noel emits
a wonderful wooden reason
If we're going to do this I think we need to talk about the nature of causality and also do be more precise in our (or Schopenhauer's) definitions of 'will'.
'No free will' I would generally take to mean a completely deterministic universe
Can we not instead decide on how good a decision is based on it's benefits? Why should it matter how we get there?
From my point of view the real debate isn't about free will but about attitudes to personal responsibility. In any case I think you are equating 'will' with mind here which I wouldn't do.
If we're going to do this I think we need to talk about the nature of causality and also do be more precise in our (or Schopenhauer's) definitions of 'will'.
That sounds like a description of our present inadequate situation maybe, but not a fundamental condition of being in the universe.I believe there are a-deterministic moments. But alas I'm not necessarily sure on the role of the individual in these. To follow Badiou on this these may well only arise out of moments of rupture in the nature of the determined situation. Although he would claim that that the subject emerges only at the point of rupture, in response to it. Here an a-deterministic event sets in motion a new time, a new subject, but to what extent this entails free will I'm somewhat unsure.
I still couldn't really give a toss about the philosophical debate unless it translates into something practical. I'll go back to something elgato said earlier:If we are talking about free will, well then in terms of this debate then of course it does!
Just to remember how we got into all this, LOL, I am really looking at what kind of attitude works best, on an individual level and on a societal level.
Well, how exactly is it foolish to base metaphysical belief on practicality? Unless you really believe you are in possession of 'the truth', in which case I would say you are utilising 'faith', something that has been earlier characterised in this discussion as 'blind and unjustified'. I'd say having faith in a deterministic amoral universe is certainly less justified than having faith in some metaphysical position chosen for practical reasons.
Surely this should read "even if there is free will"?"Even if there is no free will (at the level of the individual) there remain statistical likelihoods based around the factors which make up each individual- factors which can be manipulated. As such it might therefore be greatly harmful to fail to admit the totally deterministic society- for in doing so we would fail to achieve the manifest benefits of determinism..."
First point - I'm not saying that feeling is necessarily evidence that we "decide freeely" however I'm saying that it should not be lightly thrown aside. When performing a scientific experiment you consider the data obtained and apply your reasoning to it, I would say that this "feeling" is in some way analagous to that data, it is just "internal" data rather than external data but it should play the same role in shaping our theories."Merely because we feel like we make a decision, how does that give us any guide to the actuality of the process which leads us into making the decision? Anyway the real issue rests at the level of how a will can be free"
Except that here if we do have some free will and we deny that then we could be in big trouble as a society, we'd at least be missing out on our potential.So in essence for reasons of efficacy you are making a similar argument to that of believeing God, if it exists, you are a winner, if it doesn't you lose nothing?
(of course just because you can treat something probabilistically does not mean that it is deterministic).
The second point as to how a will can be free is tricky. One stab I will have at an answer is to say that there could be some part of you outside of the world which is the "true you" and which is able to take a second (or nth) order to any attitudes that you have. I guess this "true you" would actually represent your will, and there is no reason to think it cannot be free.
Except that here if we do have some free will and we deny that then we could be in big trouble as a society, we'd at least be missing out on our potential.
If we don't have any free will then we have no choice in our attitudes towards it anyway so it doesn't matter what any of us think we're saying or doing.
I'm also pointing out the 'faith' embedded in the belief that the universe is completely deterministic. That's a religious position and not one that offers much dignity or joy to human beings.
It's not entirely deterministic, but there is no free will......because you say so?Its not entirely determinstic, but there is no free will, because will cannot be free. Even less diginity to humans in that position!
Well this seems to be a much more complicated position you hold with a whole pantheon af actors! All I mean by no free will is total determinism. Mechanical, predestination etc...Also it still matters what we do even if we have no free will, but merely the case that so long as there are selves, factors will determine them. And even if there is no determinism per se and merely chancey operations upon the individual, the free and the will elements fail to come together...
I don't know about hyper-chaos, but what about hyper-causality where everything basically causes everything else every which way in time, except that you have us self-aware beings as pockets of intentionality. I think this presents a paradigm where determinism doesn't really make sense.
I have no idea but it allows for a basis for free will and independent thought not arising from deterministic processes. We don't really exist in linear time, that's just how it seems.I think Meillassoux deploys Cantorian ordinality of infinity to argue that it is concievable that a universe of laws which are contingent yet stable beyond all probability exists... anyway: explain how a self outside of linear time would operate?