterize certain aspects of “scientific method” (i.e. repeatability of the results, confirmation that the results are not just an “artifact” of the scientific apparatus) in terms of what distinguishes science as a “practice,” or as a form of creativity and invention. She is trying to get at what, for scientists themselves, distinguishes science from other sorts of practices, without thereby endorsing the claim (made by scientists mostly when they are addressing public discourse, but not when they are actually involved in their own research) that science is thereby “true” in a way that no other discourses are or can be.]
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[Stengers is trying to characterize certain aspects of “scientific method” (i.e. repeatability of the results, confirmation that the results are not just an “artifact” of the scientific apparatus) in terms of what distinguishes science as a “practice,” or as a form of creativity and invention. She is trying to get at what, for scientists themselves, distinguishes science from other sorts of practices, without thereby endorsing the claim (made by scientists mostly when they are addressing public discourse, but not when they are actually involved in their own research) that science is thereby “true” in a way that no other discourses are or can be.]
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Pete Rollins: Creationism Is Scientific
It is very popular, especially within the scientific community, to contrast the theory of evolution with the fundamentalist’s interpretation of Genesis as a six-day (or six-epoch) creation, via the claim that the former is properly scientific while the later is pre and/or anti-scientific. In response to this Creationists will generally counter with the claim that they follow the scientific approach rigorously. Indeed there are numerous fundamentalist institutions which spend vast sums of money attempting to debate evolutionary biologists purely on the basis of scientific research while there is a whole industry churning out books attempting to reach people on the basis of scientific principles. In fact, ID theory has attempted to move away completely from any explicit claims related to biblical hermeneutics in its attempt to focus purely upon what they see as the scientific method.
In this science verses fundamentalism debate I have to say that I side more with the Fundamentalists in their claim that they follow scientific procedures (and for this very reason seek to distance myself from them). At a very basic level the fundamentalist affirms (1) the same ontological outlook as that expressed in classical scientific method (2) that their views can, in principle, be proved via the same empirical processes as those affirmed by classical scientific theory and (3) that their views can be accepted on the same epistemological level as those affirmed by classical scientific method.
This means that beliefs such as a six-day creation, a fruit tree with the power to bestow knowledge of Good and Evil upon eating from it, a snake with the ability to talk, the transfiguration and the new Jerusalem descending from heaven all exist on the same mundane natural level as a phenomena such as snow falling on a winters evening and are, in principle, able to be proved true (or false) on scientific grounds (truth here being defined as ‘actual material occurrence’, i.e. if a video camera existed at the beginning we could have recorded the snake talking to Eve). Indeed the fundamentalist will hold to the principle of falsification (as well as accepting the usefulness of the ideal of striving for verification). If evidence were needed that this is the case we can turn to the fact that Creationists have long claimed that micro-evolution does indeed occur within species.
More than this, the fundamentalist accepts and applies the scientific principles of detachment, disinterestedness and objectivity when looking at scripture (for a paradigmatic example see Charles Hodges three volume work Systematic Theology). At its core Christian fundamentalism is profoundly scientific in its outlook and embraces the tools developed and employed by the empirical realist philosophers of the Enlightenment.
Of course, the Creationist can be seen to engage in bad science, and this is perhaps what evolutionary biologists are reacting against (even though they generally articulate their frustrations incorrectly). My point in this post is not to show why Christian fundamentalists engage in bad science but rather to draw out their reliance upon underlying, classical scientific principles.
Instead then of saying that evolutionism (by employing the ‘ism’ here I am referring to those who embrace a metaphysical naturalism which claims evolution as a fact) and creationism are opposed to one another, one can say that evolutionism and creationism are intimately joined together by their belief that reality is empirical and thus in the view that the only good beliefs are those which are factual. In a sense people like Dawkins and Harris are thus profoundly religious in the fundamentalist sense and thus closer to their supposed enemies than they think. As such the two sides of the debate can be productively described as analogous to that of the ‘two’ sides of a mobius strip, which are in fact one and the same side (as one discovers as they follow its contours).
In this science verses fundamentalism debate I have to say that I side more with the Fundamentalists in their claim that they follow scientific procedures (and for this very reason seek to distance myself from them). At a very basic level the fundamentalist affirms (1) the same ontological outlook as that expressed in classical scientific method (2) that their views can, in principle, be proved via the same empirical processes as those affirmed by classical scientific theory and (3) that their views can be accepted on the same epistemological level as those affirmed by classical scientific method.
This means that beliefs such as a six-day creation, a fruit tree with the power to bestow knowledge of Good and Evil upon eating from it, a snake with the ability to talk, the transfiguration and the new Jerusalem descending from heaven all exist on the same mundane natural level as a phenomena such as snow falling on a winters evening and are, in principle, able to be proved true (or false) on scientific grounds (truth here being defined as ‘actual material occurrence’, i.e. if a video camera existed at the beginning we could have recorded the snake talking to Eve). Indeed the fundamentalist will hold to the principle of falsification (as well as accepting the usefulness of the ideal of striving for verification). If evidence were needed that this is the case we can turn to the fact that Creationists have long claimed that micro-evolution does indeed occur within species.
More than this, the fundamentalist accepts and applies the scientific principles of detachment, disinterestedness and objectivity when looking at scripture (for a paradigmatic example see Charles Hodges three volume work Systematic Theology). At its core Christian fundamentalism is profoundly scientific in its outlook and embraces the tools developed and employed by the empirical realist philosophers of the Enlightenment.
Of course, the Creationist can be seen to engage in bad science, and this is perhaps what evolutionary biologists are reacting against (even though they generally articulate their frustrations incorrectly). My point in this post is not to show why Christian fundamentalists engage in bad science but rather to draw out their reliance upon underlying, classical scientific principles.
Instead then of saying that evolutionism (by employing the ‘ism’ here I am referring to those who embrace a metaphysical naturalism which claims evolution as a fact) and creationism are opposed to one another, one can say that evolutionism and creationism are intimately joined together by their belief that reality is empirical and thus in the view that the only good beliefs are those which are factual. In a sense people like Dawkins and Harris are thus profoundly religious in the fundamentalist sense and thus closer to their supposed enemies than they think. As such the two sides of the debate can be productively described as analogous to that of the ‘two’ sides of a mobius strip, which are in fact one and the same side (as one discovers as they follow its contours).
Mr. Tea
Let's Talk About Ceps
Hang on - you're not actually defending creationism/ID here, are you? I mean, seriously?
So-called 'Intelligent Design' is not science, or anything like science, for the following reason: it requires the existence of an Intelligent Designer, which must be God or some kind of being functionally equivalent to a god, and God is by definition supernatural. Science is an attempt to understand and explain natural phenomena in terms of natural laws, so any theory relying on the supernatural disqualifies itself from being science at the very first hurdle.
Edit: Stenger seems to have met physicists very different from the ones I know. The topic of the 'Arrow of Time' is one actively persued by many researchers, the second law of thermodynamics has nothing to do with anything as anthropocentric as epistemology (entropy is a physically-defined quantity), and as for quantum mechanics - well, I certainly don't have a problem with the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and neither does any physicist I've met, and hidden-variable theory has never been anything more than a fringe theory at best. Perhaps she's constructed a time machine and sat in on the procedings of the Royal Society ca. 1870? Major straw-man-construction here, I think.
So-called 'Intelligent Design' is not science, or anything like science, for the following reason: it requires the existence of an Intelligent Designer, which must be God or some kind of being functionally equivalent to a god, and God is by definition supernatural. Science is an attempt to understand and explain natural phenomena in terms of natural laws, so any theory relying on the supernatural disqualifies itself from being science at the very first hurdle.
Edit: Stenger seems to have met physicists very different from the ones I know. The topic of the 'Arrow of Time' is one actively persued by many researchers, the second law of thermodynamics has nothing to do with anything as anthropocentric as epistemology (entropy is a physically-defined quantity), and as for quantum mechanics - well, I certainly don't have a problem with the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and neither does any physicist I've met, and hidden-variable theory has never been anything more than a fringe theory at best. Perhaps she's constructed a time machine and sat in on the procedings of the Royal Society ca. 1870? Major straw-man-construction here, I think.
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hundredmillionlifetimes
Banned
another one bites the dust
We'll assume you're referring to Mr Tea here, having once again radically misunderstood the texts quoted, though where this positions you is equally questionable. The text above was questioning empiricist fundamentalism, of whatever kind, not subscribing to any fundamentalism, which appears to be your affliction.
Scientific empiricism is YOUR God. Simply asserting that there is no supernatural God [which as rationalists we can all take for granted, since Spinoza and Nietzsche especially] is not the same as claiming that there is no God, the latter claim requiring the total, earth-shattering rejection of all Truth, all Ultimate Realities, including scientific ones. For science (or "creationism") - whether in the realm of the natural sciences or the human sciences - to claim privileged access to any such a reality, any such underlying order or structure to the world, any such absolute "truths", is for it to claim to be God, something even more destructive than supernatural fictions, because so much more plausable.
matt b
Indexing all opinion
Mr. Tea
Let's Talk About Ceps
Would you care to explain to me exactly how I've "radically misunderstood" the texts? Stenger in particular seems to think physicists lie awake at night tortured by apparent paradoxes or contradictions that were put to bed long ago. Anyone who considers 'creationism' to be science is fundamentally wrong, for the reasons I have stated; if postmodernists want to support it just to piss off scientists, well, that's up to them I guess.
On the other point, I believe that there is Truth 'out there', inasmuch as I believe the processes by which the universe works are, in principle, amenable to understanding by rational beings. Science (as it exists today, on Earth) is by no means a perfect tool for doing this, because scientists are humans and humans are fallible and limited, and it may be that no ultimate scientific truth can ever be reached, only better and better approximations to truth. I do, however, believe that science is the best thing we have for this job. (But not any other job: the most persistent straw man in this thread is the idea that science - in particular natural science - claims to be able to explain *everything*. I'm saying natural science can explain natural phenomena, *not* the behaviour of complex emergent systems where non-physical processes take place in physical systems. Note that this is not the same thing, by any means, as an actual physical dualism.)
I find the whole argument that "if you believe in rationality and empiricism it's actually the same as believing in God" to be smug, intentionally controversial and ultimately sophomoric.
On the other point, I believe that there is Truth 'out there', inasmuch as I believe the processes by which the universe works are, in principle, amenable to understanding by rational beings. Science (as it exists today, on Earth) is by no means a perfect tool for doing this, because scientists are humans and humans are fallible and limited, and it may be that no ultimate scientific truth can ever be reached, only better and better approximations to truth. I do, however, believe that science is the best thing we have for this job. (But not any other job: the most persistent straw man in this thread is the idea that science - in particular natural science - claims to be able to explain *everything*. I'm saying natural science can explain natural phenomena, *not* the behaviour of complex emergent systems where non-physical processes take place in physical systems. Note that this is not the same thing, by any means, as an actual physical dualism.)
I find the whole argument that "if you believe in rationality and empiricism it's actually the same as believing in God" to be smug, intentionally controversial and ultimately sophomoric.
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borderpolice
Well-known member
This is confused and not well expressed. To summarise (and simplifying this complicated matter greatly):
- The purpose of scientific theory is to improve the human ability to predict and hence to manipulate (parts of) the world.
- Truth is gradual: scientific statement/theory A is more true than statement/theory B, the more working scientists argee easily that A is is more useful in their research (ultimatly: aids prediction more) than B. Not surprisingly, especially with fresh scientific statements, there's a lot of disagreement as to truth. This often changes over time as the community gets more familiar with the pros and cons of using a specific theory. It should be noted that there's never absolute agreement, and hence no absolute thruth, but often the circle of dissenters is small enough to be ignored or easily marginalised.
- The choice between competing scientific theories does not need to be made, as long as all aid predictability. In practise, one of the existing theories tends to be simpler and or is better developed than its competitors and tends to gain dominance (partly because of external reasons, like competitors not getting enough funding), at least until something even better comes along.
- A scientific statement is one that not only claims truth, <B>but also</B> comes with an associated set of conditions under which the truth claim can be evaluated <B>and retracted</B>. In mathematics the retraction conditions would be the inability to formalise a proof in ZF, or a counterexample, in physics the inability to reproduce experiments. It must be noted at this point that the conditions of retraction are usually not stated explictly. This is because they happen to change very slowly only, and are implicity accepted, hence there is no particular need to specify them every time.
- Science is self-referential, circular: science investigates itself (and its methods) using the scientific methodology. The scientific methodology is consequently subject tochange, albeit usually only evolving slowly (because only rarely do people come up with improved methodologies.).
The superiority of science over other forms of discourse, like religion, then simply boils down to the empirical fact that science tends to be vastly better at prediction and facilitating manipulation. But that's an empirical and scientific statement, hence science, by definition, is willing to retract it.
For example the set of retraction conditions mentioned in (4) is one key differences between scientific statements and others: creationists are -- at least as far as i'm aware -- not prepared to state under which conditions they would discard their belief in the unquestionable authority of the old testament. scientists are perfectly happy to retract evolution theory, for example if the creationists come up with better predictions than the adherents of evolution.Coming back to your claim: scientific results are often not at all fragile and unstable, just look at hellenistic science (and its rediscovery starting in the renaissance, to be concluded only in the 19th century), much of it is valid still today, over 2000 years later. Of course fresh scientific claims are much less stable. And some domains of the world, like the social or the time before the big bang, don't seem to admit stable scientific statements at all.
The importance of the scientific methodology is then simply the emprical fact that it has been very successful. Should that success come to an end, the scientific method as we know it now, will whither.
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Mr. Tea
Let's Talk About Ceps
That's a very good way of putting it: treat the scientific method itself a bit like a scientific theory, in that we shall continue to use it for as long as it is useful.