There are two distinct reasons for treating the study of subjective experience - how things appear to us, what that appearing feels like, what textures and adumbrations it has - as first philosophy. One is to make sure we aren’t mistaking appearances for reality - we have to know ourselves, as knowers, before we can really know what we can know, otherwise we will keep mistaking how things are for us for the way things really and necessarily are. So that motivation gives rise to a phenomenology which is about taking ourselves properly into account when thinking about how we think about the world. That’s what Edmund Husserl was up to - he wanted to provide a foundation for science, and his phenomenological investigations were intended as a long detour along the path to that goal.
The other motivation is just subjectivism: the texture if our own experience is all we can ever possibly know, so the only real philosophical task is to describe it as profoundly and variously as possible. This is what gets people’s backs up, as it turns all of philosophy into theoretically sophisticated navel-gazing.
The other motivation is just subjectivism: the texture if our own experience is all we can ever possibly know, so the only real philosophical task is to describe it as profoundly and variously as possible. This is what gets people’s backs up, as it turns all of philosophy into theoretically sophisticated navel-gazing.