Russia Surrounded

[padraig (u.s.)]

a surprisingly poor performance by vimothy (perhaps illustrating the difficulty of expanding gnomic one-line utterances into actual positions)

we went through all this realpolitik biz fairly thoroughly last year shortly after the initial invasion

Nutshell: NATO obv made lots of sense during Cold War as counter to Warsaw Bloc. After Cold War ended, NATO gradually expanded east. Russian leadership always hated it - even Yeltsin blew up @ Clinton multiple times over it - but couldn't do much bc Russia was such a mess, and also they were bought off with electoral and economic support. Ukraine + Georgia were a kind of a red line that everyone tacitly agreed not to cross, then in 08 GW Bush unilaterally was like "let's make Ukraine + Georgia part of NATO". Russia now in better position, promptly invaded more or less to deter former Soviet republics from joining NATO. Then a decade plus of subversion, annexation, proxy warfare, etc in Ukraine, and here we are.

What I don't understand at all is actual invasion. Gradual annexation strategy was working out great, low risk solid reward. This is madness. All I can think is, from what I've read at least, Russia may not have the military industrial capacity to project force like this in 5-10 years, so go now if you're going to go, create new client state buffer w/West. And/or maybe Putin just losing it. Gonna drive all fence-sitters directly into arms of NATO/West ASAP, wreck Russian economy, etc.

Like, I'm certainly no apologist - Putin + his cronies are fucking terrible, Russia historically has always just another shitty empire, and this war is insane and awful - but the general drift shouldn't be surprising. Russian anger at this predates Putin. Don't put the boot into your defeated enemy like we did in the 90s unless you're willing to reap the consequences. It was hubris, like many (most?) elements of the Pax Americana and the end of history were, and hubris usually ends poorly - tho here, unfortunately, those who actually made the decisions are not the same people paying for them now.

Granted I'm just a random guy on the internet, but it really, really seems to me like Putin set out to rattle the old sabers in order to consolidate and perhaps advance proxy gains in the Donbas - makes sense, it's always worked in the past - was caught totally off-guard by the vehemence and unity of Western opposition, and just keeps doubling down instead of backing down and losing face. In a vacuum the invasion is totally crazy, in the context of Russian bitterness over NATO etc and domestic political consideration, it not quite as crazy - tho still, pretty crazy - but that escalation seems increasingly desperate and irrational, and tied more and more to Putin's individual objectives rather than yunno, Russia's.

if you go further back you can find me comparing current Russian objectives to objectives of prior Russian rulers

always more useful to view geopolitics thru realpolitik lens. regimes act in what they perceive to be their self-interest. those actions may/not be morally objectionable.

do think historical context is important here. Russian rulers have always been concerned w/access to year-round ports, Central Asia (Great Game etc), influence in E Europe, etc. add inherent paranoia of siloviki ruling class, post-Cold War tension lingering resentment over American/W European role in absolute mess of 90s Russia, to traditional Russian fears and losing my edge worries over diminished global role. easy to forget Putin was (still is to some extent? idk) v popular when he came to power, stabilizing things, restoring Russian pride killing many, many Chechens. I'm sure many Russians, even some opponents, appreciate him standing up to the West, if perhaps not the repressive state security apparatus, murdered journalists, corruption, etc. + obv no one should be surprised that a regime of ex-KGB guys is totally into disinformation and information warfare.

and so on

but just expounding on it in realpolitik terms 1) doesn't really say anything everyone doesn't already know 2) doesn't offer any solutions

 

[DannyL]

All I can think is, from what I've read at least, Russia may not have the military industrial capacity to project force like this in 5-10 years,

@padraig (u.s.) where did you come across this notion?

 

[padraig (u.s.)]

All I can think is, from what I've read at least, Russia may not have the military industrial capacity to project force like this in 5-10 years,

@padraig (u.s.) where did you come across this notion?

I don't remember exactly, some military analyst at the time or even shortly before the invasion I think

I want to say it was tied in with demographics (Russia's are bad, like most of Europe), economic dependence on fossil fuels, etc

I'm not saying it's true/not - I have no idea - but it would make sense as a motivating factor for what otherwise seems like an insane decision

 

[DannyL]

I don't remember exactly, some military analyst at the time or even shortly before the invasion I think

I want to say it was tied in with demographics (Russia's are bad, like most of Europe), economic dependence on fossil fuels, etc

I'm not saying it's true/not - I have no idea - but it would make sense as a motivating factor for what otherwise seems like an insane decision

It's a very interesting idea, not come across it before. I suspect the invasion partly came from Putin's belief that we wouldn't do anything, West is soft, no appetite for a fight etc. - which tbf, we've given him ample evidence for. That worked in tandem with not having an accurate assessment of the strength of his forces, not realising how hollowed out by corruption the army had become - a tough message to pass up the chain.

 

[padraig (u.s.)]

I suspect the invasion partly came from Putin's belief that we wouldn't do anything, West is soft, no appetite for a fight etc. - which tbf, we've given him ample evidence for.

yes, well

The West is treating this like a Munich moment, and idk if anyone really saw that coming

 

[padraig (u.s.)]

That worked in tandem with not having an accurate assessment of the strength of his forces, not realising how hollowed out by corruption the army had become - a tough message to pass up the chain.

and yes

Basically, Russia has transitioned from an autocratic but still "civilian-led" regime (there are still checks on the leader's power, even if they're not officially enshrined - think Erdogan) to a personal dictatorship (Stalin, Saddam, etc) which, no surprise, usually turn to be less rational, less predictable, as well as worse at war (bc dictator overrules generals). It turns out that "oligarchs" these days are not really what we think of, i.e. robber barons who amassed vast fortunes in the Wild West 90s - Putin has spent the last 20 years liquidating those guys as a class in order to consolidate his own power - but rather security officers running state companies whose wealth + power, unlike the original oligarchs, is dependent on Putin, and so they're much less likely to oppose him even with sanction.

 

[padraig (u.s.)]

it does seem absolutely fucking crazy to me say that Russia is winning, by any stretch or definition of "winning"

"not losing" I could see

gambling that if Russian leadership's resolve to fight outlasts Western leadership's resolve to supply Ukraine, they can still salvage a victory of sorts

idk it seems pretty clear that Ukraine alone can't inflict a catastrophic defeat on Russia, and the Russian state/military has, so far, amply demonstrated its inability to inflict a catastrophic defeat on Ukraine. and surely nothing would renew/harden Western support for Ukraine more than significant Russian advances.

so, barring some unforeseen event - the Putin regime collapsing, or who knows - the most likely outcome still seems like some kind of negotiation and terms, whether that's post-2014 status quo ante bellum, or whatever each side holds when the eventual armistice kicks in, or whatever. Russia would probably insist on a provision that Ukraine can't join NATO, but it's hard to see how they'd get it unless they can somehow get to a position of much greater strength.

by any standard the invasion looks like a disastrous miscalculation - hundreds of thousands of casualties and huge expenditure of material, Finland, Sweden, and likely Ukraine, driven into the arms of NATO, massive economic disruption, becoming an energy semi-colony of China, etc. in return for what? the declaration of puppet republics in Donetsk and Luhansk that no one besides Russia recognizes, and not much else.

 

[padraig (u.s.)]

gambling that if Russian leadership's resolve to fight outlasts Western leadership's resolve to supply Ukraine, they can still salvage a victory of sorts

and I assume that this the reason they're still fighting, as well an inability to abandon sunk costs for domestic political reasons

 

[padraig (u.s.)]

I think people often seriously underestimate the extent to which foreign policy decisions, and wars especially, are driven by domestic political concerns

that's actually one of the best strategies for a weaker or isolated power to divide (et impera) a stronger opponent, or coalition of opponents

by understanding the different aims of different elements of that coalition, and exploiting their differences as fracture points

the Russian leadership had been so good at that for the last ~15 years, which makes it all the more bizarre that they chose this clumsy frontal attack

which brings us back to things like underestimating both Ukraine and the West's resolve, and overestimating their own military strength

 

[DannyL]

Yeah, I agree with most of that, only I'd add we'll have to see how the spring offensive goes. I'd anticipate some kind of late summer crisis over Crimera as well if this is successful - big if there though. Crimera is the one area I could see the war ratching up, perhaps with a nuke or chemical attacks. it's the jewel in the crown of recent Russian foreign policy so to lose it is going to be hugely humiliating.

 

[DannyL]

I think people often seriously underestimate the extent to which foreign policy decisions, and wars especially, are driven by domestic political concerns

Yes on both counts.
I'd add pushback against being completely booted out the country which very feasibly could happen. I wonder about the tenacity of Russian forces if there's a significant break in their lines. But this might be wishful thinking on my part.

 

[thirdform]

I would argue that the richer picture helps us position ourselves. What do we want to align with? What kinds of choices are we making about how we support? If I read you right though, you're saying this is a kind of side issue compared to watching the play of the great powers.

hmmm, I struggle with this framing. It seems to assume that we have an impact on the way in which states legislate their backing for supporting this or that bloc.

Remember that it was only with the Syrian civil war that Russia became an ally to Syria, and even that Russia fell out with the anglo-American block. In Iraq, for instance, they were all allied, and assad himself hosted CIA black sights. So whilst the narritive about jihadists is disgusting, it is based on misdirection.

I think it is erroneous to see Russia as some kind of superpower in this regard. By doing that, people tend to miss the aspects of cooperation between the atlanticists and the so-called Eurasians. Russia is a major power within the Eurasian region, but outside of that, its global influence is scant. China has much more of a global impact. Which is why they are taking a purported position of neutrality in the Ukraine war. Superficial as it may be.

And, even then, people tend to overemphasise China's sleeping giant status. What should be worrying to atlanticists is that US hegemony in the pacific is crumbling. Japan is re-arming, something the American project after WW II tried to curtail by all means.

 

[padraig (u.s.)]

Yeah, I agree with most of that, only I'd add we'll have to see how the spring offensive goes. I'd anticipate some kind of late summer crisis over Crimera as well if this is successful - big if there though. Crimera is the one area I could see the war ratching up, perhaps with a nuke or chemical attacks. it's the jewel in the crown of recent Russian foreign policy so to lose it is going to be hugely humiliating.

we get into speculation here, but I have to think that just as Russian advances would harden Western resolve, serious enough Ukrainian advances would increase the likelihood of Western pressure on Ukraine to negotiate, specifically because of the potential for such a crisis. Obviously Zelensky et al are committed to kicking Russia all the way out, it depends how willing Ukraine's allies are to back that in the face of Russian threats, possibly complicated by the West having done sweet fuck-all over the initial annexation in the first place.

Nukes seem unlikely (but possible, always possible, as long as they exist) to me for several reasons but I wouldn't be surprised by chemical attacks, especially with the recent precedents set in Syria

 

[thirdform]

It's more useful to see America at present as a kind of binding agent which holds Zelensky's allies together in a precarious balance. Which indicates A) America's weakining status as hegemon and B) the irrelevance of Western Europe in global geopolitics.

 

[IdleRich]

not realising how hollowed out by corruption the army had become - a tough message to pass up the chain.

This is something I want to get a real handle on. How weak are Russia's forces, or more than that actually, something that ought to be easy - or seems it ought to be easy - to get an objective and accurate view of; how badly is the war going for Russia?

Cos the thing is that the general view from most people taking a casual view and just knowing what they see in the news (eg me) and also the view that Dan and Ollie seem to hold from reading the last few pages, is that Russia is performing disastrously, it may not be actually losing the war but it is far behind where it ought to be given the size of the country and its resources. However, both Vimothy and a friend of mine here in Portugal who holds a roughly similar outlook to Vim (ok with more conspiracy and a paranoid fear of China stirred into the mix) both say that this is not true. Or certainly that their underperformance has been hugely exaggerated.

So two questions, or maybe three I dunno

The first is, why is there a debate on this?

In general I feel that there has been a change in what is up for argument; once upon a time everyone looked at what had happened and then the left and the right argued about why it happened, what it means and what will happen next. Now it seems that when something happens there is a significant strand of the loony right who will just deny that it happened at all, and before you can talk about Biden's inauguration (say) you have to establish it happened, fighting through a host of claims about how it was actually Trump wearing a Biden mask or suchlike. But Vim and Aidan are not like that, this appears to be a situation where there is a genuine debate about where we are now - why is that?

And the second is, where are we now? Is Russia losing the war, or is this s minor delay which will ultimately be nothing more than a soon forgotten minor inconvenience on the way to Putin obtaining all his objectives exactly as planned?

I gotta say that I find the latter quite hard to accept. Surely Russia expected the "special military operation" to be over long before now, it has lost more troops and officers than planned, has had to recall up extra reserves etc And from what I'm hearing from inside Russia, life has become more miserable for your average Russian and they have needed to bring in loads of new laws allowing them to silence dissent in the most draconian way, making it possible to declare people enemies of the state for the most minor of transgressions.

I really don't know much about this, but what is the argument that Russia isn't fucking this up?

 

[IdleRich]

Ah you touched on that while I was writing it out

it does seem absolutely fucking crazy to me say that Russia is winning, by any stretch or definition of "winning"

"not losing" I could see

 

[padraig (u.s.)]

I think it is erroneous to see Russia as some kind of superpower in this regard. By doing that, people tend to miss the aspects of cooperation between the atlanticists and the so-called Eurasians. Russia is a major power within the Eurasian region, but outside of that, its global influence is scant. China has much more of a global impact. Which is why they are taking a purported position of neutrality in the Ukraine war. Superficial as it may be.

And, even then, people tend to overemphasise China's sleeping giant status. What should be worrying to atlanticists is that US hegemony in the pacific is crumbling. Japan is re-arming, something the American project after WW II tried to curtail by all means.

I agree with most of that. I would note that even with Russia's seriously diminished position post-USSR, Russian leadership has pursued the same traditional concerns - access to year round ports (Sevastopol), expansion, regional hegemony - as well as global influence via traditional means with modern technology - disinformation, cyberwarfare, etc, and that some of the disjointedness between its goals and the actions it takes to pursue those goals seem to have roots in a failure to admit it is no longer a superpower and/or a desire to return to/cling onto superpower status, again and as always viewed also thru the prism of domestic political concerns (can't admit any kind of decline in global status).

and while the post-WWII Pacific as quasi-American Mare Nostrum might be receding, one of the U.S.'s main strengths has always been its ability to make and hold onto allies - even the farcical Coalition of the Willing had a kind of symbolic value (or else why even bother). Japan rearming is good for American Pacific interests.

related note: that allies thing is the major reason, why Putin has consistently supported Le Pen, Salvini, Orban, etc as well as Trump. democracies tend to ally with democracies and dictatorships with dictatorships (in b4 someone mentions the U.S.'s long, long history of not only allying with dictators but overthrowing democratically elected govts to install friendly dictators: absolutely true, but our closest, strongest, and longest allies have - besides Saudia Arabia - all been democracies).

 

[padraig (u.s.)]

I really don't know much about this, but what is the argument that Russia isn't fucking this up?

there isn't one. it's basically "they haven't yet been unceremoniously booted out of the much smaller country they thought they could steamroll".

 

[IdleRich]

Or ok let me rephrase that - why do people I'd consider feel able to claim that. What are they basing it on? I consider it a claim of the kind that needs a strong argument to back it up.

I'm gonna ask Aidan why he says that, I've tended to try not to get into it with him but I guess I need an explanation.

 

[padraig (u.s.)]

I'm gonna ask Aidan why he says that, I've tended to try not to get into it with him but I guess I need an explanation.

please let us know if you get answer

because I would very interested in hearing an even remotely coherent argument for how Russia is "winning"

or even just not doing terribly compared to its initial goals

ask him how a bloody quagmire, huge expenditure for virtually no gain, and global embarrassment of its military is a Russian success in any sense