sus
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Ok phew I didn't miss anything, thanksBasically, we've been discussing whether various frameworks like postmodernism, Marxism, etc. can tell us anything about the world or whether they merely describe themselves.
Ok phew I didn't miss anything, thanksBasically, we've been discussing whether various frameworks like postmodernism, Marxism, etc. can tell us anything about the world or whether they merely describe themselves.
Gus (in his own mind) when inflicting a brutal sadface:
Brilliant example of 1st year undergrad writing![]()
Lords of the Fall
It’s been nine months now since I set aside the other preoccupations of this blog and launched a project I’d had in mind for many years—a discussion of the political and economic subtext underlying…www.ecosophia.net
no, because those improvements (not just in Eastern Europe, but in many parts of the globe) were due to contingency, as a side effecy you could say. it's not any sort of dialectical necessity or progress
that's exactly the bigger point, that you see these contingencies (and predict their future developments), because you are looking at them from within your dialectical, hegelian framework, which, again, determins how you see them.
you claim to reject foundationalism and fixed categories, but you insist that ‘matter as motion’ is ‘undeniably correct’ and exactly that sort of category. if you truly reject foundationalism - matter-in motion can’t serve as your ground any more than "consciousness" could.
and on what independent grounds can you prove that matter-in-motion precedes consciousness, if any such proof already assumes its own conclusion?
and it also assumes that the way we find out something (epistemology, basically) justifies the ontological claim that matter comes first or how things REALLY ARE.
i mean, it's kind of pointless, because you will keep falling back into this contradiction, because it's a in-built glitch that no theory can prove its own axioms, it's own foundationas and its own fundamental distinctions (matter/consciousness); that is - step outside itself to observe itself.
problem is that you present this point of view a sort of ultimate vantage point from which you can see the order of things somehow OBJECTIVLEY, but you are just doing it from within certain framework which already determines how you perceive and what distinctions - more or less arbitrarily - you choose to apply. meaning, it can only be correct if it stays within its own framework.
What underlines this argument is simple self-referentiality or tautology - true communism hasn’t failed; it’s never been tried (except when it fails, which proves it wasn’t true communism); I think it's called No True Scotsman fallacy (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_true_Scotsman) which basically makes it unfalsifiable claim, therefore it's a claim of religious nature.
yes but the idea that history has no progress and just goes by contingency is also a foundational framework, it can't be proved in and of itself, without, again, going back to the thing-in-itself of Kant. so you then end up refuting yourself. you are essentially arguing that society can have a consciousness of itself via contingency, but also that to have a self-consciousness is teleology. You see how even you can't make the contradiction symmetrical?
Was this aimed at me or Zizek?
Contingency can be observed empirically, the changes of history, collapse and failure of communism, breakdowns of old systems and birth of new ones and so on; thing-in-itself is something that's outside empirical observations.
Martin Broszat wrote that: "He [Irving] is too eager to accept authenticity for objectivity, is overly hasty in interpreting superficial diagnoses and often seems insufficiently interested in complex historical interconnections and in structural problems that transcend the mere recording of historical facts, but are essential for their evaluation".
yes, but empirical observation provides no inherent ground for narritive. you just have a mass of data, you have to go back to the mutable human categories of thought to make sense of any of it. I know you want to have social sciences standing above all social relations as some kind of neutral arbiter, but this is make believe.
Even in bourgeois universities the first thing a historian learns is that history is *written* not compiled.
Someone like David Irving observed the empirical recording of contingency, and this still led him to write reprehensible and falsified history negating Hitler's responsibility for the holocaust, precisely because his narritives were motivated by certain political biases. History, like all things, is a battlefield.
or as even his wiki page says
contingency doesn' exclude the fact that systems are interconnected, that they influence each other or that they evolve and collide; it only means that their interactions and mutations follow no predetermined necessity. in short,, things could always have turned out otherwise.
you have completley the opposite view
yes, and your statement that 'things could have turned out otherwise' is a statement of causal determinism itself. The fact that they didn't means that systems do not follow random courses of action (which again, is an incoherent proposition.) to make evaluations of why x happened instead of y is to make a statement of determination.
The only way I can see you can uphold your view is the multiverse theory, which I am open to on principle — just like the existence of alien lifeforms (which i cannot and would not want to discount.) I would, however, take issue that these universes replicate the same timelines as us, I think that is an assumption that is overzealous.
Why do you think contingency excludes laws of causation? it's not randomness, that's a different concept entirely.
contingency doesn't exclude laws of causation, it's that all contingencies are causal and are the product of other contingent causes, and thus determined, in the broadest sense.
Hume tried to refute this by saying causality is just a mental abstraction with no real world referent, but then one has to deny the material world entirely, because our senses cannot provide accurate mental representations at all. Even Judith Butler must congregate for a dump of the faecal nature, and I can not propell myself to Brussels via flight after jumping outside of an open window in London. in spite of the idea that I have convinced myself that somehow my lack of wings is a sensory deception.
hume's skepticism was epistemological not ontological. he was talking about how we interfere causality from constant conjunction, not denying brute and well known facts about material reality.
For the contemporary liberal atheist, if God doesn't exist, nothing is permitted,
For you and tea religion is just bonkers ideas people have. Neither of you choose to ask how said bonkers ideas come about.
yes, for Hume it was epistemological, but conjunction is causation its broadest sense, even if it does not appear to us as being so. Coincidences are a case of incomplete knowledge (something I have never denied.) Hence why some philosophy departments in England will use Hume to justify the brain-in-a-vat theory, even if Hume's scepticism was ultimately directed against religious dogma.
It reminds me of something funny that Plekhanov recounts (I don't have the reference to hand but I think it's in the 5th chapter of Monist view of history) Hume once quipped at a dinner in France that he had not met a single atheist. and Holbach responds that there are some 16-17 seated at the table. Hume was mostly a religious indifferentist, and thus left his epigones to use his philosophy in different ways. Hence Kant uses it to justify a practical religion based on categorical imperative.
But incomplete knowledge (and as a rule all knowledge has to be incomplete) doesn't negate the ontology we construct to make sense of the material world. Otherwise we couldn't function in it.
Think about the difference between being and non-being. Now we can take a piece of chalk and say it exists. We can then destroy it and say now it does not exist. Very well. But does that mean we have justified existence or being-qua-being as such? no, because there is nothing to justify. the difference between being and non-being is ultimately nothing.
If you want to claim that I am a prisoner of my dialectical framework, then you must concede in good faith that you are a prisoner of language and cannot escape language, and absolute unmediated non-linguistic access to knowledge is not possible for you either. But then, you are also inside of a framework!