vimothy
yurp
Sullivan is practically messianic.
Andrew Sullivan is very excited.
Sullivan is practically messianic.
So, who is willing to make some predictions?
I never know for certain if you're deadpanning it josef.
4) Can Khamenei back track? I doubt it.
7) The protesters are outgunned. They cannot take the State by force. It comes to force, the state will prevail, badly weakened.
8) How many people is the State willing to kill? Can they realistically crush this movement by force, with the State still surviving intact?
The regime wins if everyone goes home. All (he says!) the protesters need to do is keep protesting.
Assembly of Experts expresses strong support for Leader’s guidelines
TEHRAN -- In a statement issued on Saturday the Assembly of Experts expressed its “strong support” for the Supreme Leader’s statements on the presidential elections on Friday....
nah he can't, he really backed himself into a corner w/that speech yesterday. before that he had some freedom to maneuver but now any concessions are akin to admitting defeat (& weakness).
If this is true, then the protesters can only succeed by effecting a drastic curtailment of his power, if not his replacement. Which means that this is already an existential-constitutional crisis.
The Artesh regards the IRGC and particularly the Basij as untrained and low class and the IRGC sees the Artesh as elitist, hierarchical, and un-Islamic. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Artesh and the IRGC have developed more compatible working relationships that allow for complex, multi-service joint-training exercises. The IRGC has developed some units whose emphasis on professionalism is acceptable to the Artesh, and the Artesh has proven its loyalty and value to the Islamic Republic through its service during the Iran-Iraq War. Still, conflicts and rivalries remain
Feel-good pronouncements such as this cannot obscure the fact that Iran cannot move forward as a regional power until the state has full control over all the armed services. If the IRGC were only a special-operations directorate, that would be troubling enough. But their ambitions are much larger and a successful major power needs a strong, unified, fully professional military, not a bunch of cowboys looking for a rodeo.
Historically, every successful state has started with an inventive, energetic militia that eventually had to sublimated into a professional military. This process is incomplete in Iran and the persistence and success of the IRGC in siphoning funds and missions from the regular military is an indication of fundamental divisions and weaknesses in the central government.
Until the IRGC is dramatically reduced in size and the Regulars regain control over the reserves and the major combat elements, including missiles and aircraft, state consolidation in Iran will be more theoretical than real. There are Iranians who believe that the IRGC gives Iran indirect military and political options but, in truth, it only disperses state power and leaves the government vulnerable to arguments over tactics and strategy right at moments that they need to be focusing on their adversary. Iran needs to move beyond ad hoc revolutionary arrangements and become a cohesive state in order to achieve its goals and I believe the IRGC is standing in the way of that.