noel emits
a wonderful wooden reason
If we're going to do this I think we need to talk about the nature of causality and also do be more precise in our (or Schopenhauer's) definitions of 'will'.
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noel emits
a wonderful wooden reason
Just to remember how we got into all this, LOL, I am really looking at what kind of attitude works best, on an individual level and on a societal level.
I believe there are a-deterministic moments. But alas I'm not necessarily sure on the role of the individual in these. To follow Badiou on this these may well only arise out of moments of rupture in the nature of the determined situation. Although he would claim that that the subject emerges only at the point of rupture, in response to it. Here an a-deterministic event sets in motion a new time, a new subject, but to what extent this entails free will I'm somewhat unsure.
If we are talking about free will, well then in terms of this debate then of course it does!
I hold that determinism is the guarantor in a weird way of responsibility, that it is I who made the decision. Perhaps it would be more sound to look at the absence of constraints to making that decision, and define that as a limited free will. But whilst there are selves to make decisions, such selves will have emerged through processes which were set in motion before they came to exist, (language history, genetics) and as such are deterministic creations. Even to the extent that we are able to modify ourselves (at the level of preferences which effect choice making) such processes may well be set in motion through predetermined factors. Obviously at different scales determinism may no longer hold out tho...
Go on then...
noel emits
a wonderful wooden reason
That sounds like a description of our present inadequate situation maybe, but not a fundamental condition of being in the universe.
I still couldn't really give a toss about the philosophical debate unless it translates into something practical. I'll go back to something elgato said earlier:
"i see it as foolish to base policy on a fallacy, or to work backwards and base metaphysical belief on practicality, based on practice in a very specific society"
Well, how exactly is it foolish to base metaphysical belief on practicality? Unless you really believe you are in possession of 'the truth', in which case I would say you are utilising 'faith', something that has been earlier characterised in this discussion as 'blind and unjustified'. I'd say having faith in a deterministic amoral universe is certainly less justified than having faith in some metaphysical position chosen for practical reasons.
On an individual level it is pretty much irrelevant- it is difficult to avoid the (either real or illusory) psychological perception of free choice, even if we might not be able to choose otherwise. (actually another way of analysing the problem is to consider the self that is created after each decision point, after the actual decision has been made-- I remain I only to the extent that I had to make that decision to necessitate the existence of this particular I which exists right now as the result of that decision...) It is a slightly different matter at the level of society.
So in essence for reasons of efficacy you are making a similar argument to that of believeing God, if it exists, you are a winner, if it doesn't you lose nothing?
IdleRich
IdleRich
Surely this should read "even if there is free will"?
In which case I take it to be that you are arguing that even free-will on an individual level does not preclude a worthwhile statistical treatment of society (of course just because you can treat something probabilistically does not mean that it is deterministic).
First point - I'm not saying that feeling is necessarily evidence that we "decide freeely" however I'm saying that it should not be lightly thrown aside. When performing a scientific experiment you consider the data obtained and apply your reasoning to it, I would say that this "feeling" is in some way analagous to that data, it is just "internal" data rather than external data but it should play the same role in shaping our theories.
Arguments rejecting this internal data seem to be some kind of equivalent of "brain in a vat" arguments that reject all external data. In other words if you think that your internal data isn't a fairly reliable guide to what's going on it's just as sceptical as saying that external data (ie that you get through your senses) is totally unreliable. Just like a "brain in a vat" sceptic the onus is surely on you to make your case as to why things aren't as they appear.
The second point as to how a will can be free is tricky. One stab I will have at an answer is to say that there could be some part of you outside of the world which is the "true you" and which is able to take a second (or nth) order to any attitudes that you have. I guess this "true you" would actually represent your will, and there is no reason to think it cannot be free.
noel emits
a wonderful wooden reason
Except that here if we do have some free will and we deny that then we could be in big trouble as a society, we'd at least be missing out on our potential.
If we don't have any free will then we have no choice in our attitudes towards it anyway so it doesn't matter what any of us think we're saying or doing.
I'm also pointing out the 'faith' embedded in the belief that the universe is completely deterministic. That's a religious position and not one that offers much dignity or joy to human beings.
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Probability vs determinism-- Obviously it is believed that in terms of physics at a quantum level we deal in probability. However this need not necessarily lead to a bleed-up the scale to the level of human actors. Even if it does I feel this does not necessarily imply a world of free will, merely of chance rather than guarentee within a chance based mechanism, rather than a certainty mechanism. This istherefore not necessarily of any help to those proposing a system of free-will. Indeed it may bugger things up even more comprehensively!
A Kantian solution then? The phenomenal/noumenal split to allow a self outside of physical laws? That always felt like a terribly unsatisfactory conclusion to me...
Its not entirely determinstic, but there is no free will, because will cannot be free. Even less diginity to humans in that position!
Also it still matters what we do even if we have no free will, but merely the case that so long as there are selves, factors will determine them. And even if there is no determinism per se and merely chancey operations upon the individual, the free and the will elements fail to come together...
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noel emits
a wonderful wooden reason
It's not entirely deterministic, but there is no free will......because you say so?
Well this seems to be a much more complicated position you hold with a whole pantheon af actors! All I mean by no free will is total determinism. Mechanical, predestination etc...
Ah there are two different questions here. One about deteminism the other about free will. They are linked but clearly distinct.
What is free will then- and the absence of total determinism is probably not a good enough answer, as we are talking about humans at the scale of humans and the way they make choices, yes? What then allows a will to be free... From an inside-the-human point of view, when I choose between two options I will usually have a reason for making a choice. Sometimes I may not, but that decision then will be effectively abitrary. If a decision, in order to be willed requires a justification, even if that justification amounts to a mere whim, then such a whim can be traced back to the individual possessing such a whim, and as such there remains the question of could this person have chosen otherwise? Is otherwise-ness a necessary property of a choice? Or is a choice merely the presentation of options, and the conclusion of a process?
What is free will then- and the absence of total determinism is probably not a good enough answer, as we are talking about humans at the scale of humans and the way they make choices, yes? What then allows a will to be free... From an inside-the-human point of view, when I choose between two options I will usually have a reason for making a choice. Sometimes I may not, but that decision then will be effectively abitrary. If a decision, in order to be willed requires a justification, even if that justification amounts to a mere whim, then such a whim can be traced back to the individual possessing such a whim, and as such there remains the question of could this person have chosen otherwise? Is otherwise-ness a necessary property of a choice? Or is a choice merely the presentation of options, and the conclusion of a process?
noel emits
a wonderful wooden reason
I suppose in this discussion I have always been talking about 'will', not 'free will'. Will in the sense that sentient self-aware beings do have the ability to act upon the universe, primarily in the domain of our own physical bodies, and generally in a forward time direction. I would also say that we potentially have free will in the domain of our own minds.
Sure, we have will, and make decisions, and hence act upon the universe. I think the "free" aspect is greatly overrated, or rather misconstrued (since there are free elements- certainly if you bring in chance-y processes- but this doesn't really enable the will to belong to us). The more frightening aspect comes when we consider something like Meillassoux's principle of necessary contingency (ie his argument that the only necessary principle is that everything, every physical law, may change at any moment in time) and what that might mean on the human level of choice making. This radically shifts the debate about determinism, but possibly not in a terribly human dignity-friendly manner (leading to what is termed "hyper-chaos").
noel emits
a wonderful wooden reason
I think statistics can save us from being too worried about that.
Also I am with IdleRich on the 'true-self' thing, except that I don't see why this has to operate outside the world, merely outside linear time. It's the lack of willingness to include 'subjective' personal impressions in ideas about being that leads into these outlandish positions.
This is kind of irrelevant too though and I do prefer to stick to the logical arguments rather than my own preferred biases.
I don't know about hyper-chaos, but what about hyper-causality where everything basically causes everything else every which way in time, except that you have us self-aware beings as pockets of intentionality. I think this presents a paradigm where determinism doesn't really make sense.
Also I am with IdleRich on the 'true-self' thing, except that I don't see why this has to operate outside the world, merely outside linear time. It's the lack of willingness to include 'subjective' personal impressions in ideas about being that leads into these outlandish positions.
This is kind of irrelevant too though and I do prefer to stick to the logical arguments rather than my own preferred biases.
I don't know about hyper-chaos, but what about hyper-causality where everything basically causes everything else every which way in time, except that you have us self-aware beings as pockets of intentionality. I think this presents a paradigm where determinism doesn't really make sense.
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Ok, fair enough but then you still have the problem of how these pockets develop. And also how they connect back to the causal world. And whether in connecting back to the causal or hyper-causal they fail to disrupt its causality in some respect. Unless you limit this intentionality to a purely inside-mind concept.
noel emits
a wonderful wooden reason
I have no idea but it allows for a basis for free will and independent thought not arising from deterministic processes. We don't really exist in linear time, that's just how it seems.
Anyway, like I say that's really just a personal preference and intuition and has no real bearing on the discussion. I just present it as another possible viewpoint.