Iraq: U.S. Troop and Mercenary Escalations

vimothy

vimothy

yurp
Gavin said:
I think Nomad was laughing at the notion that the government in Iraq is anything but a U.S. puppet -- in other words, not representative of the Iraqi people.
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If you think that the current Iraqi government is a puppet of the American military and / or the American administration, you are not paying any attention, or you're an idiot. A puppet government (a la Daniel Pipes' suggestion) would solve everyone's problems. Well, obviously not everyone's, but it would certainly make George Bush's life easier.

If we want to talk about the inherent flaws in "representative" political systems... maybe another thread is needed.
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More interesting to me is how someone considers Baathist terrorists, chauvanistic Sunni militia and murderous Fedayeen to be more legitmate than a government elected by the people of Iraq. (Even if you don't think it's truly representative in an ideal sense, it's at least substantially more representative than Saddam, i.e. gives power to Shia and Kurds).
 
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Mr BoShambles

jambiguous
So Vim would you argue that the fall in the death rate is indicative of a process of reconciliation amongst the different factions in Iraq? Is an institutional framework for representative government being built which will [or at least has the potential to] be accepted by sunni, shia and kurd alike? And if so, at what point, in your opinion, can the coalition forces leave?
 
vimothy

vimothy

yurp
Mr BoShambles said:
So Vim would you argue that the fall in the death rate is indicative of a process of reconciliation amongst the different factions in Iraq? Is an institutional framework for representative government being built which will [or at least has the potential to] be accepted by sunni, shia and kurd alike? And if so, at what point, in your opinion, can the coalition forces leave?
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Well, I stand by what I said upthread -- the falling rate of violence represents (not necessarily in any sort of order):

  • the spread of the "Anbar awakening"
  • the al-Sadr ceasefire (and the associated (though obviously strategic) Iranian stand-off)
  • the improvements in Iraqi security forces
  • the new COIN strategy
I don't think an explicit institutional framework is being built, but perhaps we are seeing something develop regardless of the central government (e.g. federalism, Sunni involvement -- i.e. rejection of Al Qaeda and responsibility for own security, distribution of resource rent (anyone else notice Iraq oil production is up?), etc). Personally I expect MNF forces to be there for some time, though perhaps a rapid deterioration in security / expolsion in violence would be enough to convince America to leave. As long as the situation is improving, America will continue to provide a boots on the ground presence, and probably bases for some time after that.

There will also be a reduction in forces soon, due to purely logistical reasons.
 
H

hundredmillionlifetimes

Banned
The Myths of Military Progress

The More Things Appear to Change, the More They Don't

By Ron Jacobs

Making occupation and calling it peace. Killing fewer and calling it progress. Rotating troops and calling it a withdrawal. Setting up new death squads and calling them allies. Lowering standards and calling it opening new opportunities.
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State Department official Iraq update is really compilation of plagiarized major media articles :

Kind of pathetic when the official report from the US State Department on what's "really" happening in Iraq is actually just a bunch of plagiarized paragraphs from the major media in the US.
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C

crackerjack

Well-known member
Thanks, I'll print that out and read it on the tube.

Did you know if you a double-click on a word in the NY Times it pops up with the dictionary definition. How cool is that! 1st time i've noticed.
 
vimothy

vimothy

yurp
Mr. Tea said:
What's bad about the article? (In terms understandable to the economically illiterate. :))
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Not the article per se (e.g. "Obama was very good about this. He said, 'I'm not against war - I'm just against stupid wars.' And I feel very much the same way.") It's more that it's a bit conflicted as an analysis, in terms of fitting a straightforward point (the Iraq War was and is very expensive, and the opportunity cost is therefore large) into Stiglitz's more general ideology. Then again, maybe I'm letting my dislike of Stiglitz get in the way. Hmm.

I'll get back to you on this in more detail when I have some time ...
 
Gavin

Gavin

booty bass intellectual
More on the surge: http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/18722376/the_myth_of_the_surge

"We are essentially supporting a quasi-feudal devolution of authority to armed enclaves, which exist at the expense of central government authority," says Chas Freeman, who served as ambassador to Saudi Arabia under the first President Bush. "Those we are arming and training are arming and training themselves not to facilitate our objectives but to pursue their own objectives vis-a-vis other Iraqis. It means that the sectarian and ethnic conflicts that are now suppressed are likely to burst out with even greater ferocity in the future."
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C

crackerjack

Well-known member
Gavin said:
More on the surge: http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/18722376/the_myth_of_the_surge
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The quote before yours was possibly even more illustrative.

There is little doubt what will happen when the massive influx of American money stops: Unless the new Iraqi state continues to operate as a vast bribing machine, the insurgent Sunnis who have joined the new militias will likely revert to fighting the ruling Shiites, who still refuse to share power.
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Off out now. Gonna read the rest of this later.
 
vimothy

vimothy

yurp
From an an argument at the SWJ discussion board, between Gian P. Gentile and a couple of other army personel:

I wish you would stop with the downright, untrue lie that we simply "bought off" the Sunni tribes. We didn't. Yes, money was used as an incentive in several ways. But the Sunnis wanted to get rid of Al Qaeda on their own. We simply had the fortitude to help them. It's as much as an demeaning insult to those who worked that hugely significant turnaround as you feel it is an insult to your soldiers that some perceive they weren't doing things right, or trying hard.

Using money as a weapon is critical, as you know. What’s cheaper – gassing up your M1 at $13/gal (KBR delivered cost) , 504 gals, and probably twice a day = $13,104. Using that money to support actions that prevent having to use the tanks = much better deal. I know how much CL I/III/V my guys used during the Sadr rebellion,. The extension for 1AD cost $1bil for three months. We probably could have prevented it if we had spent $250mil in Sadr City to create jobs in late 2003. (Impossible for policy reasons). And with a payout of $500k + death funds for each soldier killed, I think using money to create stability sounds like a damn good deal.

And again, was Iraq truly better off in 2006 than today in 2007? Are we in a worse strategic position? Operational? Tactical? Does the US have less options today than in late 2006? Are the people less secure? Are more US soldiers dying? Are more Iraqis dying?
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In any case, surely if we follow Stiglitz's arguments through to their logical conclusions, it would be more efficient to pull out all troops and just bomb Iraq with money.
 
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