k-punk said:
Nothing at all. That was my point. The quote clearly has
nothing to do with psychoanalysis.
in other places, Adorno was quite happy to level the charge of
pacifying bourgeois subjects, rather than changing socialisation such
that repressive super-egos are no longer needed, at psychoanalysis
proper, e.g. Minima Moralia, Part I, around Note 40.
k-punk said:
You might be shocked, actually, at the number of
students I teach at college who have some supposed disorder or
other. I think much of what is called dyslexia is actually a kind of
post-lexia; many kids now have a nervous system which makes it nigh on
impossible for them to read - whether that is an individual pathology
or a pathology of capitalism itself is an interesting question.
I'm not at all shocked. I loose the ability to read when i'm not
interested, or my mind is somewhere else. Clearly, most students don't
really want to study, and what they study is usually not very
interesting to them. So it is no wonder that they are thinking of
something else -- more likely than not involving the hot girl/guy
sitting right in front of them.
k-punk said:
1. Concepts of clinical effectiveness involve all kinds of value-laden
assumptions,
I am extremely aware of this. But these issues don't only pertain to
PA critics of whatever strife, but also to defenders. In fact one of
the persisten criticisms of PA is precisely the lack of substantial
reflection on these issues. Gruenbaum is the most well-known exponent
of this line of attack. I think that G. is right in pointing out this
shortcoming, but his specific claim of methodology (he thinks PA
should follow physics) is inappropriate for a science like PA. Freuds
opinions on women, his lacking appreciation of the problem of
"therapeutic suggestion" and his -- how shall i put it, interest?
... in telepathy are telling in this regard.
k-punk said:
and PA is often attacked for its failings in these
areas by extremely powerful and wealthy vested interests.
That's too conspirational for my liking. For a start i'm neither
powerful nor wealthy. And criticisms are not invalidated by wealth and
power either. And, as i pointed out several times, most criticisms of
PA have been made by practising psychoanalysts (I had already pointed
to the famous columbia study). Another example is the preoedipal
post-natal child development. Freud made fairly clearcut statements
how this was supposed to happen (child passively following the
pleasure-principle, building up a representation of reality, in
particular of mother and father objects, through a mismatch between
the expectations generated from the pleasure principle and reality),
but the "babywatchers" have made quite a convincing case that this
ain't so. children are rather active from day one, in particular,
complicated mother/child interaction sequences happen right from the
start. I cannot see a "big pharma" interest or influence
in the details of post-natal development. To be sure, there may be
some undue influence, where specific medications are tested, but
without strong evidence beyond your say-so i'm not willing to dissmiss
all studies of therapeutic effectiveness tout court.
k-punk said:
Given the current prevalence of multinational-pushed
pharma-psychology,
There was a time when PA was the dominant approach to mental
health. The reason for it's declining popularity is lacking clinical
effectiveness. I would posit a different causal chain: the popularity
of certain pharmacological treatments for certain indications is
mostly due to it's greater effectiveness vis-a-vis talk based cures
like PA.
k-punk said:
and given that its SOLE CRITERIA for success is
clinical effectiveness, it strikes me that ITS effectiveness and
philosophical framework should be the more pressing priority atm.
issues:
Clinical success is important. And it strikes me that most social
contemporary social though has been inspired by and struggled with the
claims of PA in some form or another. Looking at the great social
thought of the later part of the 20th century (Parsons, Luhmann),
one sees this very clearly. [Incidentally, Parsons's daughter committed
suicide after being psychoanalysed in her training towards becoming a
psychoanalyst.]
k-punk said:
2. As John and others have argued, psychoanalysis has
other dimensions other than its therapeutic claims.
it was born and bread in the clinic. Freud and Lacan were practising
analysts, and -- at least for the former -- but i also think for
Lacan, that's where most of the insights came from. Let me ask you:
exactly on what grounds do you judge Lacan's theories to be
interesting? Divine inspiration?
Where I would agree is that most metal problems are cruicially and
intimatly intertwined with the sufferer's social environment and that
in order to understand and cure mental conditions, one needs to
understand first and formost 'normal' human development. Hence
psychology needs to look outside the clinic.
k-punk said:
3. There is a philosophical problem with the notion of assessing PA on
empirical grounds alone. PA is a metaphysical theory as well as a
clinical cure.
Yes, as I said, I am very much aware of this, but this predicament is
not one of PA alone. Any science has to face is, including Physics and
Maths, though for the latter that is not generally appreciated,
probably their truth-claims turn out to be (and this is an empirical
statement) much less problematic -- presumably because these sciences
have been so successful. Universal theories, like PA, that are
characterised by circularity, i.e. they appear "Re-enter" as objects
in their own theory, they investigate the causes and mechanisms for
their own truth-claims, are harder to verify -- if it makes sense to
use this term here -- than 'normal', small- or medium range theories.
For universal theories criteria like internal consistency, simplicity,
scope, range and so on become inportant. How a theory handles its own
"re-entry" is particularly relevant.
k-punk said:
For example, it would be manifestly absurd to ask Lacan
to empirically prove the validity of his concept of the Real.
Any theory has "theoretical terms" and postulates "theoretical
entities" that are not immediatly or at all verifyable. However, there
is a reason why we (or at least I) care about theories at all, namely
as problem solving tools. If a theory has no measurable consequences
(in a generalised sense), it is simply uninteresting. PA's measurable
consequences involve the clinical situation, and that's where it comes
from.
k-punk said:
(As absurd as it would be to ask Kant to give empirical
evidence for his concept of the noumenon).
Interestingly, some other theoretical concepts of Kant's like the
apriori structure of time and space, have become highly problematic due
to empirical investigations into the geometry of space-time.
the relationship between empirical data and theories is circular, not
linear in the sense that theories are first and organise empirical
data.